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Restorative Justice, Responsive
Regulation, and Democratic Governance
PAUL ADAMS

Guest Editor

Restorative justice has been a central tradition of justice in
most, perhaps all societies prior to the emergence of the modern,
central state power with its bureaucratic-professional systems
and its emphasis on retribution, deterrence, and, sometimes, rehabilitation. Its revival as a new social movement in modern
states offers a new paradigm for addressing the key questions
in social work and social welfare of the relation of formal to
informal systems of care and control, and of empowerment to
coercion. Restorative justice may be defined in terms of processone whereby all stakeholders come together to resolve how to
deal with the aftermath of an offense and its implications for
the future-or in terms of its core values-healing rather than
hurting, moral learning, community participation and caring, respectful dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, apology, and setting
things right or making amends.
The articles in this issue take as their starting point the recent path-breaking book by renowned Australian scholar John
Braithwaite (2002), Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation.
Braithwaite is Professor of Law at Australian National University
in Canberra and heads the Regulatory Institutions Network there.
He is a business regulatory scholar, sociologist, criminologist,
activist, and leading researcher on both restorative justice and
responsive regulation, as well as a scholar of democratic theory.
In Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, Braithwaite synthesizes recent research and conceptual analysis of restorative
justice and integrates them with his work on responsive regulation of business. Braithwaite not only demonstrates the superior
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
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effectiveness of restoring victims, offenders, and communities
compared with punitive practices of modern judicial systems;
he also shows how the experience of responsive regulation of
business-utilizing a regulatory pyramid to ensure complianceand restorative justice practices can enrich each other. In the form
of family group conferencing, restorative practices have already
had an important impact on child welfare and youth justice, both
in the United States and in many other countries. The integration of restorative justice and responsive regulation presented
by Braithwaite offers an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of this new paradigm and, indeed, achieve greater
clarity about the very nature of social work and social welfare.
These articles consider the relation of restorative justice to
responsive regulation-or more generally, to democratic governance-by examining areas where restorative justice and family
group or community conferencing have had most influence in
social welfare-child protection, domestic violence, and youth
justice. Restorative and regulatory justice has much wider application, to areas as various as school bullying, international
peacemaking, nursing home or nuclear power plant regulation,
and radical reform of the whole legal system, and Braithwaite
has studied all of them. The aim of this issue is more modestto focus the attention of scholars and practitioners working at
the interface of sociology and social welfare on the importance
for this field of Braithwaite's synthesis of restorative justice and
responsive regulation.
Each of the authors writes out of a conviction of the importance for social work of the theory and research reviewed and developed by Braithwaite, but there is also caution about the infancy
of research in this field and the need to avoid grandiose claims. At
the same time, a sense of the broad significance of this synthesis
of restorative justice and responsive regulation for social welfare
policy, for building a richly participative civil society, and for
democratic governance pervades many of the contributions.
The first essay, by Burford and Adams, while not an introduction to each of the other articles, offers a context for reading both
them and Braithwaite's work as contributions to the literature
of social work and social welfare. The final article is an invited
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response by Braithwaite to this special issue. It takes up, highlights, and clarifies many of the issue's themes.
As guest editor, I would like to thank Gale Burford for inspiring me to take on and persevere with this project, and Susan Chandler and Kalei Kanuha for their participation in the manuscript
review process. Above all, I would like to thank John Braithwaite
for his international leadership, as scholar and activist, in the
effort to build more just and democratic societies throughout
the world, and for graciously agreeing to read and respond to
the articles included here.

Restorative Justice, Responsive
Regulation and Social Work
GALE BURFORD

University of Vermont
PAUL ADAMS

University of Hawaii at Manoa

Two of the dichotomies or tensions at the heart of this profession are
especially important for the themes of this special issue on restorative
justice and responsive regulation. These are the relation between formal
and informal helping and between care and control, or empowerment and
coercion. In this article,we make a casefor the importanceof Braithwaite's
work, especially his (2002) book, Restorative Justice and Responsive
Regulation, for conceptualizing the nature of social work in relation to
these dualities. Since Braithwaite's writings do not have social work or
social welfare scholars and professionalsas their primaryaudience and are
less familiar to much of that audience than they should be, we seek here to
provide a context for readingboth Braithwaiteand this issue of the Journal
of Sociology and Social Welfare.
Key words: restorativejustice, responsive regulation,social work, child
welfare, family violence
Reflecting on the essence of social work brings its duality as a
profession concerned with both individual and community wellbeing sharply into focus (Albers, 2001; Weick, 2001). Two of the
dichotomies or tensions at the heart of this profession are especially important for the themes of this special issue on restorative
justice and responsive regulation. These are the relation between
formal and informal helping and between care and control, or
empowerment and coercion. In this article, we make a case for
the importance of Braithwaite's work, especially his (2002) book,
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
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Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, for conceptualizing
the nature of social work in relation to these dualities. Since
Braithwaite's writings do not have social work or social welfare
scholars and professionals as their primary audience and are less
familiar to that audience than they should be, we seek here to
provide a context for reading both Braithwaite and this issue of
the Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare.
Social Work as Social Control
When sociologists and historians look at social work, they
tend to see a profession the essence of which is social control. For
them the language of therapy, helping, or even empowerment
disguises a coercive core (e.g., Funiciello, 1993; Gordon, 1994;
Margolin, 1997; Polsky, 1991; Tice, 1998). Some recent literature
of the profession, on the other hand, has challenged the methodology of those researchers who rely on case records as evidence
of what social workers actually do in the field (Floersch, 2002;
Wakefield, 1998). Simon (1994) has emphasized empowerment in
the history as well as recent theory and practice of social work.
For those, including the present authors, who embrace empowerment as central to good practice, there remains, however, the
challenge of reconciling these self-images of empowerment with
the undeniable reality that social workers function as agents of
social control, usually paid directly or indirectly by the state to
do so. This is nowhere more evident than in the fields of child
welfare and corrections. In child protection in particular, where
social workers are the core profession, are backed by the power
of the state, and have enormous power over their clients, the
language of empowerment, partnership, and strengths characterizes innovative practices like family group conferences and patch
(Adams, 2000). But can such practices be truly empowering in the
bureaucratic, professional, and legal context of state or county
child welfare agencies and family courts or even in corrections
(Boyes-Watson, 1999)? Braithwaite's synthesis of his work in the
areas of restorative justice and responsive regulation, developed
in his recent book of that title, challenges us to reconceptualize
the relation between two apparently irreconcilable yet irreducible
aspects of social work-care and control, or empowerment and
coercion.

RestorativeJustice
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Formal and Informal Helping

Social work, like the whole field of social welfare policy and
services, has similar difficulties in specifying the optimal relation
between formal and informal helping. In their 1977 monograph,
To Empower People, Berger and Neuhaus argue for shifting the
stale social policy argument about the proper role of states and
markets away from a view of the state as provider, the citizen
as atomized recipient, to a focus on the structures that mediate
between state and individual, including family, religious community and faith-based organizations, neighbors and neighborhood
organizations, and the like. Other recent literature on civil society and social capital (Putnam, 2000), rebuilding neighborhoods
and communities (Schorr, 1998), and partnerships with families
(Briar-Lawson, Lawson, & Hennon, 2001; Burford & Hudson,
2000) has also emphasized the importance of non-governmental
organizations, social networks, trust and civic engagement for
healthy families, communities and democratic societies. In social
work, these influences have combined with a wider appreciation
of the incapacity of state institutions, including police as well as
social workers, to substitute for the care and control of families
and communities. A creative ferment of community-based and
family-centered practices has sought ways to interweave formal
and informal care and control (Adams, 2002; Adams & Nelson,
1995; Bayley, Seyd, & Tennant, 1989). As Hadley et al. (1987)
put it, formal human services represent "no more than a single
strand in the complex web of relationships and services, formal
and informal, statutory and nonstatutory, which together provide
care and control in the community. The overall effectiveness of
provision depends not on one part of this network alone but on
how well the whole is woven together" (p. 95).
But what is the relation of formal to informal? On whose
terms does the interweaving take place? Worries have been raised
about the assumptions behind the notion of community (Pavlich,
2001) and about community-centered practice that there is a colonial character to this relation of middle class professional social
workers to poor and working-class neighborhoods, a context of
class, if not ethnic, subordination in the nature of the partnership
of professionals and citizens (Bulmer, 1987). In FGC, among the
worries and criticisms are those that it has a colonial character,
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appropriating indigenous practices and placing them under state
and professional control (Blagg, 1997; Love, 2000; Walker, 1996);
that, on the contrary, it abdicates state responsibility for vulnerable individuals by handing control to the oppressive or pathological families that gave rise to the problems of child maltreatment in
the first place (Bartholet, 1999); and that it denigrates professional
expertise. Braithwaite, again, gives us a way to think about and
address these issues.
Braithwaite's (2002) book Restorative Justice and Responsive
Regulation is of great importance to social work and social welfare
because it offers us a way to reconcile empowerment practice with
the context of coercion in which much social work takes place.
It offers an understanding of both the limits and the possibilities of a genuine, empowering partnership with service users or
clients. The book appears at an important stage in the continued
devolution of human services. Both the book and the devolution
trend have considerable implication for social work and social
work education. There is renewed interest in strengthening civil
society and considerable belief that the best way to help vulnerable people is to empower them. At the same time lingering and
polarizing debates challenge professional efforts to build on the
capacities of families and communities. Especially in child protection, domestic violence, and corrections services, assumptions
about the application of restorative justice and other communityand family-centered empowerment practices raise concerns that
devolution necessarily means risky deregulation and giving the
upper hand to the wrong people.
Restorative Justice
Restorative justice has emerged with considerable appeal
worldwide to those who well know the limitations of over-reliance
on the formal legal system to deal with injustice, especially crime,
and its fallout. Advocates argue that efforts to restore the social
functioning of victims, offenders, and others in the affected social
networks, is at least as effective in terms of recidivism and costs,
but of considerably greater value than punitive practices when it
comes to promoting citizenship and community-capacity building. In the long run, it is argued, restorative justice has the capacity
to transform the role of the legal system in preventing crime and
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strengthening the response of those at the community level who
first encounter it when it does happen (Braithwaite, 2002).
A broad definition of restorative justice is found in Strang
and Braithwaite (2002): "Stakeholders affected by an injustice
have an opportunity to communicate about the consequences of
the injustice and what is to be done to right the wrong" (p. 4).
The authors note that most advocates seem to believe that for
the potential of restorative justice to be realized, some face-to-face
processes are needed but point out that there is less agreement
about the who, what, when, how, and where of those interactions.
They further argue that safety and autonomy must trump other
outcomes, including reconciliation.
Tugged as it is in different and perhaps competing directions, restorative justice is shaped by the interests of a range
of state and non-government groups, professions, theories, and
ideologies. Roche (2003a) argues that practices and theories that
rely too heavily on a critique of the limitations of the formal
legal system have tended to over-romanticize the mutual aid
and communitarian support of neighbors and family members
in pre-modern years by leaving out chapters of history in which
oppressive forces ruled. Along with Braithwaite, Roche argues
that regulatory strategies need to be reconsidered to ensure that
empowerment approaches are accountable. Too, feminist critique
points out that communities and families did not reliably step
forward to protect women and children and that people do not
want to be coerced into forgiving their abusers, even in circumstances where this may be advanced as an acceptable "cultural
practice" (Burford, 2000; Busch, 2002; Coker, 1999). To the extent
that a restorative justice practice or practitioner sets into procedure expectations of shaming the abuser, requiring an apology
or some other outcome, the risk of colonizing the process and
the outcomes with formalism are increased. Braithwaite (2002)
agrees and argues that in informal justice processes, apology
and forgiveness often emerge in face-to-face meetings but should
not be deliberately produced. The important question becomes
how is it possible to balance empowering and regulatory processes in a decision-making effort that safeguards the rights of
the individuals, especially to safety, and allows for solutions to
emerge from the affected parties themselves?

12
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Responsive Regulation
To ameliorate the dangers associated with restorative justice,
and a wide variety of other empowerment-driven phenomena,
Braithwaite (2002) proposes a regulatory pyramid as "a framework for checking the abuses and limitations" (p. vii) of the use
of restorative justice while simultaneously counterbalancing the
formalized means of achieving justice (punishment proportional
to the offense). A basic premise of the regulatory framework is that
"Governments should be responsive to the conduct of those they
seek to regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist
response is needed" (p. 29). Braithwaite (2000) offers the following
(see figure 1), from Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) Responsive
Regulation: Transcending the DeregulationDebate as an example of
a regulatory pyramid in the context of regulating a business such
as a nursing home or nuclear power station.
The application of this pyramid to restorative justice, especially in the context of child protection, domestic violence, and
youth justice, is illustrated and discussed throughout this issue
(see Adams & Chandler; Crampton; Kelly; Neff; and Pennell, in
this issue). In all these cases, restorative justice practices form
the base of the pyramid, with increasingly coercive, deterrent,
or incapacitating regulatory actions higher up as later and more
seldom used regulatory responses follow failure of restorative
approaches at the base. Braithwaite (2002) has shown that this
approach has a wide array of applications, from corrections to
school bullying to international peacemaking. Its application in
some areas of social work and social welfare in which restorative
justice has made some headway is the subject of this issue. At
the same time, the issue raises, implicitly at least, the question of
its significance and applicability to all areas of social work and
social welfare, at least where some kind of regulatory mandate is
involved. Roche (2003b) argues persuasively that "the very hallmarks of restorative justice-informal stakeholder deliberation,
a focus on harm reparation and offender reintegration-should
be the presumptive regulatory strategy in all regulatory fields."
Braithwaite's (2002) regulatory pyramid combines the possibilities of restorative, dialogue-based, empowering approaches at
the base of the pyramid where regulation starts, with ineluctable

Restorative Justice

Persuasion

Figure 1
An example of a Regulatory Pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992;
Braithwaite,2002).

escalation up the pyramid to more coercive, deterrent, and ultimately incapacitating (e.g., license revocation in the case of business regulation) responses if the regulated body proves unwilling
or unable to put things right. No less important, the pyramid
offers the hope and possibility of de-escalation down the pyramid
to less coercive responses as those regulated show evidence of
their will and capacity to come into compliance.
Braithwaite (2002) asserts that the preponderance of evidence
supports the notion that if people who are willing to acknowledge
the existence of a problem come together and offer suggestions
about what needs to be done about it, and participate in shaping
the plan, they are then considerably more likely to comply with
that plan, even when its design is to regulate their own behavior.

14

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

While restorative justice moves in the direction of setting things
right with those who have been injured directly and to restore
the impact that an injustice has had on the wider community,
carrying it out within a responsive regulatory framework makes
visible the multiple accountabilities that typically go unrecognized in instances of injustice but which are thought to be vitally
important in organizing to keep bad behavior from happening
again and setting out a plan for concrete repair when that is
possible or symbolic reparation and healing. The power of the
state, Braithwaite (2002) argues, must loom, not as a brickbat but
as a firm hand that gives legitimacy to the values being expressed
in the informal processes.
Some restorative justice advocates, including Braithwaite,
claim that conferencing creates space in matters of settling injustice for "emotional intelligence". (See also Moore, this issue.)
This does not mean that it is neutral. Braithwaite argues
that a responsive regulatory approach must begin with a clear
statement of values and principles and need not be laissez faire.
Being clear with an offender that her behavior is unacceptable
needs to be done in a respectful way in a responsive regulatory
approach. Especially the emissaries of the state need to avoid
going head-to-head with any of the persons who will be part of
a regulatory plan.
Empowerment approaches necessarily focus on the mediating structures through which formal and informal helping systems can complement and balance one another. Berger & Neuhaus
(1977) define as mediating structures those institutions "that
stand between the private world of individuals and the large
impersonal structures of modern society ...[and protect] the
individual from alienation while giving legitimacy to large institutions, including the state, as being related to values that
govern the lives of ordinary people" (p. 148). Braithwaite and
Strang (2002) include in civil society all those institutions that
are intermediate between the individual and the state-families,
schools, churches, private workplaces, indigenous organizations,
social movements, etc.
While Braithwaite acknowledges that responsible devolution
of services depends on the evolution of cooperation among agencies, he is also concerned that policies are at risk of what he calls
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'capture and corruption'. To offset these processes, he argues for
the use of tripartite arrangements involving empowering citizen
associations as a solution to these dilemmas. In his view, the regulatory model calls for empowering citizen associations that foster
"welfare-enhancing" capture through leadership without forfeiting the agency's role in enforcing the rights of those involved. In
this way the model works to facilitate the attainment of the goals
mutually specified but counterbalances both the corruption of
process by informal dominance and the harmful capture by any
of the parties. The model promotes democracy and a wider civic
engagement and certain forms of capture, or influence, that are
considered beneficial.
By contrast to responsive regulation, regulatory formalism is
reactive, and directed at extracting compliance divorced from the
influence of the persons harmed. The outcomes of adversarial
interventions are typically seen as heavy-handed, uninformed
and unfair and thereby promote reactivity even from people
whose interests may be harmed by their own refusal to comply.
Responsive regulation grows out of a relationship between the
people who are being regulated through the state's exercise of
its simultaneous duties to protect and to safeguard and citizens'
rights both to privacy and protection. Its presumption is to start
with the most dialogue-based approach that can be crafted for
securing compliance with the law in situations where there has
been harm or trauma and aims to support compliance in a context built on the paramountcy of protection from further harm,
healing, and repair or restoration. Hence, restorative justice advocates' preference for conferencing and related face-to-face group
and family approaches to dealing with injustice. Escalation to
control or punishment is made only if other approaches fail or
there is no indication of willingness or ability to comply on the
part of the person who has caused the injury. Despite expressing
preferred values, neither restorative justice nor responsive regulation seek to establish who is to blame. People participate only
if they acknowledge the existence of a problem-or if that has
been established by the courts. In New Zealand, for example, a
young offender might go to court but in the case of conviction
the matter may be referred back to a conference at which the
offender's family, the victim and their supporters and the offender
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are offered input into shaping a restorative plan as opposed to one
that is exclusively punitive.
The pyramid offers a useful framework to re-examine stalemated discussions of such tensions as those between coercion
and empowerment, formal and informal helping, responsiveness
and formalism, public and private, individual autonomy and
community well-being. Its implications are profoundly radical.
It has the potential, in Braithwaite's (2002) view, to "contribute
not only to the creation of a more crime-free society but also to
a society where our whole legal system works more efficiently
and fairly, to a society where we do better at developing the
human and social capital of our young and to a more peaceful
world" (p. xi).
Restorative justice involves the opportunity for everyone involved in the situation to have an unfettered but safeguarded
opportunity to tell their story of what happened, to say what
the effect has been on them, and to say what they want to see
happen (Moore & McDonald, 2000). The plan that emanates by
consensus forms the basis for regulation. This allows the offender
to exercise a degree of choice about coming into compliance, and
sets the needs of the injured persons, as defined by them, in the
foreground of regulation. It also assumes that unless permanent
banishment of the offender and all influence from significant
members of the offender's close social network is to occur, or
if it is unsafe to meet with them present, that the offender will be
involved or represented.
If things go according to plan, further formalism is seen as
unnecessary but is always available and possible. In situations
where the regulator has a legal mandate to be involved there is
no assumption that the monitoring should be done on neutral or
impartial grounds. In situations that have involved violence, the
opposite is the case; judgments need to be made.
As Braithwaite (2002) points out, few offenders would participate in restorative justice without some coercion, brought on by
at least detection and/or disclosure. The problem for Braithwaite
"seems not the question of how to avoid coercion, but how to
avoid the escalation of coercion and how to avoid threats" (p. 34).
Threats and counter-threats are steps to juried and other thirdparty resolutions in situations where the guilt is in dispute. In
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these approaches, prosecution and defense are impelled to harden
up the differences between their views in order to establish guilt
or innocence; a dance in which both sides seek to maximize
the problem for the others and minimize the responsibility for
themselves. Seeking to understand the others' arguments and
positions has only one aim: to find the flaws, i.e., not to promote
empathy.
When there is no threat of consequence, however, backed up
by certainty and immediacy when it becomes necessary, offenders, and in particular it would seem, young offenders, will, and
frequently do, walk over the top of limits. But offenders, it is
argued, are more likely to take responsibility when their conduct
and its impact are reviewed in a non-adversarial context in the
presence of people whose opinion matters and there are consequences for not subordinating one's self-interest to the interest of
the group.
In the sense that offenders have the option of non-participation and of taking their chances before a court, or of refusing
cooperation at the lower, less coercive levels of the pyramid, the
process is voluntary. At any point, things can move up the pyramid into a new level of deliberation and coercion. Braithwaite's
(2002) research supports the view that this process is a more
active and effective form of deterrence to criminal behavior than
is sentencing in courts itself. The attempt to "send a message"
through tough and inflexible sentencing, without also offering
the person the invitation to take responsibility, has the same
effect as punishment alone; that is, it does not work unless it
is applied quickly and is perceived by at least the offender if not
others in the offender's social network, as being fair. Neither of
these conditions characterizes the workings of the justice system,
especially the courts.
Braithwaite (2002) builds a convincing case that responsive
regulation at the level of citizen involvement is worth using,
repeatedly, both for its potential to empower those who have been
injured and also to deter the offenders from further harm. In the
case of offenders, restorative justice invites persons from the offender's social network who might be able to exert social influence
or-in Braithwaite's (2002) term-who have preventive capabilities. In particular, he points to people who themselves might be
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ashamed if others found out they knew about the injustice and
did nothing about it, i.e., people who might be sub-criminally
responsible. In restorative justice, these people would typically
be invited to a face-to-face meeting with the offender with a view
toward their becoming involved in forming a plan to head off
further offending which then provides the basis of regulation. In
this way, restorative justice or conferencing is thought actually to
increase the deterrent power of the threat of arrest or re-arrest.
The challenge is to keep the threat in the background but seen
at the same time as legitimate and fair. The role of the state is to
constrain the self-regulatory excesses of the community (e.g., in
the form of harsher punishment than courts would impose) and
safeguard the process.
The Fault Lines Between Public and Private Life
Trends to increasing state intervention in family life, as represented by mandatory reporting of child abuse or mandatory
arrest and prosecution of intimate partner abusers, have been
challenged in recent years by concerns over limits to the state's
capacity either to deliver justice or to substitute for the care and
control functions of social networks including extended families
and communities.
In the case of abuse within the family, while abused persons
do not want to be put in a position where they must forgive their
abusers or be pressured to stay with them, neither do they like
feeling coerced to separate from their partners when other people
think that is the best thing for them, and while women generally
welcome the involvement of police and legal authorities when
they feel they need protection (Martin, 1997; Miller & Krull, 1997),
they also do not like to suffer the considerable loss of influence
that can go with exercising their rights to invoke protection and
help from the authorities (Coker, 1999; Grauwiler & Mills, this
issue; Kelly, this issue; Pence, 1999; Pence & Shepard, 1999; Pennell & Burford, 2002). The interventions of authorities into the
lives of women to protect them (Miller & Krull, 1997) and their
children (Callahan, 1993; Pennell & Burford, 2000) have had varying and sometimes contradictory results. In part, as will be discussed elsewhere in this issue, that is invariably a consequence of
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getting help in situations where the state is vowed to protect. The
question becomes under what conditions can decision-strategies
work cooperatively both to promote a woman's, child's or young
person's rights to autonomy and non-domination [as befits their
legal status] and the family's right to privacy?
In restorative justice, the family group conference brings together extended family members with professionals and others
involved in the situation who can provide information to assist
the family in developing a plan to keep all its members safe. It
opens up a space where members who want to support vulnerable
members can talk in safety and build connections across branches
of the family and across generations in a context of safeguards
for the process, and protection from abuse (Burford & Pennell,
1997; Pennell & Burford; 2002). By partnering with the state at
the level of culturally appropriate leadership, the private space
of the family is honored and the role of the state to protect and
safeguard is undiminished.
From the perspective of responsive regulation, the family
group conference may be understood as a form of state-managed
family self-regulation, akin to the opportunities provided by
business regulators for management to come into compliance
through developing and implementing their own plans in consultation with the regulators. Only if this process of supported
self-regulation fails, does the regulatory process become more
coercive, as families lose to professionals and courts more of their
own control over decision-making about their futures (see in this
issue Adams & Chandler; Neff).
Restorative Justice, Responsive Regulation, and Social Work
If social work is the core profession in child welfare, in corrections it has been marginalized. Whether social work abandoned
the field of corrections (Young & LoMonaco, 2001) or was exiled,
the outcomes need reconciling, not only for the sake of those
caught up in that system, but also in terms of our understanding
of the nature of social work itself. To be sure, victims were often
ignored in the era of rehabilitation in corrections and considerable
antipathy was aimed at social work educators who were seen to
have undermined the role of the state in protecting vulnerable
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people in favor of promoting either social activism or isolation in
clinical encounters.
These worries about social work may be seen as having arisen
in part through the profession's inadequate theorizing and state of
denial about the context of coercion framing much of its practice.
In discussing the limitations of critical social theory's application
to statutory social work, Healy (2000) argues the need for social
workers to "situate their theorizing within the unavoidable obligation faced by statutory workers to use legal force if necessary to
ensure minimum standards of well-being for the most vulnerable
members" (p. 75). She goes on to argue that "Practice insights
can be drawn from critical social theory to recognize the impact
of social and economic systems on service users' lives and to
demand sensitivity to the cultural differences in the formation
of assessments. However, this is very different to suggesting, as
critical social work theorists have done, that judgments should
not be made" (p. 75). Some social activists, Healy points out,
in advocating for the liberation of their clients, have minimized
the differences in power between themselves and their clients
and this has contributed to "exploitation and confusion for service users about the nature of their relationship with the service
worker" (p. 126). Workers can promote the values of respect,
transparency, honesty and non-tyranny without abdicating their
statutory responsibilities and desire to assure safety.
Although highly valued in the academic community, empowerment practice in social work remains largely at the margins of
practice and has met mixed results with the most concern about
the ideas of consumer-led or driven services remaining in statutory areas of practice (Burford & Pennell, 2004). The prevailing
response during the past 25 years is concerned with the legalistic determination of guilt or innocence and the management
of risk all carrying the taint of "undeserving" that lingers when
one is constituted a "neglectful mother", an "abusing father", a
"perpetrator" and other categories. In particular, the dominance
of practice by legal and administrative procedures and oversight
is regarded by many as having isolated child protection work
from the wider system of services regarded as making up the
child welfare system (Davies et al, 2002; Parton, 1997; Parton,
Thorpe, & Wattam, 1997). Rightly or wrongly, dissatisfaction with
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the increased formalism in child protective services is high and
child protection workers and departments find themselves in the
position of lacking the resources and decision processes to engage their clients flexibly and with support while simultaneously
fulfilling their mandated responsibilities to look out for the best
interests of the child. The imposition of legalistic, administrative,
and expert-dominated solutions in child protection undermines
empowerment principles and practice.
At the same time, social workers often seek to partner with
members of affected constituencies, including service user or citizen interest groups, in assessing needs, designing, implementing
and evaluating plans. This latter activity includes overseeing
progress, including compliance with plans when services are
mandated. The social worker plays a key role in creating a culture
of participation and activism in planning so that plans reflect the
real needs of persons affected and participants are prepared to
carry out important roles in achieving the plan including taking
initiative when things are not going well.
Social work and social workers have long been concerned
with finding ways to make bureaucracies, policies, and procedures responsive to the simultaneous promotion of the autonomy
of individuals and the well-being of communities. Staking out this
dual focus for the profession has meant that workers have considerable experience working along the fault lines between what formal organizations require through their policies and procedures,
including the ways they organize the use of workers' time and
allocated resources, and the needs of the people they work with.
Social workers well know the dilemmas for families of trying to
maintain control over the definition of their situation, especially
when faced with multiple, categorical, and frequently conflicting
avenues to get the help they need. Despite social work's historical embracing of the notion that human behavior is largely
determined by meaning-making in social context, practices have
followed quite different paths determined largely by the organizational and ideological umbrella under which practice takes
place and the multiple demands made on families that require
services from-or are required to be involved with-more than
one institution or organization. This is especially true in situations
where the justice system has become involved.
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Nevertheless, the idea that an acknowledged offender, including someone who has abused a child, or their partner, might be a
key player to be enlisted, along with other members of the formal
and informal social influence network around them in developing, implementing, and evaluating a plan that aims to halt their
own future re-offending causes some advocates of empowerment
to take pause. Social workers themselves, even in a state like
Hawaii that has a statewide system of family group conferencing
with official support, may by professional ideology and habit, be
an obstacle to restorative justice practices (see Adams & Chandler,
this issue).
If sociological critics of social work one-sidedly emphasize
the social control aspects of social work, social workers and social
work educators may mislead themselves by equally one-sidedly
stressing, at least in their rhetoric, the profession's empowermentoriented side, and denying its coercive aspects. Braithwaite
provides us a way to understand the central dualities of the
profession, not only as a theoretical matter, but also in light of
those practices like conferencing where responsive regulation
and restorative justice, formal and informal problem-, conflict-,
and injustice-resolving mechanisms, support and constrain each
other.
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Working Together to Stop Domestic Violence:
State-Community Partnerships and the
Changing Meaning of Public and Private
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The increasingreliancein the United States on state-community partnerships to address social problems represents both new opportunities and
new dangers.This articlepresents examples of both possibilitiesthrough a
consideration of contemporarycollaborationsbetween state and nonstate
actors in the development of a public response to domestic violence. This
discussionprovides the basisfor an elaborationof a conceptualapproach to
public/privaterelationshipsthat replaces the traditionaldichotomy with a
triangularrelationship,of state,family and community. By improving on
our ability to think through the complex relationshipsbetween these three
spheres, it is argued that this model that can assistthose who are committed
to pursuing the positive potential of community-state partnershipswhile
avoiding theirdangers.John Braithwaite'stheory of responsive regulation,
and the regulatory pyramid that structures its operation, is discussed in
terms of its ability to provide additional insights into the relationship
between formal and informal responses to social problems.
Key words: domestic violence, community state-partnerships,responsive
regulation,social problems, collaboration,battered women

Introduction
The trend in recent years, toward more frequent and varied
collaborations between state and nonstate actors in the development of public responses to a range of social problems has become
difficult to ignore (Minow, 2002; Cohen, 2002). The increased
interest in exploring the potential of state-community partnerships correlates with the intensification of the challenges posed
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number I
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by highly complex social problems that require multifaceted solutions characterized by a high degree of innovation and flexibility. When viewed from this optimistic angle, the growth of
public/private collaborations represents a multitude of exciting
opportunities for improving our collective capacity to meet the
needs of individuals who are caught in cycles of violence, poverty,
addiction, and so on. Even so, as both critics and supporters of
the trend point out, it is vitally important to be aware of the many
dangers inherent in even the most successful collaborations.
My goal here is to contribute to current debates about how best
to avoid the potential pitfalls of state-community partnerships
while maximizing the achievement of their potential benefits.
My ongoing interest in this subject arises from my belief that
the trend is here to stay; indeed, it has so transformed the regulatory landscape that new conceptual frameworks are needed
to assist with the important task of evaluating its impact. With
these things in mind, in what follows, I consider the perils and
the promise of combining state and community-based responses
to social problems through an examination of contemporary efforts by the battered-women's movement to address domestic
violence in the United States. This discussion provides the basis for the elaboration of a conceptual framework that, I argue,
can significantly enhance our ability to realize the promises of
community-state partnerships while minimizing their dangers.
This discussion is followed by a consideration of the ways in
which John Braithwaite's theory of responsive regulation further
enhances our ability to assess the implications of state-community
partnerships. Although the focus is on domestic violence, I believe that the frameworks (developed by both Braithwaite and
myself) and the insights that they make possible can be usefully
applied in the wide variety of contexts in which state-community
partnerships have become common.
A Short History of the Battered-Women's Movement
The battered-women's movement is a particularly apt exemplar of state-community partnerships because of its longstanding commitment to the simultaneous development of both a
community-based and a state-sponsored response to domestic violence. During the early 1970s, movement activists began calling

Working Together to Stop Domestic Violence

29

attention to the prevalence of violence being perpetrated against
women by men with whom they are intimate. The articulation
of the problem was quickly translated into political demands
that the state begin treating such violence as a serious crime
rather than as a personal matter between partners. Legal reforms
followed, and by the 1980s domestic violence was illegal in every
state. Police departments nationwide began implementing new
arrest procedures designed to ensure that violence by one adult
against another, regardless of their relationship, would be treated
seriously (Edwards, 1989).
At the same time that movement activists were pushing for
the enactment of new legal measures, they were also working to
develop a grass-roots community-based approach to providing
direct services to victims of domestic violence. In 1979, the first
domestic violence shelter in the United States was opened in an
apartment in St. Paul, Minnesota, staffed entirely by volunteers
(Schechter, 1982). Today more than 2,000 shelters and crisis centers
dot the North American landscape. Some are funded through private donations and staffed by volunteers but most are sustained
by a combination of public and private monies and are run by a
mix of professional and nonprofessional, paid and unpaid staffs
(Schneider, 2000, pp. 182-184). Thus we see that contemporary
efforts to address domestic violence are characterized by a pattern
of service provision and problem definition that from the outset
has involved a reliance on state and community measures.
The dual focus on the development of both state-based and
community-based responses to domestic violence has grown
stronger as movement activists have become increasingly aware
of the limits of legal interventions and of the need to work harder
at changing cultural attitudes about the acceptability of this type
of violence (Kelly,2003). Although the criminalization of domestic
violence and legislation permitting the civil issuance of orders
of protection of victims have been of undeniable importance in
transforming the act from a private into a public problem (at both
the symbolic and material levels), it nevertheless is still the case
that many victims are simply reluctant to turn to the state for help
(Dutton, 1995).
There are many reasons that victims of domestic violence
might not welcome the intervention of the state. For some, the
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avoidance of legal action is premised on a desire to maintain
the privacy of their problem. As Margaret Borkowski explains
it, "Because privacy protects intimacy and because intimacy is
an aspiration normally expected to be satisfied in marriage, it
is understandable that women, when first experiencing marital violence and wanting to continue their relationship should
turn to agencies such as doctors and marriage guidance counselors who are believed to have strict rules about confidentiality"
(Borkowski, 1983, p. 112). Borkowski's (1983) observations are an
important reminder that concerns about privacy are not limited
to batterers seeking legal immunity.
For others, the reluctance to turn to the state is based, not
on a general desire to maintain privacy but on very specific and
tangible fears about the negative consequences of doing so. Many
are involved in illegal activities themselves, such as drug use or
prostitution, some are illegal immigrants or are engaged in the
process of trying to become citizens (Wahholz & Miedema, 2000).
For such women, the promise of protection and the potential
of punishment cannot be easily separated when it comes to the
operation of state power. For women of color, the equation is
complicated even further by fears that turning to the law may
expose them to further victimization, this time by police and
legal personnel who harbor racist feelings toward them or their
abusers. Kimberle Crenshaw has argued one of the consequences
of such fears among African Americans is "a more generalized
community ethic against public intervention, the product of a
desire to create a private world free from the diverse assaults
on the public lives of racially subordinated people. The home is
not simply a man's castle in the patriarchal sense, but may also
function as a safe haven from the indignities of live in a racist
society" (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1241).
Even if they have none of the above concerns, battered women
must still confront the possibility that turning to the state for protection might actually result in an escalation of violence thereby
putting themselves (and sometimes their family and friends) in
even greater danger (Dugan, Nagin & Rosenfeld, 2003). Finally,
for the many women who depend largely, or entirely, on economic
support from their abuser, the imposition of criminal sanctions
leading to incarceration and/or unemployment brings with it the
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possibility of impoverishment and homelessness for themselves
and their children.
But irrespective of the specific details behind their anxieties
about state intervention, if the only available recourse is to call
the police and thereby involve the state directly and possibly subjecting the partner to incarceration, many victims will choose to
manage the abuse on their own. Responding to the gaps that have
been created by these and other limitations associated with legal
solutions, in recent years movement activists have started to place
a much greater emphasis on providing victims with a network of
resources not so closely tied to the coercive powers of the state.
Pursuit of this objective has entailed a range of efforts fashioned to generate the involvement of a much greater number and
diversity of people from the general community in developing
a public response to domestic violence. Examples include public
education programs about how to avoid violence, fund-raising
for the provision of resources that enable victims to survive financially and emotionally without the abuser; informal actions and
media-based messages communicating the wrongness of abusive
behavior; corporate contributions toward violence-prevention efforts and services; and creation of workplace policies for assisting
employed victims (Kelly, 2003, pp. 102-106).
The battered-women's movement has also placed a growing
emphasis on reaching out to professionals who regularly deal
with the consequences of domestic violence in the course of doing
their jobs: social welfare professionals, health care workers, teachers, therapists, and clergy. Support activities range from training
sessions, to the provision of resource and referral materials, to
the development of coalitions to facilitate mutual support and to
improve service coordination (Ibid, pp. 106-109).
Community interventions: Opportunities
Trends that stress the development of state-community partnerships in the treatment and prevention of domestic violence
can be understood for the most part as an adaptive response to
the limitations of formal legal mechanisms for addressing the
problem. But, beyond providing an alternative for those who
are unable or unwilling to turn to the criminal justice system
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for assistance, community-based intervention offers a number of
important additional opportunities that do not exist with statebased intervention. First, because it does not involve the direct
imposition of state sanctions, community-based intervention is
not required to meet the same level of "probable cause" and thus
can occur at a much earlier stage. Involvement by outsiders before
domestic conflict escalates to violence can serve to support the
couple's addressing the abuse pattern before it wreaks its havoc.
Even when state intervention becomes necessary, the presence of community-based sanctions and support can significantly
contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of the state's measures.
Domestic violence has ramifications that extend well beyond the
circumstances of a particular incident. To expect that a single police intervention or even multiple interventions will eradicate an
entrenched pattern of abuse is unrealistic (Sherman, 1992 p. 248),
which means that there is an especially strong need for legal
intervention to take place within a community-based framework.
Because the perpetrator and the victim typically have a relationship of some duration, resolution of a single incident rarely ends
the violence. Accordingly, an array of coordinated services and
support systems is a critical component of the effort to help the
couple either to part or to work at reconciling.
De-centering the state in the public response to domestic
violence by stressing the community's role also has the beneficial
result of deflecting what are widely regarded as unhelpful speculation and questions about what particular battered women did
to contribute their victimization (Jones, 1994, p. 152). As long as
public intervention is defined chiefly within a legal framework,
the focus on individual behaviors remains primary. One of the
outstanding characteristics of the American legal system is its individualistic basis. Although it is no longer incumbent on victims
to press charges in felony cases of domestic violence, the burden
to report the abuse and then to follow through with legal action
is a heavy one (Mills, 1998). The great advantage of communitybased approaches is that rather than being dependent on the
initiative of those who are most the vulnerable and in need of help,
the approaches are generated principally within the community
itself. Consequently, the translation of domestic violence into an
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issue meriting a public response no longer hinges so strongly on
what its victims decide to do or not to do.
In addition to supporting our ability to relax our expectations
about the "right way" to handle battering, a greater focus on activities designed to engage a wide variety of community members
with the issue of domestic violence has the distinct advantage
of educating people about the problem, its patterns, causes, and
strategies for how and when to offer assistance. Research suggests
that many people refrain from offering assistance when they
encounter domestic violence not because they approve of the
behavior or think it should remain private but because they do not
understand what was happening and were confused about what
to do. In this light, the importance of domestic-violence education
for the long-term goal of transforming the violence from "their
problem" into "our problem," is obvious.
As even this truncated discussion of the battered-women's
movement makes clear, when it comes to the problem of domestic violence, the adoption of a dual approach that includes the
development a formal legal response along with the provision
of community-based programs has many potential advantages
for the short-term goals of crisis intervention and the long-term
goals of violence prevention. Still it is prudent to keep our hopeful
enthusiasm in check. After all, it was less that than fifty years ago
that domestic violence was widely viewed as a private matter
to be discussed only rarely in public let alone debated on the
national political stage. Its relatively recent emergence as a serious
public policy issue means that when it comes to the collective
effort to meet the challenge of responding, we are still very much
in what John Braithewaite (2002) calls "the research and development phase" of policy formulation. The ability to learn from
our experiences (including both the mistakes and the successes)
during the process of experimenting with different approaches
depends to a large extent on our openness to the possibility "that
both optimistic and the pessimistic propositions may capture part
of the truth" (Braithewaite, 2002, p. vii).
With this in mind, in what follows I will consider two distinct
sets of concerns that are routinely raised by those who are worried
about the negative implications of placing too much emphasis on
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community involvement in the development of a public response
to domestic violence.
Community interventions: Dangers
A persistent fear associated with increasing our reliance on
community-based responses to battering is that doing so may
contribute to a reprivatization of domestic violence. Arguments
about the potential for such a reversal can be confusing because of
their reliance on differing interpretations of what treating domestic violence as a public problem entails. For those who subscribe
to a liberal legalist perspective, private problems become public
when laws forbidding the conduct in question are enacted and
enforced. Within the battered women's movement, this view has
been expressed through the energetic pursuit of legal reform designed to ensure that the state makes its disapproval of battering
obvious through consistent application of laws that forbid it.
From the liberal legalist perspective, prioritizing the development of a bigger role for the community in responding to domestic
violence has a number of potentially negative implications. Of
particular concern is the danger that a shift in focus could result
in a reversal of progress in the ongoing struggle to make development of an effective governmental response to domestic violence
a political priority. Notably, the likelihood of such reversals occurring is especially high during difficult economic periods, such as
the one we are in now, that are characterized by substantial budget
deficits leading to what are often devastating funding cuts to a
wide variety of essential government-sponsored social welfare
programs. In the worst-case scenario, an emphasis on community
interventions combined with massive budgetary deficits would
result in a regression to an era in which the government largely
relinquished its obligation to provide state protection in cases
of assault within the family (Seigal, 1996). In addition to having
the effect of abandoning those living within the confines of private tyrannies, such a development could negate the hard-won
progress that has been made in the symbolic battle to force the
government to send a consistent message that domestic violence
will not be tolerated (Taub & Schneider, 1990, pp. 122-123).
Another version of a "reprivatization" concern centers on the
fear that an overreliance on community-based intervention could
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so operate as to all but eliminate the availability of assistance to
victims who do not have access to informal systems of social
support. Even where community support is readily available,
research has shown that many women who are being abused
are especially uncomfortable with the prospect of exposing their
problem to the people with whom they associate regularly, due to
shame or to fears about being judged by the people who matter
most to them. In other instances, the primary worry is that the
community intervention provided would be inadequate or even
inappropriate. This has been of particular concern with regard to
religiously based assistance; repeated reports have been made of
church authorities who recommended nothing more than prayer
and tolerance in even cases of extreme violence.
Although the focus of the concerns just discussed differs,
they are each (in one form or another) expressions of a general
anxiety about the many unknowns associated with new patterns
of state-community partnerships in the development of a public
response to domestic violence. The anxiety is made more acute
by the boundary-blurring effect of such partnerships on the structure of societal relationships. In the redrawn landscape, settled
assumptions about what falls within the purview of the state's
responsibility and authority are destabilized. It follows that the
meaning of designations such as public and private is altered, in
many cases beyond recognition. Significantly, this anxiety is not
confined to those engaged with the issue of domestic violence
but extends also to a lengthy spectrum of people involved in
the development of innovative approaches to the provision of
education, health care, and social welfare services.
To productively address the challenges posed by these changes
we need a way to think about the relationships between the
state and the community that does not depend so heavily on
dichotomous patterns of thinking that no longer accurately describe today's world. With this in mind, in the second half of
this article I outline one alternative conceptual approach to public/private relationships that replaces the traditional dichotomy
with a triangular relationship, of state, family, and community
(see figure 1).1 This is followed by a discussion of how the model
can help us to systematically think through the concerns raised
earlier about the potentially negative implications associated with
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an increased role for the community in the treatment and prevention of domestic violence. Finally, as a means of exploring
the insights generated by the model even further, I also engage
John Braithwaite's (2002) recent work on responsive regulation. In
particular, I discuss his regulatory pyramid model which, I argue,
helps to significantly enhance our ability to explicitly engage the
challenges posed by new state-community partnerships.
A New Approach to State-Community Relationships
As indicated above, my alternative approach to thinking the
implications of state-community partnerships is developed
around a triangular formulation, with the state, the family, and the
community each occupying a corner (see figure 1). The primary
contribution of this conceptual framework is that it facilitates
our ability to move beyond the dualistic models that have traditionally provided the basis for conceptualizing the relationship
between public and private.
The outstanding feature of my alternative model is that the
three boundaries operate so as to structure the meaning of public
and private. Each boundary is distinct, varying both in terms of
general characteristics and the degree of flexibility that it provides. The differences derive from the fact that rather than being
predetermined, the boundaries are defined by the relationship
between the two corners of the triangle they bridge.
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Table 1
Groups included in each category of the triangularmodel that replaces
the public/private dichotomy
State Components

Community Components

Family Components

Legislative bodies
Local governments
Judicial institutions
Criminal justice
agencies
Police departments
Social welfare
agencies

Social movement
organizations
Political parties
Special interest groups
Corporations/private
employers
Schools/Universities
Neighborhood
associations
Religious
organizations
Philanthropic
organizations
Health care
organizations
Media outlets

Nuclear family
Extended family
Intimate relationships
Close friendships

The first element of the model depicted is the relationship between the state and the family. The state refers to the institutions,
and the individuals that work within them, directly associated
with state power and sanctions. Included within this category are
legislatures, courts, law enforcement agencies, and social welfare
agencies (table 1). The major function of the boundary defining
the relationship between the state and the family is to protect
individuals and families from unwarranted intrusions by the
state. A web of institutional and cultural norms, constitutional
rights, legislative mandates, administrative procedures, and institutional mechanisms constrain the degree to which government
agents can become involved in the affairs of the domestic sphere
and structure interventions when they do take place (table 2).
The second element of the model depicted is relationship
between the family and the community. In comparison to the
institutionally driven boundary between public and private, this
boundary is more informal and less clearly defined. Its function
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Table 2
The boundary between the state and the family
Public

State

Boundary Structures

Search-and-seizure laws
Due process rights
Property rights
Legislative mandates
Administrative law
Family law
Police procedures
Physical barriers

Private

Family

is to distinguish what should remain completely within the discretion of individual family members from information and/or
events that warrant some sort of involvement by members of the
wider community. The community comprises a broad grouping
of individuals and nongovernmental organizations, including
neighbors, private employers, the media, churches, corporations,
social activists, special interest groups, schools and universities,
and health professionals (table 1). As this diverse list indicates and
as it is being employed within this model, the term community
is not intended to denote the presence of a set of assumptions,
values, and commitments that are shared by the individuals and
groups that make up this realm (MacIntyre, 1984; Taylor, 1989).
In the formulation of this model, I do not assume the presence of
unity within and among the communities that make up the larger
community nor do I wish to argue for the desirability of such
unity. In this respect the term community is used in its descriptive,
not its normative, sense.
The boundary between the family and the community operates to preserve the status of the family as a private association by protecting the family and its members from excessive
scrutiny from the community. In addition to the physical barriers
that shield family life from constant monitoring, the boundary
is structured and mediated by property laws, civil rights, and
cultural and community norms that pertain to privacy and family
life more generally (table 3).
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Table 3
The boundary between the community and the family
Public

Community

Boundary Structures
Civil rights
Ethical codes
Cultural norms
Religious principles
Family values
Physical barriers
Legislative mandates
Property rights

Private

Family

The third element of the model depicted is the relationship
between the state and the community. The interactions between
nonstate actors and individual citizens are structured by bureaucratic institutions, administrative law, legislative bodies and
processes, and social movement organizations (table 4). Activities that occur within these frameworks include the provision
of funding, regulation and monitoring of state-funded services,
education, research, reporting, public hearings, and the development and operation of coalitions designed to facilitate more
comprehensive and coordinated responses to social problems.

Table 4
The boundary between the state and the community
Public

State

Boundary Structures
Right of Free speech
Separation of church and state
Civil rights
Legislative mandates
Property rights and contracts
Tax laws and policies
Budgetary decisions
Economic regulation

Private

Community
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One of the most important roles that the state plays in a
democratic society is to ensure that the community does not
impinge on the rights of private citizens. In keeping with this role,
the boundary structures that exist between the community and
the family are explicitly designed to impose limits on communitybased interventions in the family so that rights violations are less
likely to occur.
One of the advantages of my model is that it permits an
expanded understanding of public interventions. Viewing public/private boundaries as the product of a triangular relationship
between the family, the community, and the state moves us away
from a dualistic construction that limits the definition of a public
response to formalized legal interventions backed by state power.
The model designates both state interventions and community
interventions as "public" when directed at the private realm of
the family. Hence, in the case of domestic violence, it becomes
possible to see that the development of a "public response" can,
and probably should, include both a formal state response (criminal justice interventions) and less formal community-based responses (prevention and education programs, shelter and service
provision, and programs designed to help abusers to deal with
their behavior before there is a need for direct state intervention
backed by sanctions). From this perspective, the liberal legalist's
fear that an increase in community interventions will result in a
decreased commitment to treating domestic violence as a serious
criminal matter is revealed as premised on a false choice. The
contribution of my model is that it operates to highlight that it
is not necessary to choose between formalized criminal justice
interventions and informal community-based responses when it
comes to the effort to transform domestic violence from a private
into a public problem.
Still, it is important to acknowledge that the model does
not provide any guidance about when to take a criminal justice approach and when to take a less formal approach. In this
regard, John Braithwaite's (2002) theory of responsive regulation
provides additional insights into how such determinations might
be guided: "The basic idea of responsive regulation is that governments should be responsive to the conduct of those they seek
to regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist
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response is needed. In particular, law enforcers should be
responsive to how effectively citizens or corporations are regulating themselves before deciding whether to escalate intervention" (p. 29). Relative to domestic violence, responsive regulation
would need to include state-monitored opportunities for selfregulation such as those provided by anger management programs or by programs that target abusive men. Victims, especially
those who choose to continue to live with the abuser during the
rehabilitation period, would also need to be supported.
Braithwaite's (2002) responsive regulatory approach has an
explicit preference for taking the least punitive approaches whenever possible, expressed through a formulation that he terms
"the regulatory pyramid." At the base of the pyramid are informal interventions that operate to change behavior through the
power of persuasion. That placement reflects a presumption in
favor of persuasion as the preferred mode of intervention. As the
pyramid narrows, the interventions grow increasingly punitive
and involve a much heavier degree of formal state involvement.
The decision to move up the pyramid and toward a greater
emphasis on state force is made "only reluctantly" and only "in
response to a failure to elicit reform and repair" (Braithwaite,
2002, p. 30).
It is noteworthy that the preference for persuasion reflected in
the regulatory pyramid is a preference that appears to be shared
by many victims of domestic violence. As discussed earlier, research has demonstrated that many victims will avoid involving
themselves and their abusers in the criminal justice system whenever possible. Their reasons include a desire to avoid having the
publicity attendant upon a highly visible intervention; fears about
their own vulnerability to state sanctions; and apprehensions
about exposing themselves and/or their abusers to a criminal justice response that is perceived by many to be racist in orientation
and application (Crenshaw, 1991; Coker, 2002). Even if they do not
harbor such concerns, many victims still do not want the abuser
arrested because punishment is not their goal. When victims of
domestic violence are questioned about what they want, most
say they want the abuse to stop and the abuser to be assisted
in changing his behavior (Barnett & La Violette, 1993). Thus, in
this respect, the regulatory pyramid's presumption in favor of
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public responses that depend on persuasion rather than sanctions
reflects what many women say they want as well.
It is important to recognize that a commitment to persuasion
over force is not the only priority that informs the operation of
the regulatory pyramid. Braithwaite (2002) makes clear that the
pace of escalation from persuasion to punishment must always
be case-specific. For example, if an "assault offender who during
the criminal process vows to go after the victim again and kill
her," that declared intention is a compelling reason to override
the presumption in favor of persuasion; Braithwaite (2002) says
that the offender "should be locked up" (p. 30). Thus we see
that, although the pyramid is structured such that persuasion
is prioritized over force, if there is evidence that someone is in
danger, persuasion will always be overridden by the even more
important commitment to safety.
A shared feature of my triangular model (Kelly, 2003) and
Braithwaite's (2002) regulatory pyramid is that neither depends
on prior agreement about when a formal state response should
be employed and when an informal community-based approach
should be the preferred option. Instead, both models are structured around the assumption that such decisions will (and should)
be made on a per-case basis. The focus is not on the search for
final answers but on the relationships, institutional structures,
and ideals that form the procedural and substantive elements
of the decision-making process. Thus, although neither model
provides definitive answers as to the correct balance between
state and community approaches, both operate to enhance the
capacity of those who are concerned about particular social problems to think through the stakes and implications associated with
possible combinations.
To illustrate, let us return to the concern discussed earlier,
that, especially if successful, community-based domestic violence
initiatives could provide lawmakers with a ready-made excuse to
cut (even further) funding for public domestic violence programs.
It is a concern prevalent in general debates about the promise
and peril of increasing community involvement in the provision
of social services. Further, it is concern that moves in both directions. Consider the assertion of advocates of privatization that,
in addition to being extremely inefficient, too much government

Working Together to Stop Domestic Violence

43

welfare weakens the institutions of civil society. According to the
logic of this argument, as people become more reliant on the state
to address social problems, the likelihood that those in need will
turn to community-based groups diminishes, which in turns saps
the motivation for people to organize around the shared goal of
offering assistance.
One of the elements that makes the increasing occurrence
of state-community collaborations so unsettling is they require
us to confront-and in many cases to reevaluate-the ways in
which we have assigned responsibility for social problems to
different spheres. Because my model enables consideration of a
range of possible public responses to a particular social problem,
it enhances our ability to face domestic violence and to determine,
on an ongoing basis, whether the balance between state and nonstate responses is productive. Further, the triangular model, by
highlighting the manner in which various interventions interact,
encourages us to ask questions about whether state interventions
are functioning to crowd out a community response (as in the
scenario just described) or whether the availability of nonstate
forms of assistance is negatively impacting the government's
motivation to provide public versions of the same services (Kelly,
2003, p. 161). Thinking systematically about the relationships of
state- and community-based responses to social problems can also
help us to focus on the positive potential of these relationships.
Once again, Braithwaite's (2002) regulatory framework provides
additional insights.
One of the most-cited limitations of informal interventions
is that they are not backed up by the threat of state sanctions
and hence are of limited value when it comes to changing behavior. Braithwaite (2002) argues otherwise: an increased reliance
on interventions that do not utilize sanctions will, in the long
run, enhance the ability to control negative behavior by virtue
of sanctions' rarity. Braithwaite (2002) writes that a preference
for nonpunitive responses positively impacts the effectiveness
of state punishment. First, "by resorting to more dominating,
less respectful forms of social control only when more dialogic
forms have been tried first, coercive control comes to be seen
as more legitimate" (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 33). This argument is
built upon research demonstrating that compliance with the law

44

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

is positively correlated to a belief that the law is fair. According to
this account, if people are given multiple chances to correct their
behavior before they are punished they are more likely to accept
that punishment as deserved when it is meted out (Braithwaite,
2002, p. 78).
Second, a greater reliance on non-punitive measures helps to
improve the authority of punishment, and therefore its effectiveness as a deterrent, by enhancing the likelihood that offenders
will believe that they will actually be subject to sanctions if they
break the law and are convicted. One of the most negative effects of what has become a chronically over-burdened criminal
justice system is the perpetration of the impression, especially
among repeat offenders, "that the odds of serious punishment
are low for any particular infraction." That impression operates
to undermine the credibility of state threats to punish, which in
turn diminishes their deterrent value. Braithwaite (2002) believes
that the preference for nonpunitive measures embodied in his
regulatory pyramid can help to improve the authority and power
of state sanctions by alleviating the "system capacity problem,"
and as a consequence improve the ability of the state to follow
through decisively in cases where punitive sanctions are deemed
to be necessary (p. 30).
As to legal intervention in domestic violence, high numbers
of repeat offenders, notoriously low rates of prosecutions and
convictions, and light sentencing patterns all suggest that the
legitimacy problems that Braithwaite (2002) identifies are almost
certainly at work in this context. Still, whether a presumption
in favor of persuasion would be helpful or harmful to the overall
effort to address domestic violence is a much more complex question and beyond the scope of this article. But, I do not think that
it necessary to have an opinion about the particulars of Braithwaite's (2002) claims to benefit from his analyses. The general
contribution of his model is its capacity to advance our ability
to recognize the ways in which completely different types of
interventions, sometimes occurring in entirely different domains
of society, might nevertheless function to reinforce one another
positively. In the above example, Braithwaite's (2002) analyses
offer a new way to think through the specific implications of what
now is virtually a truism in the field of criminology: that formal
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and informal forms of social control are interdependent. By improving our ability to analyze the operation of this relationship
in specific policy contexts, Braithwaite's (2002) model can help us
to maximize its potential.
Conclusion
My reason for considering both the opportunities and the dangers represented by state-community partnerships in the treatment and prevention of domestic violence is not to arrive at a
conclusion as to the merit of the partnerships. As I stated above, I
believe that the partnerships, like them or not, are here to stay.Further, as the history of the battered-women's movement illustrates,
both state-based and community-based responses offer many
important advantages, including empowerment of victims (by
offering choices when it comes to help) and the empowerment of
the community (by creating new opportunities vis-a-vis the problem of domestic violence and by providing education and support
to those who want to help). At the same time, my example also
demonstrates the way in which increases in the rate and degree of
state-community partnerships generate new challenges around
how to balance state and community responsibilities when it
comes to development of a public response to a social problem.
In light of the preceding discussion, it is obvious that the
time has come to move beyond debates that frame the choice
as one between the state and the community when attending to
social welfare needs. Doing so will enable us to apply ourselves
more vigorously to the crucial task of how to approach these
partnerships in a manner that will maximize their potential and
minimize their dangers. As Martha Minow (2002) notes in her
recent, Partners,not Rivals: Privatizationand the Public Good, "The
Stakes could not be higher. How we mix public and private, profit
and nonprofit, religious and secular in providing for schooling,
welfare, human services, medicine, and law will spell the future
of our democracy. We could shape newly vibrant and caring
communities of freedom or cauldrons for distrust and privation"
(p. 5). New conceptual frameworks that enable us to see the
connections and contradictions that arise from these partnerships,
are means to that desirable end. My triangular model of public/
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private relationships and John Braithwaite's (2002) regulatory
pyramid could help to lead the way toward a future more broadly
beneficial.
Note
1. A fuller account of the model can be found in my Domestic Violence and the
Politics of Privacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
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Moving Beyond the Criminal Justice Paradigm:
A Radical Restorative Justice Approach
to Intimate Abuse
PEGGY GRAUWILER AND LINDA G. MILLS

New York University

This article traces the history of the development of the treatment of
domestic violence as a crime in the United States and the conceptual and
practical limitations of this approach in addressing this important social
issue.An extensive body of researchon restorativejustice practicesuggests
that restorative approaches may contribute to reducing and preventing
family violence. Drawing on restorativejustice principles, an alternative
or supplement to criminaljustice approachesis outlinedfor working with
all partiesinvolved in abusive relationships.
Key words: aggression,feminism, intimate partnerviolence, mandatory
arrest,patriarchy,restorativejustice

History
Public discourse and political debate influence the recognition
and naming of social issues. Naming occurs through the assignment of language and the subsequent labels that define the social
issue. The question always lingers: who has ownership of the
issue? The battered woman's movement began over three decades
ago, as a grass roots response, by women, to help other women
escape male violence. Offering a theoretical concept of battering,
women assumed ownership over the issue and moved it from a
private family matter to one of public concern (Schneider, 2000).
Their tireless efforts have influenced political agendas across the
country, and even beyond. The social problem of intimate partner
violence is now a political priority. In the process of defining
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
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domestic violence as a women's issue, it left behind the parallel
needs of male and same sex victims, as well as children.
In the last ten years, the movement has been led by a powerful and dedicated group of mainstream feminists. Mainstream
feminism is a term borrowed from others, and is not meant as
a criticism but as a categorization of people who self-identify as
"feminist" and adhere to the belief that the primary approach to
domestic violence should be a criminal intervention (Satel, 1997).
They would argue that criminalization is the only way to address
the prevalence of male to female intimate abuse, insofar as such an
approach takes, head on, the long history of systematic patriarchal
oppression of women in the criminal justice system.
The work of these mainstream feminists has resulted in the
identification of domestic violence as a serious criminal justice
and public health concern. Angered by the criminal justice system's long history of disregard for a woman's right to live
violence-free, mainstream feminist advocates have lobbied for
and won legislative reforms that have ultimately criminalized
domestic violence through mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies. Mandatory policies force police officers and prosecutors
to pursue domestic violence cases to the full extent of the law,
regardless of the victim's wishes. These legal outcomes have been
enhanced by the efforts of mainstream feminists to frame the
issue of domestic violence as stemming from patriarchy, insisting
that the American public accept this interpretation of domestic
violence as the only valid one (Mills, 2003). The passage of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, signed into law
by President Bill Clinton, reinforced this notion. VAWA 1994
appropriated 1.2 billion dollars for more effective criminal justice
responses to victims and perpetrators. This allocation was part of
a larger crime bill and, as such, took a criminal justice approach
to domestic violence problem solving. Zero tolerance became the
battle cry; mandatory arrest and prosecution policies were the
strategies used to accomplish it.
Politicians across the country joined these mainstream feminists in support of VAWA legislation. VAWA demonstration
projects offered politicians the opportunity to ally with a womancentered political agenda, leaving behind more volatile debates
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about equal rights, equal pay and reproductive rights. Interestingly, in 2000 the National Violence Against Women Survey
(NVAW) found that most intimate partner victimizations are not
reported to the police. The NVAW Survey approximates that
only one-fifth of all rapes, one quarter of all physical assaults
and one half of all stalking incidents perpetrated against females
by intimate partners were reported to the police. These findings
suggest that victims of intimate partner violence do not consider
the criminal justice system an appropriate locus for resolving
conflicts with intimates (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). This chapter explores why battered women have so strongly resisted the
criminalization of domestic violence and the opportunity offered
by John Braithwaite's work in restorative justice to move beyond
the criminal justice paradigm.
One explanation for women's reluctance to embrace criminal
justice interventions might be the limitations of our concept of
victimization that carries with it traditional gender stereotypes.
Mandated arrest and prosecution policies foster the image of the
passive battered woman, and the belief that overcoming such
passivity necessarily involves leaving the male abuser (Mills,
2003; Peled, Eisikovits, Enosh & Winstok, 2000). This assumes battered women, whether aware of it or not, will ultimately choose
to leave their abusers. Anything short of leaving is proof that
the woman is being negatively influenced by her abusive partner to stay. Yet a majority of prosecutors find that over 55 percent of the victims they represent are "uncooperative" when
they attempt to indict and incarcerate their partners (Rebovich,
1996). The problem is that stereotypical images of the female
victim, and our aspirations for her, have not incorporated the
realities of battered women's lives. Perhaps as many as 50 percent
choose to stay in abusive relationships for emotional, cultural
or religious reasons (Griffing, Ragen, Sage, Madry, Bingham &
Primm, 2002).
One insight might explain why women are ambivalent about
engaging the criminal justice system. Two decades ago, battered
women were not consulted on whether the batterer should be
arrested. Now, with mandatory policies, their viewpoint is still
considered largely irrelevant. Women in abusive relationships are
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placed in the untenable position of choosing between protecting
their lovers or husbands from incarceration, or protecting themselves by relying on a criminal justice system that is unresponsive
to their individual needs (Mills, 2003).
In a 30 month follow-up study of extensively and severely
abused women whose male partners were in batterer treatment
programs, Gondolf (2002) found that women who felt the need
for more assistance were deterred as much by negative views of
battered women's programs as they were by barriers to service access. The decision to stay with an abuser is rarely understood as a
choice, a statement of commitment to the relationship, knowledge
of the limitations within helping systems, or an expression of selfdetermination and self-sufficiency (Lempert, 1996). The question
of whether we can address the needs of those women who continue to turn away from advocates, police, prosecutors, judges
and shelters, seeking to end the violence but not the relationship,
is addressed in more detail below.
Feminist support for mandatory interventions and willingness to engage the state as a partner in ending violence against
women reflects a significant shift away from the feminist movement of the 1960s-a time when the state was viewed as a system that maintained, enforced and legitimized violence against
women (Schneider, 2000). This shift embraces the parity model of
feminist jurisprudence that argues that women should be given
legal equality (with men) that is genuine and not nominal (Routledge, 2000). While mandatory arrest offers the appearance of
parity (intimate and stranger violence crimes are handled similarly), it does so at the expense of individual women. Mandatory
policies offer only the illusion of true gender equality by enforcing
criminal justice recognition of intimate abuse crimes. There are
unintended consequences of mandatory policies that should not
be ignored.
The question remains: Is criminalizing domestic violence
helpful or harmful? Social scientists, feminist lawmakers, victim
advocates and policy makers too often give in to the power of
law, without thinking critically and creatively about what role
the criminal justice system can really play in eradicating violence
against women. Criminal justice reform can only be meaningful
when the agents of that reform commit to the iterative process of
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social change and continue to acknowledge, evaluate and revamp
ineffective policy. We must consider what shifts are needed in
the battered women's movement as it moves forward; critical
analysis and reflection about the role of movement politics in the
current flood of domestic violence initiatives is overdue (Kanuha,
1999). The compelling work of John Braithwaite challenges us to
consider what possibilities restorative justice practice might offer
the feminist movement against domestic violence.
An exploration of the governing assumptions that underpin
mandatory arrest and prosecution policies help clarify the 'arrest
avoidant' actions of most victims of intimate abuse and offer some
insight into how to begin to address their legal, emotional, and
safety needs.
Governing Assumptions
There are four primary assumptions that underpin the mainstream feminist explanation of intimate abuse. First, men batter
women because they are privileged, physically, financially and
socially; implicit in this assumption is the belief that we need
not understand men's violence beyond the patriarchal explanation provided (Schechter, 1982). Second, women stay in abusive
relationships because of patriarchy. They fear their abusers and
lack the material resources to leave. Women who stay do so out
of weakness, lack of consciousness, and an inability to act decisively by leaving. If given the appropriate political, financial, legal
and emotional support, women would always choose to leave
their abusive partners. Third, the criminal justice system is sexist.
Police officers, prosecutors, and judges minimize the problem of
domestic violence, deny women's agency, and discredit women's
accounts of their abuse. Fourth, only extraordinary measures will
counteract men's patriarchal power and violence, women's weakness, and the justice system's sexism. Specifically, it is assumed
that the history of denial of violence against women justifies treating all domestic violence as the equivalent of violence between
strangers. Mandatory measures are necessary to overcome the
state's sexism and men's hopelessly uncontrollable violence. In
this view, it follows that jail or prison terms are the only appropriate response to intimate abuse.
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These assumptions have formed the ideological foundations
of American domestic violence practice and policy making. The
movement has persuaded citizen and lawmaker alike of the indisputable veracity of these assumptions, which are so significant
to the movement to end violence against women that they have
become markers for feminism. As they have become so deeply
ingrained in our political culture, few have questioned them.
If you do question them, you have abandoned the movement
(Mills, 2003).
Yet each assumption can be challenged on the basis of recent
work in social, cultural, and gender studies. The first assumption
that underpins mandatory policies states that domestic violence is
caused by and restricted to patriarchal governance. This however,
does not resonate with many men and women who enter the
system. For example, men and women of color often don't agree
with the dominant rhetoric that all men are "patriarchs". Many
men and women of color see the white power structure as representing views that oppress not only women, but also communities
of color. Lesbians, gays, bisexual and transgendered people often
find mainstream explanations of intimate violence completely irrelevant to their experiences of violence (Mills, 2003). For women
who choose a religious lifestyle, patriarchy is a foreign and irrelevant concept. Similarly, immigrant women steeped in traditional
cultural values may not identify their experiences of violence
with patriarchy. Their explanations include the realities of their
lives: the difficult migration challenges that their families, and
especially their husbands, often face.
If we limit our investigation into intimate abuse to patriarchal
explanations, then we ignore the voices of women and men whose
lived experiences do not comport with this analysis. Violence is
never as simple as men's power over women, although it may
be a feature of some relationships. Empirical research supports
the assertion that men and women abuse each other (Mills, 2003).
Patriarchy as the principal explanation for men's abuse ignores
the fact that violence exists in gay and lesbian relationships.
The second structuring assumption-that women stay in abusive relationships out of weakness, fear, or lack of adequate feminist consciousness-has also been challenged. Research with
women from a variety of cultural backgrounds suggests the need
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to examine choices made by women within situational constraints
rather than within a prescriptive scenario held by members of
the dominant culture (Mehrotra, 1999; Peled, Eisikovits, Enosh &
Winstok, 2000; Yoshihama, 2000). Many advocates and scholars
believe that focusing on the woman's return draws attention away
from the batterers' abuse, but not to focus on the return neglects
women's voices and concerns. The woman may be in an abusive
relationship, but she is also quite possibly a mother, a lover, a
friend, a family member, or part of a church or a tradition that
has competing claims upon her decision to stay or leave.
While it is true that violence between intimate partners has
been systematically overlooked by the criminal justice system,
we should not assume that it be treated like stranger violence,
which is distinctly different. When the victim does not know the
perpetrator of the violence, it is relatively easy, psychologicallyspeaking, to criminalize his or her acts. Criminalizing intimate
abuse on a model that has been derived from stranger violence
ignores the fact that the parties have, at one time, shared their
intimate lives together, including children, or they share the experiences of marginalization through migration, race, or sexual
orientation. Violence that occurs in intimate relationships is not
conducive to a paradigm that assigns all the blame to one party
while wholly exonerating the other. Like all intimate relationships, even violent ones have an underlying dynamic that can
help illuminate the origins of the violence (Mills, 2003). Ignoring
the significance of a woman's agency by ignoring her desires
in relation to the arrest or prosecution leaves her both without
insight into the dynamic of abuse and without protection should
the prosecution be unsuccessful or once it comes to a close. And
finally, by criminalizing domestic violence, the racism that is
endemic in the criminal justice system is underscored. Men of
color are likely to be arrested and prosecuted for intimate abuse
crimes at disturbingly disproportionate rates when compared
with their white counterparts, an experience so devastating that
their female partners will be reluctant to reinforce it (Sherman,
Schmidt, Rogan, Smith, Gartin, Cohn, Collins & Bacich, 1992).
These assumptions point to the need for inclusion of individual definitions of violence, cultural differences in the abuse
experience and its relationship to intervention and prevention
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strategies. Inclusion of individual expressions of abuse helps develop a different set of assumptions that permit us to develop a
more inclusive strategy-a restorative justice model-that does
not excuse abusers or blame victims, but instead reflects the total
psychic experience of intimate abuse. Before we describe such
a model, it is helpful to understand what assumptions would
underpin it.
A Different Set Of Assumptions
If we begin to allow ourselves to think critically about the limitations of a patriarchal analysis of intimate abuse and a criminal
justice response, we may be able to move beyond the polarization
of intimate abuse as just a "woman's issue". In turn, we might
then be better positioned to understand why women are choosing
to avoid the criminal justice system, and develop interventions
that comport with their needs and desires. Our responsibility
as a society is to address the entire problem. The women that
are currently being served by the criminal justice system represent a small portion of the population that need their problems
addressed.
Perhaps the most sacred of the assumptions-violence runs
one way from men to women-is the key to changing how we
think about intimate abuse. In 1974, Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz reported that husbands and wives committed nearly equal
amounts of physical violence in intimate relationships. According
to these findings, 12.1 percent of husbands reported that they
committed violent acts against their female partners, and 11.6
percent of wives reported acts of violence against male partners. Ten years later, their results were essentially confirmed: 11.3
percent of husbands reported violence against their wives, and
12.1 percent of wives reported violence against their husbands
(Straus & Gelles, 1986). In these studies, women and men in
equal numbers report being the sole victim of violence in the
intimate relationship (Billingham & Sack, 1987). These studies do
not suggest that women's violence is a reaction to men's violence.
More than one hundred studies have since confirmed these or
similar findings (Straus, 1999).
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Researchers have found that when they inquire into "physical
violence" rather than "injury", they are more likely to elicit admissions by women that they too have been violent. In one study,
37 percent of the women admitted that they had perpetrated
physical aggression against their male partners, compared with
22 percent of men who admitted perpetrating physical aggression
against their female partners (Magdol, Moffitt, Caspi, Newman,
Fagan & Silva, 1997). Severe physical aggression by women also
measured at significant rates. Nineteen percent of women, versus
6 percent of men, reported using such behaviors as kicking, hitting, biting, hitting with an object, using or threatening the use of
a knife or gun, and beating up. In this same study, 95 percent of
women and 86 percent of men reported at least one act of verbal
aggression against a partner (Magdol et. al., 1997).
Violence in lesbian relationships also sheds light on the issue
of female aggression. Bowman and Morgan (1998) who studied verbal and physical abuse in homosexual and heterosexual
college students, found that in same-sex relationships, lesbians
reported statistically significant higher levels of violence in all instances than women in heterosexual relationships. Lockhart and
colleagues found that 90 percent of the lesbians they surveyed had
experienced verbal aggression over the previous twelve months,
and 30 percent reported one or more incidents of physical violence
(Lockhart, White, Causby & Isaac, 1994). According to Lie and
Gentlewarrier (1991), more than half of the 1,099 lesbians in their
study reported that they had been physically abused by a female
lover or partner. Rohner (1976) evaluated the effect of gender and
culture on aggression and found that culture predicts or modifies
aggression more than gender does. Studies in Canada, Venezuela,
and Mexico also support the finding that woman are engaged
in aggressive acts towards their partners at least as often as are
men (Fry, 1992; Cook, 1992; Leschied, Cummings, van Brunschot,
Cunningham & Saunders, 2001).
Some researchers have found that traditional gender roles
influence how girls and eventually women express their aggression. Passive aggression or "indirect" methods are common expressions of female anger (Bj6rkqvist, Lagerspetz & Kaukiainen,
1992). Because boys and men are often larger and stronger and
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have higher levels of physical activity, their aggression may be
more physical. Girls and women draw on their well-developed
emotional strength to express anger (Fr~czek, 1992).
Bjbrkqvist, Lagerspetz & Kaukiainen (1992) describe indirect
aggression as an attempt to hurt another while avoiding detection. In a study of indirect aggression, Bj6rkqvist (1994) found
that the purpose of the indirect approach was to find a strategy
as effective as violence, while at the same time exposing the nonviolent aggressor to as little danger as possible. Verbal strategies,
too, put distance to the opponent, and therefore are less dangerous than physical aggression. As a result, when verbal skills are
developed, verbal means of aggression tend to replace physical
ones whenever possible.
Another distinct feature of women's aggression is that it is
most likely to occur in the context of family. In a large longitudinal study of more than forty-five hundred high school seniors and dropouts in California and Oregon, Ellickson, Saner,
and McGuigan found that girls were more likely to be engaged
in hitting family members than they were to be involved in
gang violence. Twenty-six percent of both boys and girls reported that they hit members of their families (Ellickson, Saner &
McGuigan, 1997).
In direct opposition to a strict patriarchal analysis of intimate
abuse, psychologist Donald Dutton reports that there may be
a critical link between verbal abuse inflicted by the mother on
her male child and the likelihood of the boy becoming abusive
once he grows up and becomes intimate with a female partner
(Dutton, 1996). Dutton's finding that verbal abuse by a mother
may cause a man to have extreme anger responses toward his
female partner only underscores the importance of recognizing
all forms of abuse-physical and emotional, male and female,
parent and child-in the violence dynamic.
Mainstream feminist activists and researchers have consistently argued that women's aggression against men is irrelevant
because it inflicts so much less harm than the injuries men inflict
on women. These scholars argue that psychological or even physical abuse inflicted by women is irrelevant compared with other
forms of violence expressed by men (Hamberger & Potente, 1994).
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that psychological
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abuse can often predict physical aggression. In a study of engaged
and newly married couples, Murphy and O'Leary (1989) found
that "psychologically coercive behavior precedes and predicts
the development of physical aggression in marriage". They also
report that both partners "may contribute to the escalation of
conflict tactics during the early stages of the relationship." (p. 582).
These findings are important for two reasons. They suggest that
if feminists' overriding goal is to reduce incidents of violence
against women, reducing psychological aggression in both partners (and not just the man) is likely to reduce injurious physical
abuse against women. This is important for another less obvious reason. Though Hamberger and Potente (1994) argue that
emotional abuse should count less in terms of the hierarchy of
violence because it has less potential to oppress, there is evidence
that, in fact, this is not true; some women experience emotional
abuse as much more significant than physical forms of violence
(Holzworth-Munroe, Meehan, Herron & Stuart, 1999). To limit
our understanding of abuse by women as a necessary reaction
to men's violence, we impede our capacity to connect with both
parties and to develop interventions that go beyond safety from
violence to include healing.
There is no doubt that men are more likely to injure their
female partners. However, we also know that less than 30% of
abused women are turning to the criminal justice system (Tjaden
& Thoennes, 2000). How do we empower a woman who chooses
to remain with an abusive partner if we cannot assist her in
exploring her feelings of responsibility for aggression or violence
because we dismiss these feelings as irrelevant? If she has been
aggressive, even violent, it is important to ask the question: Do
we encourage denial because we have not developed strategies
to address her complicity? By investigating women's use of aggression and the dynamics of intimate partner violence, we can
develop interventions that are responsive to both parties.
The extent to which women are viewed as helpless and submissive is apparent in feminist research, as well as in the minimization of men's accounts of women's aggression. Women's
aggression, according to the patriarchy model, can be summarized in three simple principles: the man is in control; the man is
in denial of his control; and the man is without insight into the
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violence he inflicts and feels entitled to express it. In effect he is
solely responsible for the violent dynamic (Mills, 2003).
But what if men really do feel that women cause them to
become violent because "women complain too much and nag
and harass them for no good reason" (Dobash, & Dobash, 1998
p. 155). Researchers Eisikovits and Buchbinder (2000) confirm
that these feelings are present in the abusive relationship and
also represent an important feature of the dynamic of intimate
abuse. Although, on the surface, the male partner appears in
control, and the female partner appears under his control, the
reality is much more complicated. His "attempts to control [her]
may lead the woman either toward managing the violence or
taking on a violent identity" (p. 91). Complaining, nagging, and
harassing may be learned reactions to his control or a feature
of the dynamics in her family of origin. They might also be
the female partner's way of not being able to ask for what she
wants from the relationship. This in turn, can lead the male
partner to experience what Donald Dutton calls "abandonment
anxiety."
From Dutton's (1995) research, we learn that men who experience abandonment, either because the women pulled away
emotionally or could not move closer for one reason or another,
often became aggressive against their female partners in reaction to their experiences of abandonment. According to Dutton:
"For assaultive males, the psychological and behavioral result of
the perceived loss of the female produces panic and hysterical
aggression" (p. 68). Taking these findings one step further, it
becomes apparent that when a man experiences abandonment in
the face of a woman's complaints and nagging, this may initiate
his violence. If men feel women create the conditions under which
they become violent, we need to hear them out and evaluate
whether their complaints may have some merit, without blaming
women for men's abuse. Letting women take responsibility for
whatever aggression they bring to the relationship can only serve
to strengthen their position of insight, action, and power in the
relationship overall.
This is not to argue that women in abusive relationships are
responsible for the beatings they receive, that they are to blame
for the violence inflicted on them. But rather, accounting for the
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dynamic of abuse that includes how women and men participate
in abusive relationships serves multiple goals of helping each of
us understand intimate violence, without minimizing the effect
of women's aggression on others. This, intern, helps individual
women make more informed decisions about their intimate relationships (Mills, 2003).
As the studies reviewed here suggest, male and female violence does not happen in a vacuum. Violence is a dynamic that
includes more or less significant forms of emotional and physical
abuse. Attempts to separate men's and women's aggression, even
for the goal of protecting physically abused women, only serves to
reinforce violence rather than address it. Because female aggression is part of a dynamic of intimate violence, it is time to take the
very important step of examining that dynamic (Mills, 2003).
Under current practice, rather than encouraging insight, we
reinforce in women their perception of themselves as victims.
Mandatory arrest and prosecution policies affirm that women
have no role in addressing the violence in their lives. We believe
that if we took time to discover how women and men understand
their own aggression in the context of their intimate relationships,
we not only could help them gain insight but also help them
manage the violence-both physical and emotional.
Giving Voice To New Ways Of Thinking
About Intimate Abuse
John Braithwaite's work in the area of restorative justice offers
some compelling opportunities for practitioners in the area of
intimate abuse. Restorative justice practice, in a practical sense,
involves conferences between victims and perpetrators of a crime.
Each brings to the conference a care community of friends and
family that can support them individually, while they address
the violence that has occurred. As a group and by consensus, a
contract is developed to restore to the victim what has been lost
(e.g. dignity, property etc.). This contract must be agreeable to
both sides and is prepared only after two events have occurred:
First, there has been a full examination of the impact of the
violence on those most affected; and second, violent offenders
express remorse for their actions. Conferences can only be formed
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with the consent of both parties and the participation of their
care communities. Care communities offer localized support and
enhanced safety for victims.
Braithwaite (2002) provides a comprehensive analysis of the
empirical evidence generated during the last decade, about the
effectiveness of restorative justice. Braithwaite hypothesizes that
restorative justice restores and satisfies victims, offenders and
communities better than existing criminal justice practices. This
careful review of the existing research suggests a high level of
victim satisfaction with their restorative justice experience.
Braithwaite argues that victims feel empowered by their participation in the conferences and their individual determination of
what is meaningful restoration. Similarly, the offender's apology
for the offense committed offers symbolic reparation, as well as
enhanced empathy for the offender. Both these conditions positively influence victim healing. The research also shows substantially higher levels of compliance with restorative justice contracts
than with court orders.
Offenders also express satisfaction with the fairness of the
conference process. There is some evidence that suggests that
the conferences reduce reoffending. In addition, members of the
community beyond the offender and victim tend to come away
with high levels of satisfaction; the very collaborative nature of the
conference process may increase the chance of mutual investment
in finding solutions that can promote healing on both sidesnot just "victory" for one side of the equation. This suggests the
possibility of reducing intimate partner violence at the micro
or family level that may in turn reduce the intergenerational
transmission of violence-while also reducing violence at the
macro or community level (Braithwaite, 2002). All of this is a
compelling argument for further research into restorative justice
models for family violence.
Currently, the appropriateness of restorative justice and family violence practice is a hotly debated topic (Strang & Braithwaite,
2002). Arguments against restorative justice often turn on many
of the reasons explored earlier and are related to the patriarchy
model. Essentially, the argument against restorative justice in
domestic violence cases is that all battered women are disempowered by the violence and their safety is threatened whenever
they are in the presence of their abusers. The certainty of this
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power to silence her is asserted as a fundamental reason to reject
conferences that address intimate abuse (Busch, 2002). This is
despite the reality that thousands of men are arrested each day for
domestic violence crimes, in which they often serve little jail time
and return quickly to the home and or the community (Smith,
Davis, Nickles, Davies, 2001). In addition, women testify in court
with the support of prosecutor's preparation in the presence of
their abusers and travel to and from court with friends and family
(and even, sometimes, the abuser).
It is therefore inaccurate to assume that a woman participating in her abuser's prosecution is any more autonomous or safe
than she might be with a care community in a structured setting
designed to verbalize her abuse experience. Ironically, the shame
and stigma associated with the criminal justice system may cause
some women to feel the need to hide their involvement in an
abusive relationship from friends and family, preventing rather
than facilitating support at the community level. Conferences offer the kind of non-threatening and healing-oriented intervention
that women seek and which the criminal justice system cannot
provide.
Llewellyn & Howse (as cited in Edwards & Haslett, 2002)
describe restoration as the creation or re-creation of relationships
of meaningful social equality. The offender claims responsibility
for his choices, actions and consequences of his actions; these are
essential components of restorative justice. One Canadian study
of family group conferences that addressed child maltreatment
and domestic violence found a reduction in indicators of child
maltreatment and domestic violence, an advancement of children's development and an extension of social supports (Pennell & Burford, 1998).
Family decision making conferences were introduced in the
Miami-Dade Juvenile Court in 1998. An evaluation study of this
project in cases of child maltreatment, found an increase in parent
and participant satisfaction with the court process, empowerment of families as decision makers, improved relationships between the Department of Children and Families and a reduction
in the amount of time children spend waiting for permanency
(Gatowski, Dobbin & Litchfield, 2001). This raises an important
question about conferencing: If they can improve relationships
within families and between participants within outside agencies,
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can they address violence between partners while also improving community relations? As Kay Pranis (2002) so eloquently
documents:
A very important value in restorative justice is that of empowering unheard voices. That is most often and most powerfully accomplished through personal narratives. Listening respectfully to
someone's story is a way of giving them power-a positive kind of
power. (p. 30).
Restorative justice practice in the area of domestic violence
can be rooted in a clear set of values and principles that coincide with the interests of mainstream feminists in serving the
needs of battered women: Victim safety, victim choice, offender
accountability, and system accountability (Edwards & Haslett
2002). Restorative conferences as part of a continuum of ongoing
services and even criminal justice intervention in some instances,
can help address the violence between individuals, within families, and also can facilitate community-wide healing through the
participation of friends and community leaders.
Historically, intervention in the area of domestic violence has
always started at the grass roots level-through experimentation,
advocacy and respect for a diversity of views. The movement
has succeeded in getting the attention of the criminal justice
system. It is time to expand our efforts to include the needs of
those who avoid the criminal justice system or otherwise reject
it, by developing effective community-based interventions that
are not dependent upon criminal intervention. The irony is that
mandated arrest policies were developed following a small study
in Minneapolis suggesting the effectiveness of arrest in reducing
domestic violence crimes. Despite increasing evidence that this
initial study may have been only partially accurate, mandated
arrest became the battle cry of mainstream feminists (Mills 2003).
We suggest similar experimentation stemming from early indications that restorative justice can reduce family violence. Ongoing
empirical research should accompany each of these efforts.
Modifying Restorative Justice for Intimate Abuse
Intimate Abuse Circles (IAC) draw on many restorative justice principles already described, and also incorporate the set
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of different assumptions described earlier. IACs are a culturally
sensitive alternative to the criminal justice system response to
domestic violence as the content of the conferences is tailored to
the parties involved. They are a method of intervention following
an arrest or in cases were no arrest has been made. The IAC is
specifically designed for couples who choose to stay together even
when violence has occurred in their relationship and who seek to
understand the violence rather than lock it away. Intimate Abuse
Circles are especially helpful to immigrant, minority, and religious families where it is more likely that the family will remain
intact (Griffing et. al., 2002; Snyder & Scheer, 1981) lACs may also
be used in cases where the partners have children together and
would like to separate in a more amicable fashion.
The IAC recognizes as a guiding principle that intimate abuse
involves more than just an offender and victim. This is different
from how conferences have been imagined thus far. The IAC process recognizes that the abusive relationship probably involves a
dynamic that both parties must acknowledge in order to improve
how they relate to each other. The process does not involve victim
blaming, but rather the recognition that even the more victimized
party maintains some power in the relationship. It provides a
forum for the more violent party to take full responsibility for the
violence committed in the relationship, while also validating that
intimate relationships involve two people with their complex and
sometimes conflicting needs.
The IAC will enable both parties to choose members of their
care communities to participate in the Circle process. Members of
the care community help develop concrete and measurable methods for addressing the violent relationship. The role of the care
community including family members and community leaders,
will be to participate in creating effective solutions, but also to
help monitor and, in turn, reduce the violence.
Drawing from principles of restorative justice and family
group conferencing, the Intimate Abuse Circle model seeks to
honor the partners' choices to remain together despite the violence. The IAC model achieves this goal by establishing circles
of support within the couple's community that foster healing
within their cultural context. The IAC model addresses the underlying dynamics of abuse while fostering safety for the affected
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parties through a formalized network of family and community
supports; this can be utilized in conjunction with or instead of
criminal justice interventions.
This model acknowledges the reality that many people seek to
end the violence-not the relationship. The circle conferences will
be facilitated by professionally trained domestic violence experts
who will recognize oppressive dynamics and ensure they do not
get reproduced in the Circle process. These professionals will
guarantee that all parties speak and that the feminist value of
parity is actually realized.
This radical new model moves intimate abuse beyond the
narrow parameters of mainstream feminism, allowing for the
possibility of reconceptualizing the issue to incorporate its nuances and dynamics. Doing so provides the opportunity to address the problem more holistically and directly. It also provides
a more culturally specific response that addresses the unique
gender dimensions of the problem, including violence by both
men and women in heterosexual and homosexual relationships.
With a new conceptualization such as this one, John Braithwaite's
path breaking work in restorative justice provides a model for
rethinking how we address this problem in a more sensitive,
compassionate, and empowering manner. It allows for the people
who actually own the issue-the parties themselves-to claim
their stake in healing it.
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Managing Social Conflict-The Evolution
of a Practical Theory
DAVID B. MOORE

Consultant, Sydney, Australia

This article describes the co-evolution of a process and a theory. Through
the 1990s, the process known as "conferencing" moved beyond child
welfare and youth justice, to applications in schools, neighbourhoods,
and workplaces. In each of these applications, conferencing has assisted
participants to acknowledge and transform interpersonal conflict, as a
prelude to negotiating a plan of action. Much analysis of conferencing
has been linked with social theorist John Braithwaite, whose work has
influenced the development of a multidisciplinarytheory of these process
dynamics, and the development of guiding principles.Key links between
theory and practice are described in chronologicalsequence.
Key words: Conferencing, conflict management, restorative & transformative justice, deliberativedemocracy

Introduction
This special issue of the Journalof Sociology and Social Welfare
examines a process and a body of theory. The process is known
as "conferencing", and it is being used by a growing number of
professions. Conferencing provides a conversation with a formal
structure, and that structure enables participants to address constructively an incident or issue that has caused significant conflict
between them. Different titles distinguish applications of conferencing in different fields of professional practice such as child
welfare, corrections, and schools. "Family group conferencing"
is a common title when the process is used in social welfare.
Key features are consistent across the various applications of
the conferencing process. In all of them a third party convenor
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number I
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brings together in a circle the group of people affected by the
issue in question. The convenor directs the group's conversation
through a series of stages, the last of which involves developing
an action plan to improve their situation.
A growing body of evidence indicates that conferencing can
improve the quality and quantity of relationships within each
participating community. Various theories have been used to
explain why and to justify the use of family group conferencing
and other versions of the conferencing process. One social theorist
has been particularly prominent in these dialogues and debates.
Braithwaite's theoretical work was first linked with the practice of conferencing in the early 1990s. Accordingly, we have
now had over a decade of dialogue and debate about the fit
between conferencing practice and a body of social theory of
which Braithwaite's work is exemplary. This dialogue of theorists
and practitioners has continued as conferencing has spread well
beyond its initial applications in child welfare and youth justice.
The dialogue has helped keep the conferencing process aligned
with the programs that deliver it, and with underlying principles.
My contribution to this special issue comes out of an unusual
relationship between theory and practice. In the early 1990s, as
academic advisor to a pioneering conferencing program in Australia, I connected the conferencing process with the theory outlined in Braithwaite's (1989) then-just-published Crime, Shame and
Reintegration. I subsequently evaluated aspects of that program
under the aegis of a federally-funded research program.
After working in state government policy development and
program implementation, I co-founded a company to promote
conferencing and related conflict management practices. I was
thus involved in the expansion of conferencing both geographically (to programs in North America and Western Europe), and to
sectors/professions beyond justice and social welfare (including
education, workplace relations, and community development). In
this article, I outline some lessons from this experience of promoting conferencing and related processes within various programs.
These lessons are arranged in chronological order, and are linked
with ideas found in Braithwaite's work.
Some of the lessons discussed here have direct relevance for
social welfare applications of conferencing. Others may be of
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indirect relevance. The one overriding lesson, however, is that
good theory assists good practice. So we must all keep talking,
within and between different fields of professional practice, about
the principles and practices with which we work.
Lesson: Consistently Distinguish Program from Process
The genesis of conferencing programs in New Zealand and
Australia (Australasia) has been described extensively (Hudson
et al., 1996). The New Zealand national parliament legislated in
1989 for the use of family group conferencing to deal with certain
care and protection matters and certain youth justice matters.
New Zealand's Department of Social Welfare was made responsible for delivering both applications of the process. In essence,
the introduction of conferencing into the child welfare and youth
justice systems gave considerable decision-making power to individuals and groups in cases where state officials might previously
have imposed decisions on those individuals.
The program has generally been judged very successful according to a number of measures, both for the individuals and
families involved, and for its positive impact on the youth justice
and care and protection systems. Standard measures include participants' satisfaction with the process. Standard outcome measures
include reduced reoffending, in youth justice cases, and more realistic, safer outcome plans in care and protection matters. Positive
outcomes have been measured qualitatively-through powerful
individual stories-and quantitatively, with impressive statistical
outcomes (See e.g., Maxwell & Morris, 1992; Trimboli, 2000; Luke
& Lind, 2002).
The New Zealand national legislation of 1989 inspired the first
Australian program to use conferencing in youth justice. (This
program began in 1991, in Wagga Wagga, the largest town in
the Riverina agricultural region of southern New South Wales.)
Administrative arrangements for this first Australian conferencing program were rather different from those in New Zealand.
Most obviously, local police administered the program without
the need of new legislation. This was possible because of the size
and structure of the police agency in question, the laws under
which it was operating, and some widespread cultural changes
in contemporary policing.
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The legal space for police to convene a process such as conferencing already existed. Using the British common law principle of "constabular discretion", Australian police officers have,
historically, exercised some freedom to determine how best to
deal with less serious (non-indictable) offences. In each Australian
state, various laws and administrative guidelines have built on
this discretion, introducing diversionary options such as police
cautioning for young people (Seymour, 1988).
The process dynamics of a police caution were generally not
defined with precision. So police in the Wagga Wagga patrol could
establish and administer a program of "effective cautioning using
family group conferencing" (Moore & O'Connell, 1994) under
existing legal and administrative guidelines. The idea was simple.
Here was a new option in cases involving young people aged from
ten to seventeen. The option would be available if one or more
young people had freely admitted their role in a non-indictable
offense, and so could be considered eligible for a police caution,
rather than having their case sent to court. Now, instead of a police
sergeant personally cautioning a young person to desist from
offending behavior, that same sergeant could bring together those
affected by the offending behavior, and convene a conference.
The sergeant would become more of a referee than a player in the
cautioning process.
If structural, legal and administrative factors made all this
possible, what made it desirable-at least to reform-minded local
police officers-was a cultural change in contemporary policing.
The philosophy of community policing had widespread influence
on police policies and procedures through the 1990s (Skolnick &
Bayley, 1988; Moore, 1992) Appropriately, the local 'Beat Police'
Unit administered this Australian pilot program of conferencing
in youth justice. This unit was staffed by the group of officers
expressly dedicated to the philosophy and practice of community
policing.
The police-administered pilot program of conferencing in and
around Wagga Wagga was strongly supported by a coalition of
local professionals with an interest in youth justice and social
welfare. But the program also rapidly attracted attention further
afield. And one reason for that widespread attention was Braithwaite's interest in what soon became known as the Wagga Model.
As always, terminology was very influential here.
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The word "model" conflated two distinguishing elements of
the arrangements in Wagga: a program administered by the local
community policing unit, and a process that evolved over several
years, as its theory-based design was systematically tested, redesigned, and retested. Using one word, model, to refer to two
elements obscured our understanding of both elements for some
time. But dialogue between theory and practice gradually helped
us distinguish more precisely the program from the process.
As other conferencing programs developed in Australasia,
North America, Western Europe, and South Africa, consistent
concerns were: "What agency should administer the program?"
and "Who should convene conferences?" To those of us observing
the day-to-day workings of the Wagga Model, however, the most
interesting feature was not the set of administrative arrangements for the program but, rather, the process itself. In other
words, it was "What do people actually do when they're in the
room?" rather than "What rules determine who enters the room,
and who administers those rules?" Braithwaite's involvement
with the Wagga Model began with an attempt to answer this
question.
The possibility of establishing a conferencing program in
Wagga had been first formally raised at a meeting of academics,
social services and justice professionals, and local city administrators. I attended that meeting as coordinator of a "justice studies"
program offered nationally from the local university campus.
Now a group of local service providers was considering establishing a program. To do so properly required a clearly articulated
explanation of what we (thought we) were doing. Braithwaite's
Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989) seemed to provide a theoretical counterpart to the process of family group conferencingat least in its youth justice applications. Braithwaite's theory of
reintegrative shaming provided a basis for philosophical reflection and an analytical framework for action research. We would
probably need to adjust process and program-the practice. We
might need to adjust the guiding principles-the theory. But without a working hypothesis for what conferencing was, we couldn't
begin this dialogue of theory and practice.
In essence, Crime, Shame and Reintegration offered a metaanalysis of major schools of criminology. Rather than emphasizing points of difference, Braithwaite provided a fair-minded
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summary of these schools, and an overview of the empirical
data that support their respective theoretical claims. The result
can be compared to a Venn diagram. At its center are points
of commonality in theories about what causes crime, and what
causes people to desist from crime.
Braithwaite's theoretical synthesis suggested-not surprisingly-that the more people have to lose from involvement in
crime, the more likely they are to desist from criminal activity.
Crucially, this is not a simplistic material analysis.Rather, it places
adequate emphasis on psycho-social factors such as a sense of
personal control and the presence of social support. If individuals
feel they have some sense of dignity, a sense of hope for the future,
and significant positive relationships, then they have a great deal
to lose from behavior that damages those relationships.
Such ideas seem commonsense to professionals in social welfare and social work. The ideas can also be theorized in terms
of family systems and social networks. Some of the activists who
had pushed for reform of New Zealand's child welfare and youth
justice systems had expressed similar views. Appropriately, some
criminological research in New Zealand at this time was producing much the same findings (Leibrich, 1995). And these theories
about reintegration had significant policy implications (Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994).
The terminology of reintegration was chosen as a counterpoint to a famous phrase in North American legal sociology.
In the 1950s, Harold Garfinkel had articulated "conditions of
successful degradation ceremonies." Garfinkel was suggesting
ways to strengthen symbolic messages of social disapproval sent
by the criminal justice system (Garfinkel, 1956). From a strong
base of evidence, Braithwaite was now suggesting the opposite
approach. He was arguing for a strategy of reintegrating rather
than "degrading"-stigmatizing and segregating-people who
had caused social harm.
At the core of the theory was not just a suggestion, based on
strong sociologicalevidence, for decreasing reoffending by increasing social support. There was also a psychological claim about the
nature of processes, or "ceremonies." The claim was captured in
the title of the book: in the wake of a crime, social reintegration
becomes possible once there has been an understanding of the
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harm caused and an expression of remorse in a supportive setting.
At the core of this expression of remorse is a feeling of shame.
Braithwaite has since continued to speculate about the larger
social dimensions of stigmatization and reintegration, of how
what is considered shameful or not influences social regulation.
This work is typically both descriptive and prescriptive, and it addresses some very broad themes (Braithwaite, 2002). But already,
while the theory still specifically concerned formal responses to
criminal behavior, it raised very broad questions.
As one looked for points of commonality between Braithwaite's theory and related theories across the spectrum of social science and humanities disciplines, the area that seemed
most to warrant more careful attention was that of psychology
(Moore, 1993). In particular, the theory of "reintegrative shaming"
begged the question of whether emotions-and specifically the
emotion of shame-were human universals or were "culturally
specific." Empirical evidence from conferencing prompted speculation here. As many conference evaluators and convenors have
since noted, despite all the differences from one case to the next,
a strikingly similar emotional dynamic seems to recur in conferences, irrespective of the nature of the case, the numbers present,
or their cultural backgrounds. (Moore with Forsythe, 1995)
Convenors ask questions in a particular sequence, encouraging participants to paint a picture of what happened and how
people have been affected, before considering how the situation
might be improved. As these questions are asked and answered,
the group as a whole seem to move through a series of stages.
Each of these stages is dominated by a small number of emotions.
Cognitive psychology, with its emphasis on conscious decisionmaking, did not adequately explain this group psychological
dynamic. Nor did psychodynamic theory, with its emphasis on unconscious drives. Nor did behavioristpsychology, which provided
a description of behavior rather than a theory of psychology.
I had noted that there was indeed a profound emotional turning point in the latter half of most well-convened conferences.
It marked the point at which participants could begin working
constructively towards a plan of action for making things better.
Initially, this turning point seemed consistent with the theory of
psychological process hypothesized by Braithwaite: a sense of
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shame would be experienced once the full social effects of harmful
behavior had been explained by those most affected, and had
been understood. And because this shame was experienced in a
supportive setting, it could be a prelude to social reintegrationrather than stigmatization and segregation. But closer observation suggested that this theory needed modification in a subtle
but profound aspect.
After observing many conferences, after audio-recording and
analyzing transcripts, comparing filmed role-played conferences
with the 'real thing', and interviewing observers, convenors and
participants at length, a key feature of this emotional turning
point in conferences was clear. It was not an experience confined
to any one individual. Rather, all of those present experienced
something profound. They experienced a moment of "collective
vulnerability", as a Canadian colleague described it in a training
workshop. It was several years before we articulated adequately
the emotional sequence leading to and following this turning
point in the conferencing process. (A brief account is provided
below.)
Meanwhile, justice system programs used some or all of the
convenors' (process) training that a group of us involved with the
program in Wagga had developed. So too did the first programs
in schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces. Indeed, the only
professional domains where conferencing was applied with little
reference to this process seem to have been social welfare and
social work (see Ban, 2000; Cashmore & Kiely, 2000; Burford &
Hudson, 2000). And until fairly recently, there has been only
limited dialogue between social services and other applications of
conferencing. But inter-professional dialogue about conferencing
is now increasing, and one reason seems to be a common interest
in an adequately articulated psychosocial theory of the process.
As conferencing programs are established in various fields, more
and more practitioners have observed the need to look more
deeply, to pay closer attention to the dynamics of conferencing
and related processes.
Paradoxically, a better understanding of the process dynamic
was assisted by the parallel project of looking more broadly, of reconsidering the principles that the conferencing process seemed to
exemplify. Reconsidering the guiding or foundational principles
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of conferencing made it easier to see the process through different
lenses.
Lesson: Distinguish Principlesfrom Program and Process
Through the 1990s, a great deal was learned from programs
that applied the conferencing process in different settings, in
Australia, North America, Western Europe and elsewhere. New
Zealand's national legislation provided for conferencing in care
and protection matters and in youth justice, all under the administrative aegis of the Department of Social Welfare. In contrast, the
first youth justice conferencing program in New South Wales was
administered by police, as was the first large random-allocation
study of conferencing, which began in the Australian Capital
Territory in 1994 (Sherman et. al., 1998).
Some local police patrols (in other states and the Northern
Territory, and especially in rural and remote areas) replicated the
Wagga model. In other words, they used the training methodology we had developed, and administered a diversionary program
of "effective cautioning using conferencing." (Nearly a decade
later, working with reformers within the Northern Territory Government, we used the same model to provide a humane alternative to the Territory's notorious mandatory sentencing laws.)
Meanwhile, in 1993, South Australia passed the first Australian statewide legislation for conferencing in youth justice. Although much of the framework was influenced by New Zealand's
legislation, the program was administered by the South Australian Courts Administration Authority, which, in turn, established a semi-autonomous Conferencing Unit. Schools also began
to use the process, with initiative taken variously at the level of
individual schools, districts (boards), and statewide departments
(Cameron & Thorsborne, 2001). In Canada and the United States
from 1994, some schools and police agencies began to use versions
of the training material developed in Australia.
Social welfare applications of the process were piloted with
various administrative arrangements, including grant-funded
dispute settlement agencies, faith-based organizations, and government agencies (Burford & Hudson, 2000). In a further significant variation, conferencing was also used to address conflict
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in inner city neighborhoods (Abramson & Moore, 2002). Finally,
as far as we know, the first regular formal use of conferencing to
address conflict in workplaces began in New South Wales in 1995,
after a group of us founded Transformative Justice Australia.
In all these applications, one of the attractions of the conferencing process was that it seemed more than just a process. To
bring a group of people into a circle, and to enable them to deal
constructively with problems that affected everybody present,
seemed consistent with various aspirational political philosophies. For instance, conferencing could be seen as an example of
participatory democracy. It could be seen as realizing some practical middle ground between liberal and communitarian philosophies of civic involvement (Moore, 1993).
Likewise, in justice system applications, the process seemed
consistent with a "republican" model proposed by Braithwaite
and philosopher Phillip Pettit, whereby justice processes and
systems are judged according to the degree to which they increase
or decrease the "dominion" of those affected (Braithwaite & Pettit,
1990). The process also seemed to have much in common with
other interventions informed by family systems theory or practices such as narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990; Niemeyer,
2001; Perry, 2002). Finally, conferencing seemed consistent with
the movement for restorative justice (Moore with Forsythe, 1995).
Much of the theoretical discussion about conferencing through
the latter half of the 1990s was subsumed by debate and dialogue
conducted in the language of restorative justice. In retrospect,
it seems that this development may have constrained unduly
thinking about conferencing, and may have temporarily limited
applications of the process. To understand how this occurred,
we need to consider the origins of the modern restorative justice
movement.
A theoretical distinction between retribution and restoration
or reconciliation had long existed in jurisprudence and in social
theory-for instance, in the work of G.H. Mead (1917-18). The
distinction was also part of older faith traditions. In the Christian
tradition, an emphasis on the restoring power of forgiveness
was particularly strong in Anabaptist--Quaker and Mennonitecommunities. So it was perhaps not surprising that Mennonite
activists played a significant role in developing the process known
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as "victim-offender reconciliation." The acronym "VORP" was
derived from victim-offender reconciliation programs developed
in the mid-1970s, first in Ontario, then Indiana and various other
US states and Canadian provinces.
These developments have been well chronicled in an ongoing
series of anthologies edited by Burt Galaway, Joe Hudson and colleagues (see also Zehr, 1990). Contributing writer/practitioners
typically offer a general critique of the criminal justice system,
wish to improve the wellbeing of all those affected by crime, and,
specifically, wish to create circumstances whereby those affected
can themselves address the specific harm they have experienced
and deal with perceived underlying causes (Daly & Immarigeon, 1998).
Through the 1980s, this philosophy of restorative justice was
represented primarily by one process. It was called either Victim
Offender Reconciliation-a term that emphasized the desired
outcome--or Victim Offender Mediation (VOM)-a phrase that
emphasized process. Through the 1990s, however, conferencing,
circle sentencing and other processes were also deemed exemplary restorative justice processes. Chapters and articles were
published with grids comparing and contrasting their similarities
and differences (e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, 2002) And there are
indeed many procedural and philosophical similarities between
these processes, and practitioners generally have similar goals.
A key administrative or program difference between conferencing, victim-offender mediation and circle sentencing is that circle
sentencing is typically an alternativeto traditional court, victimoffender mediation typically an adjunct,while conferencing can be
both alternative and adjunct. But the more significant differences
concern process dynamics. (The following generalizations apply
in most though perhaps not all cases.)
Conferencing seemed to differ from circle sentencing in its
definition of community, with greater emphasis on the community of family, friends and/or colleagues, and somewhat less
emphasis on state officials. Conferencing also differed from circle
sentencing in its explicit definition of the collective agreement
reached by participants as something other than a sentence.
This difference is partly a function of where in the system these
two processes are used. But the difference arises also because
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conferencing explicitly asks different questions from those traditionally asked by the criminal legal system. The traditional social
welfare and justice systems have both asked: Who is our subject
and what do we do to them? Conferencing, in contrast, asks: What
has happened? How have people been affected? What do we now do to
make things better?
This difference in the focus of proceedings is also true of
Victim Offender Mediation. Conferencing is not designed primarily for victims, nor for perpetrators. It is equally for all those
other participants who attend. It is for anybody who, by virtue
of friendship, family or professional relations, has been affected
by what happened. So conferencing seems to differ from VOM in
its emphasis on the whole community of people affected by an
incident or incidents and the associated conflict.
Secondly, conferencing is designed for cases where interpersonal conflict is the presenting problem. The theory that we developed to understand conferencing and to guide conferencing
convenors explicitly distinguishes conflicts from disputes (Moore
& McDonald, 2001). A dispute requires two parties, and it requires
a set of facts around which the dispute occurs. It need not involve
negative feelings.
Conflict is more general, is associated with strongly negative
feelings, and may be experienced within a person, within a group,
and/or between groups. So a dispute may cause conflict, and a
state of conflict may generate disputes. But conflict can exist in
the absence of any specific dispute. In other situations, disputes
can be resolved without conflict. Different approaches may be
required for each type of situation.
Accordingly, from the mid 1990s, I emphasized the need to
distinguish three approaches to conflict: (1) maximizing conflict,
as a side effect of adversarial dispute resolution; (2) minimizing conflict, as a tactic in the non-adversarial dispute resolution
process of assisted negotiation known as (interest-based) mediation; (3) acknowledging and transforming conflict, the optimal
approach where specific disputes are merely symptoms of more
general conflict, or when there is conflict but no dispute.
For instance, when someone admits having acted in ways that
offended against and victimized others, there is undisputed harm.
In other words, there is not necessarily any dispute. Accordingly,
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the primary need is not to negotiate, using a process designed to
minimize conflict. Rather, the primary need is to acknowledge the
conflict between people and, if possible, to transform that conflict
into cooperation. Conferencing is designed expressly to do this.
So this was a subtle but significant difference between conferencing and the model of mediation-as-assisted-negotiation that
we understood to have been adopted on behalf of perpetrators
and victims of crime (Moore, 2000). The distinction between these
processes is similar to that made between "interest-based" and
"transformative" models of mediation. But the conferencing process has a more specific structure than most models of transformative mediation. And it is informed by a psychosocial theory
about the emotional stages that this structure allows (Moore &
Abramson, 2002).
A further interesting difference between conferencing and
VOM is the direction in which these processes have promoted
reform. The mediation process was developed for Alternative
Dispute Resolution in other fields, and then introduced to the
justice system by reformers (Umbreit, 1994). Conferencing, conversely, was first used in justice and child welfare applications,
then implemented in successful programs in other regulatory
systems.
So what is it about the theoretical basis and structure of conferencing that have made it suitable for systemic reform outside the
justice and child welfare systems? This is a question about process
and principles. It links neatly with a debate that was occurring
by the early 2000s concerning the nature of restorative justice
programs. Strang, a colleague of Braithwaite's at the Australian
National University, suggested that differences in national culture
help explain differences in the restorative justice movement in
Europe, North America and Australasia.
Strang perceived a distinction between a "support-focused"
victims' movement in Europe and its counterpart in the United
States, which has a stronger "rights-focus." Many readers will
recognize the parallel between this dichotomy and Gilligan's
(1982) competing ethics of care and of justice. Strang suggests that
Australian restorative justice programs have taken a third way,
moving beyond the dichotomy of justice versus care. She provides
examples from RISE (the Reintegrative Shaming Experiment), a
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randomized controlled evaluation of conferencing in Canberra
that was inspired by the program in Wagga Wagga. (A Justice
Research Consortium, with the backing of the Home Office, has
been implementing this evaluation on a much wider scale in the
United Kingdom since 2001, when we trained the first group of
convenors for that program.)
RISE researchers in Canberra found that victims of crime
whose case went to conference rather than court were presented
with greater opportunities for material reparation, yet they were
less likely to ask for money as part of the case outcome. They
were significantly less distressed and angry, and rated higher
in sympathy and trust, than the control group. This effect was
most pronounced for victims of violent crime. Four times as
many conference victims received an apology. Conference victims
were more satisfied with the information about case processing
and outcomes, the opportunity to participate in the development
of case outcomes, and the "fair and respectful treatment" they
received (Strang, 2002).
Cultural and institutional variations may well account for
significant differences in the victims' movement in Europe and
North America, and, indeed, in many other parts of the world.
They may well provide part of the explanation for this apparent
third way in Australasia. But a procedural factor seems at least
as significant, namely that the victims interviewed in Strang's
Australian evaluation had attended a conference. In other words,
they had participated in a process designed expressly to answer
the sorts of concerns traditionally raised by victims of crime.
As Strang's study reminds us, research shows consistent criticisms of the justice system. Its processes are perceived as unfair, as
are the outcomes that those processes generate. People affected by
crime feel excluded from decision-making, and outcomes tend to
neglect non-material dimensions.
People in many other situations express similar concerns.
Conferencing seems to address concerns raised by victims of
crime about process and outcome, for the same reasons it is
judged positively in other situations where participants have been
in conflict. In all these situations, the primary problem is not
a dispute. There is either undisputed harm, or there are many
poorly resolved disputes associated with the conflict. Either way,
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an effective process will need systematically to revisit the key
causes and consequences of conflict.
For this reason, I suggested it was not accurate to interpret
conferencing as third-party assisted negotiation with extra participants. Analysis of the process dynamics reveals that the differences between these processes are more significant than who is in
the room (Moore, 2000). To use phrases associated with the work
of the Harvard negotiation project, the structure of conferences
enables participants to systematically "get to peace" before they
seek to "get to yes" (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). And a key tactic
for getting to peace is to engage a whole social network.
For the same reasons, it seems not quite accurate to call conferencing a victim-offender process. Even when conferencing in
the justice system deals with an incident involving a single perpetrator and single direct victim of a crime, many other people
will have been affected. And if conferencing is the process used to
address the associated conflict, then many people should attend
the conference. Again, the process is for all of them.
Likewise, it seems not quite accurate to call conferencing
specifically an exemplar of restorative justice. Yes, it is a process
that can be used in justice systems. It may indeed restore some
elements of the situation-perhaps a sense of relative harmony
or some similar psychological and/or social factor. But the more
striking feature of a process that engages a whole social network
in conflict is less restoration and more transformation. For this
reason, in the mid-1990s, we adopted the hybrid term "transformative justice" (which was at that time most associated with
Canadian activist, the late Ruth Morris (Morris, 2000).
This term "transformative justice" is a hybrid in the sense
that it combines information about process and system. The word
"transformative" refers to the change in participants' perspectives
and feelings, as they work towards an agreement to transform
their circumstances.
So what was the defining essence of conferencing in its various
applications? Again, it seemed not quite accurate to describe
conferencing primarily as an example of participatory democracy.
Yes, the guiding principles for convenors of participation, equity,
deliberation and non-tyranny are those of deliberative democratic
process (Moore & McDonald, 2001). But to define conferencing in
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these terms is to risk emphasizing process over outcome. Which
again begs the key questions: What is the generic desired outcome
of conferencing?
Lesson: The Generic Process and
Outcome is Conflict Management
A generic desired outcome of conferencing only became clear
once the process had been observed in three and more specific
program applications. Only then did broader patterns appear beyond the administrative concerns and risk minimization practices
specific to that agency or profession.
Social welfare programs have tended to adopt conferencing
(and, indeed, Alternative Dispute Resolution process generally)
in response to concerns that a social services system was disempowering. Conferencing increases client participation while
being consistent with family systems theory and other key ideas
informing contemporary welfare practice. So a key desired outcome of conferencing in social welfare has been empowerment.
Justice system reformers have tended to promote conferencing for multiple reasons. Key desired outcomes include reducing
the rate of reoffending relative to other interventions, diversion
from the formal system, a voice for victims of crime, a more
general sense of participation for those affected by crime, and
even strengthened communities.
Some of these outcomes have also appealed to members of
school communities. But conferencing has appealed above all
to those schools seeking a "whole school approach to behavior
management", and appropriate responses to behaviors such as
harassment and bullying. A system goal, in many cases, has been
to reduce the alarmingly high rates of suspension and exclusion
from schools in the wake of such behaviors.
In welfare, justice and schools applications, program administrators are dealing with relatively (and in some cases literally)
captive audiences. Conferencing had only to be more appealing
than the alternative processes to be judged positively by participants. But the situation in workplaces is rather different. In
many cases, the argument for conferencing had to be put far
more persuasively if work colleagues were voluntarily to attend
a conference. And it was when we began offering conferencing in

Managing Social Conflict

87

industrial/organizational settings that the need for a more thorough paradigm shift became glaringly obvious. As it happens, the
exercise of revisiting our original hypothesis about conferencing
in the justice system helped articulate this new paradigm.
Close observation of conference dynamics suggested two key
modifications to the theory that Braithwaite had postulated in
Crime, Shame and Reintegration, and that we had applied to conferencing. First, the use of conferencing was clearly not confined
to single incidents of undisputed harm, although the process was
used overwhelmingly for such cases in the justice system.
Second, the key process dynamic was not that shame was
induced in one individual. Rather, the key emotional shifts in the
process were collective. They occurred as participants reflected
on a complex picture of how things were, mapped each person's
contribution to what happened, and gained a shared understanding and feeling that "we're all in this together."
What seemed to be happening physiologically was a shift in
affects, or "basic emotions." The shift begins from the moment the
convenor, quite transparently, shifts the focus from judgements
about individuals to analysis of actions and/or events. This shift
in subject matter begins the first affective shift, from emotions
most associated with conflict-anger, fear and contempt-to the
emotions of distress, disgust and surprise. These emotions are
consistently expressed about harmful actions (in cases where the
conference is dealing with undisputed harm), and/or about the
general set of circumstances (in cases where the conference is
addressing many disputes).
When a picture has been painted, collectively, of what has
happened and how people have been affected, the convenor
creates a space for reflection, asking some or all participants
whether they have anything to add. This is a logical break, the
divide between looking at the past and the present, and looking
to the future. Again, in parallel with the structural logic of the
process, this is also a profound affective turning point. Various
metaphors describe the physiology of participants at this point.
They will, for instance, look as though they have "had the wind
knocked out of their sails."
This is where an argument for cultural distinctions in the
understanding of emotion might be particularly relevant. Our
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understanding of what is happening here is that participants
are experiencing a human universal, the state triggered when a
positive emotional experience is abruptly but incompletely interrupted. And this affective state is amplified, as is any strong
affective state, by being experienced collectively. It is triggered as
participants reflect on how things got worse, and it is amplified
because they have reflected collectively on that question. (The
theory that seems best to explain this phenomenon is affect theory.
For more on this theory and its significance for conferencing, see
Demos, 1994; Moore & Abramson, 2002).
Although justice system applications of conferencing dealt
with undisputed harm that had been categorized as criminal,
what conference participants were ultimately addressing was not
the crime as such. Rather they were addressing the conflict associated with crime. As the sources of conflict were identified and
acknowledged, participants experienced an emotional transformation, then developed a plan to transform their circumstances.
In short, the process dynamic was "conflict, acknowledgment and
transformation." (Moore & McDonald, 2001)
This distinction between crime and conflict associated with
crime became more obvious as conferencing began to be used
further within the formal justice system, rather than as a diversionary option. In conferencing programs supported and/or
administered by corrections departments, conferencing is an autonomous adjunct to all the usual processes associated with judging, sentencing and treating. A trial resolves a dispute about
culpability. Sentencing imposes some form of (punitive and/or
therapeutic) treatment. But conferencing provides an opportunity to address interpersonal conflict that a system of imposed
punishment and/or therapy is simply not equipped to provide.
Importantly, this theoretical model-that causes of conflict are
acknowledged and there is some sort of associated transformation
-does not assume that conflict will necessarily be resolved. It
is more accurate to think of conflict as being managed. In some
cases, attitudes towards others may not change significantly. Conflict will be managed by a mutual agreement to alter behaviors,
procedures and so on.
But systematically mapping what factors contributed to the
conflict helps ensure that any plan of action is likely to be fair and
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realistic and stands the best chance of being implemented. There
may be less transformation as a result of the process, and more
transformation as a result of the outcome. Change comes from an
action plan that is put into practice in the following weeks and
months.
In some applications of conferencing, too much can be made
of this distinction between process and outcome. It is perfectly
understandable that government-backed programs should emphasize outcome plans; agencies require tangible outcomes and
some official record of those outcomes. But an action plan is of
minor importance to participants in some conferences. Again, this
tends to be most obvious in serious cases of undisputed harm.
Participants sometimes say that gaining a shared understanding of the tragic events allows them to continue with their lives.
As a father who had lost his only daughter expressed it: "The
process is the outcome."
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Responsive Regulation in Child Welfare:
Systemic Challenges to Mainstreaming
the Family Group Conference
PAUL ADAMS AND SUSAN M. CHANDLER

University of Hawaii at Manoa

The purpose of this article is to examine the challenges inherent in transforming child welfare services. We apply Braithwaite'smodel of responsive
regulation to the restorativepractice of family group conferencing in child
welfare. Shifting the role of the state away from controllerof families in the
child protective services system to one of regulatorypartnerwith them is
extraordinarilydifficult. The paper looks at the complexities of reorienting
child welfare services through the use of family group conferences on a
large scale.
Key words: responsive regulation,restorativejustice, family group conference, child welfare, child protection
In this article, we argue that Family Group Conferencing
(FGC) in child welfare has a transformative potential, but one that
is hard to realize for systemic reasons. We first examine the application of Braithwaite's (2002) model of responsive regulation to
child protective services (CPS) in the United States. We argue that
model enables us to understand the relation of two apparently
contradictory but essential elements of FGC-empowerment and
the context of social control or state coercion. We discuss the
difficulties of implementing FGC in the United States and suggest
that the range of models and variations currently being practiced
across the country may be in part evidence of and a response to
these difficulties.
Drawing on the experience of the State of Hawaii in adopting
a uniform model of FGC and its application statewide to over
2,000 cases, we conclude with a discussion of the kinds of system
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
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change needed to facilitate and support the mainstreaming of
FGC. The wide variations in FGC and in other forms of family
group decision-making (FGDM) may be decried as representing
compromises of core principles that undergird the model. This variety also is making evaluative research difficult since researchers
are failing to specify a consistently applied model of the elements
of FGC prior to analyzing its effectiveness. On the other hand,
the diversity of forms of FGC may be celebrated both as creative
adaptations to local conditions and cultures and as providing a
natural experiment without prejudging the key, efficacious components of the approach. We sidestep these disputes and take
a different path here-one of exploring the systemic context in
which policy-makers and practitioners are attempting to apply
FGC principles and processes.
Conferencing as Regulation
Braithwaite's (2002) work on restorative justice and responsive regulation provides a valuable conceptual framework for
this undertaking. It enables us to see both the restorative aspects
of FGC-its relation to indigenous practices aiming at solving
problems and setting things right, its empowerment of families, and its widening the circle of care and control beyond the
professional-client relationship-and FGC's role in the context
of responsive regulation of families. Braithwaite's discussion of
responsive regulation draws on the field of business regulation.
It enables us to see, in the complex field of child welfare, how
combining the empowering aspects of FGC with the coercive
power of the state is not necessarily a limitation or contradiction.
Rather, empowerment and control are different, but necessary
and mutually enriching aspects of a dynamic model of state
regulation of families to protect children.
The Braithwaite Pyramid
(2002)
contends that "restorative justice, deterBraithwaite
rence and incapacitation are all limited and flawed theories of
compliance" (p. 32). Each needs to be understood and applied in
a model that includes all three. In his figure entitled "Toward an
Integration of Restorative, Deterrent and Incapacitative Justice,"
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Rational
Actor
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Virtuous
Actor

Restorative justice

Figure 1
Source: Braithwaite J., Restorativejustice and responsive regulation.Oxford &
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 32.

Braithwaite (2002, p. 32) hierarchically orders these concepts and
places restorative justice at the base of the pyramid, filling up
most of the space.
The pyramid provides a dynamic, non-formalist model of
governmental regulation, whether of a nursing home, a nuclear
power station, an insurance company, or a family. The formalist
approach to regulation seeks to define in advance which problems or failures of compliance require what official responses
and mandate them in regulations. In responsive regulation, by
contrast, there is a presumption, regardless of the seriousness of
the offense or violation, in favor of starting official intervention
at the base of the pyramid. Moving up the pyramid to deterrence
and, ultimately, incapacitation, is a response not to the seriousness
of the harm done but to the failure to elicit reform and repair at the
base with restorative justice processes. Of course, as with other
violent crimes-a shooting spree in progress, for example-an
immediate move to incapacitation (at least temporary) may be
necessary in cases of child abuse where there is imminent and
continuing danger to the child.
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The presumption in favor of starting at the base of the pyramid, Braithwaite (2002) argues, not only favors less coercive and
costly state intervention where possible, but also makes more coercive measures more legitimate when escalation up the pyramid
is necessary. This is important because "when regulation is seen
as more legitimate, more procedurally fair, compliance with the
law is more likely" (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 33; see also Neff in this
issue).
By analogy, accreditation of a professional school, whether of
law, medicine, nursing, or social work, is a process of required selfregulation through a process of self-study and reform. The accrediting body, e.g., the Council on Social Work Education in the case
of U.S. baccalaureate and masters of social work programs, has
a range of escalating options to identify and encourage schools
to address concerns and come into compliance, culminating in
the ultimate and rarely used action of withdrawing or denying
accredited status. In extreme situations, withdrawal might be
immediate rather than a final step in a succession of regulatory
actions. Although this option of denying a school accreditation is
understood by all to be at the Council's disposal as a last resort,
site visitors and accreditation commissioners work in collegial
partnership with schools with the shared aim of avoiding escalation up the regulatory pyramid.
In applying this model to a business such as a nursing home,
nuclear power station, or insurance company, a regulator would
begin to work with the firm's management at the base of the
pyramid. Both management and regulator are aware that if the
firm proves unable or unwilling to make the changes needed
to come into compliance, the next level of regulation will be
more coercive. At the first level, the assumption is that the firm's
management is a "virtuous actor," with the will and capacity to
respond to the regulatory process by taking the steps needed
to come into compliance. Regulator and regulated work together
to prevent a more coercive regulatory response. At the next level,
management may have no wish to cooperate with regulators or
to make the necessary changes, but is assumed to be a "rational
actor" who-faced with a fine or other penalty and the threat of
being put out of business-will calculate that it is better to comply.
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At the highest level of the regulatory pyramid, management
is assumed to be an "incompetent or irrational actor" who is
unable or unwilling to comply and who therefore needs to be
incapacitated by losing its license to operate.
Applying this model to FGC, we see conferencing as a restorative process at the base of the pyramid. Following Marshall's
widely quoted definition of restorative justice as process, FGC
may be seen as a "process whereby all the parties with a stake
in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how
to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for
the future" (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 11). Conferencing involves core
values as well as processes, having to do with healing and setting
right, moral learning, community and kin participation, respectful dialogue, responsibility, apology, forgiveness. "So restorative
justice is about restoring victims, restoring offenders, and restoring communities... Stakeholder deliberation determines what
restoration means in a specific context" (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 11).
In contrast to youth or criminal justice contexts, conferencing
in child welfare is not directly focused on the wrongdoing and
the harm done, nor is there a process, in any usual sense, of
resolving a conflict between offender and victim and between
their respective families. Instead the focus is on the future safety
and well-being of the children involved. The extended family
partners with the system professionals-the family regulatorsin order to develop a plan to achieve this. The family members
receive significantly more information than usual from the state
about their "case", including the actions of the social worker,
the official concern about the abuse or neglect, and any other
pertinent facts about resources and constraints that could affect
decision-making. The process is concerned not with holding the
"offender"-the maltreating parent-passively accountable for
past actions, but with engaging the extended family group in
taking active responsibility for generating and implementing solutions. Conferencing aspires to form a true partnership of family
and state, even though the state retains the ultimate veto power
in light of its legal mandate and responsibility to protect children.
In this sense, child welfare conferencing shares with other forms
of conferencing and restorative justice certain principles-about
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healing, moral learning, taking active responsibility for resolving
the situation-but de-emphasizes others such as apology, making
amends, and forgiveness.
These differences of emphasis notwithstanding, FGCs in child
welfare fit well at the base of Braithwaite's regulatory pyramid.
They offer a decision-making process in which the regulator (the
public child welfare agency) works with the family in a respectful
mode that assumes that the family group (if not necessarily the
parents) has both the capacity and the caring concern to come
into compliance with the law and community standards so that
children are protected from abuse and neglect. The process taps
into and mobilizes the knowledge, wisdom, and caring capacity
of the extended family, its culture and community, in order to
plan for the children's safety.
Levels of the Pyramid
FGC, from this perspective, is a process of state-enforced family self-regulation, a collaborative regulatory process in which the
professionals and any other community representatives help the
family design a strategy to come into compliance by providing information, a structure, and access to resources. However,
the regulatory context of this empowering, professional-family
partnership is one in which all understand and seek to avoid
escalation up the pyramid's levels to a more coercive regulatory
response in which the state, through its social workers and/or
family court, take over the decision-making process. At the apex
of the pyramid lies the regulatory option of incapacitation, which
in the case of families in the United States could mean the involuntary termination of parental rights and a permanent alternative
placement for the child, such as adoption.
Braithwaite (2002) suggests that in the case of business regulation, "Perhaps the most common reason ... for successive failure
of restorative justice and deterrence is that noncompliance is
neither about a lack of goodwill to comply nor about rational
calculation to cheat. It is about management not having the competence to comply" (p. 32).
Much the same may be said about families. That is, restorative,
empowering practices like FGC as well as more direct control by
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CPS may fail, not because rational and competent adults in the
family group choose to defy the child welfare regulators (CPS) or
fail to appreciate the threat of losing parental rights if they do not
comply, but rather because they lack the capacity or competence
to make the changes required for the safety and well-being of
their children. Escalation up the pyramid results from failure,
for whatever reason, to respond at lower levels of coercion. The
model also allows for movement back down the pyramid away
from coercive interventions when a family demonstrates its will
and capacity to plan for and assure the children's safety. The
model provides for movement to more or less coercive forms of
social control according to the family's behavior.
In Braithwaite's model, deterrence represents an intermediate
place in the pyramid between restorative justice and incapacitation. This fits well with the use of FGC's in the youth or adult
justice systems, for generally restorative justice occurs in the context of violations of criminal law with the potential for imposition
and escalation of formal punishment. Although child abuse and
neglect violate the law, criminal penalties are rarely invoked except in the most egregious cases. In those circumstances, criminal
sanctions are retributive measures commensurate with the perceived seriousness of the offense, not necessarily a response to the
failure of restorative regulation. Deterrence in the form of fines or
other penalties analogous to those invoked in the deterrent phase
of business regulation is similarly rare.
In child welfare, therefore, deterrence does not seem to fit
neatly between restorative justice at the base of the pyramid
and incapacitation at the top. Rather, if restorative justice at the
base takes the form of the collaborative, respectful, non-coercive
decision-making process of FGC, the place of deterrence in the
middle is taken by professional- or court-determined disposition
of the case, imposed with or without the family's agreement. In
practice, that might mean a temporary custody arrangement for
the child with a stringent time line in which the family must comply or the court would begin taking steps toward permanently
removing the child. The deterrent for the family is not the threat
of a punishment such as a fine, as might be imposed in a case of
business regulation, but loss of control, of active, decision-making
responsibility for their children, to the state.
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We may assume that such loss of control is a powerful deterrent for families that may not wish to comply with legal requirements or collaborate with the child welfare authorities, but
who nevertheless have the capacity to make and act on a rational
calculation of the inevitable consequences of their failure to do
so. In Braithwaite's scheme, these are rational actors, in contrast
both to the virtuous actors at the base of the pyramid-who seek
the best for their children and willingly collaborate in the restorative FGC process-and to the incompetent or irrational actors at
the apex who are unable or unwilling to comply. Despite some
peculiarities of the child welfare context, FGC's provide both
a form of restorative justice and an empowering, non-coercive,
respectful form of collaborative decision-making at the base of
the regulatory pyramid.
The key to applying the regulatory pyramid to child protection is to see that the levels of the pyramid do not reflect particular
outcomes but different decision-making processes with different
degrees of coercion or non-domination. For example, a decision
to remove children permanently from the care of their parents,
through guardianship or other mechanisms, could be an outcome
arrived at even at the base of the regulatory pyramid. That is, it
could be part of the plan developed by the extended family group
in its private family time and endorsed by the other participants
in the conference, by the responsible agency, and subsequently
by the court. The pyramid in child welfare reflects a continuum
from state-managed family self-regulation to an outcome unilaterally imposed by the state, not a continuum of outcomes from
reunification with supportive services to termination of parental
rights.
Empowerment and Coercion
If a formal regulatory philosophy objects to the inconsistency
of punishment implicit in restorative justice-the punishment
does not fit the crime, but depends upon the offender's willingness and capacity to set things right-an objection may be
made from the opposite direction that truly restorative justice,
not to mention empowerment, is impossible in the presence of an
implicit threat of escalating coercion.

Mainstreamingthe Family Group Conference

101

Braithwaite (2002) makes the point that as a matter of fact,
very few criminal offenders would participate in restorative conferences in the absence of some degree of coercion in the form of
detection and/or arrest, and perhaps the specter of a trial. A conference or sentencing circle puts the offender's behavior under the
scrutiny of family and community and inevitably involves shame.
Shame, as Braithwaite (1989) argued in his earlier classic work,
Crime, Shame, and Reintegration,may stigmatize or, in a restorative
justice process, help to reintegrate the offender. In the case of
child abuse and neglect, the FGC process brings secrets, e.g., of
violence within the family, out into the open, brings contributing
behavior such as drug use to the attention of both maternal and
paternal relatives, and focuses the attention of all participants
on the harm done to the children and the need to protect their
future well-being. It is reasonable to assume official investigation
and the prospect of court involvement and ultimately of losing
one's children, create a coercive context that provides a strong
and often necessary incentive for abusing or neglecting parents
to collaborate with the conferencing process.
Braithwaite's (2002) hypothesis is that restorative justice
works best in the context of coercion, but where the implicit
threat-in this case of loss of control over decisions involving
one's children's future-is in the background. Similarly, Burford
and Pennell's (Burford & Pennell, 1996, 1998; Pennell & Burford,
2000) research on an FGDM project to reduce family violence
in Newfoundland and Labrador suggested that the sanction,
support, and resources of government and professionals could
facilitate the family's decision to stop violence within it. Vulnerable family members were protected both by widening the circle of
responsibility and control to include those who love and care for
each other, ending secrecy and isolation and providing for active
family responsibility for its members, and by the sanction of the
law. The legal context of FGC-the fact that in New Zealand the
state has veto power if the family's plan is contrary to the principles of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act-sets
up a tension that may make for sharper focus and better decisions.
The legal system, similarly, constrains the "people's justice"
of FGC by providing a recourse for the protection of individual rights, at the same time as FGC loosens the dead hand of
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bureaucratic-professional domination and unleashes the creativity, wisdom, and active responsibility of families and communities. The hypothesis is that the interweaving of formal and
informal, state and family, professional and community care and
control in this way makes for a fairer process and better decisions
than either would achieve if left to itself (Adams, 2002; Braithwaite, 2002; Strang & Braithwaite, 2001).
Adapting Braithwaite's (2002) hypothesis to child welfare
conferencing enables us to see, however, even in the social control
sphere of child protection, an important difference between the
ultimatist social worker who threatens the parent with loss of her
child if she does not comply with her instructions, on the one
hand, and on the other, the process of collaborating with the parent and others involved to prevent escalation up the regulatory
pyramid. This is true even though all understand that escalation
is inexorable if they cannot work together to find ways to keep
the children safe. The focus of the conference is not on blaming
or threatening the maltreating parents, but on meeting the needs
of the children themselves. The threat is in the background, not
the foreground. This difference makes possible the empowering
nature of an FGC, which enables the family group to tap into its
own knowledge, wisdom, and resources in collaboration with the
others involved, including the responsible agency and professionals. The family group takes active responsibility for mobilizing
its collective capacity to care for the children and keep them safe
through whatever plan they, rather than the professionals, play
the lead role in developing.
The Promise of FGC
The child welfare FGC brings together those affected by a
situation of harm to children-parents, children, extended family
members, other community supports or fictive kin, and professionals (such as therapists, school officials, the CPS social worker,
and the conference coordinator/facilitator)-to provide the family group with all the pertinent information and engage them in a
planning or decision-making process. It widens the circle of care
and responsibility, shares information with the family that under
professional-dominated practice would be kept confidential to
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the professionals alone, and potentially places the social worker's
behavior under scrutiny as well as that of the parents.
FGC in child welfare differs from some other kinds of conferencing, mediation, or alternative dispute resolution. It is not a
third-party mediated negotiation of a dispute between offender
and victim, or parents and child. It does, however, deal with the
aftermath of the (normally undisputed) harm done to the victim
and involves a process of taking responsibility for resolving the
concerns about the child's safety and well-being. Like other forms
of restorative justice, it draws on a cultural treasure of pre-state
societies and ancient civilizations that has persisted in many
indigenous people's practices around the world. Grounded in
traditions of justice that have roots and resonance in many, perhaps all cultures, as Braithwaite (2002) argues, restorative justice
was eclipsed with the emergence of the modern state, which "stole
conflicts" and their resolution from those affected (Christie, 1977).
The resulting homogenization and impoverishment of justice
traditions has, for our purposes, at least two important aspects.
One is the domination of the processing of both conflicts and
disputes, both within and between families, by professionals
licensed by and/or acting on behalf of the state-police, lawyers,
social workers, probation officers, among others. The other is
that in certain fields like child protection where workers face
a high level of public skepticism about their professionalism
and competence, their capacity to negotiate solutions with those
directly involved is increasingly circumscribed by formal rules,
regulations, and procedures (Adams & Krauth, 1995; Adams &
Nelson, 1997)
FGC offers a paradigm shift in this context. It fundamentally alters the relationship of professionals and the families and
communities they serve. It de-centers the professional-client relationship and widens the circle of responsibility and decisionmaking to include those whose relationship to the children at
risk is based not on professionalism but on caring and kinship.
It rests on the assumption, as Burford and Hudson (2000) put
it, that "lasting solutions to problems are ones that grow out of,
or can fit with, the knowledge, experiences, and desires of the
people most affected" (p. xxiii). The key shift in practice and
in such legislation as mandates it (above all the 1989 Children,
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Young Persons, and Their Families Act of New Zealand) is from
professional-dominated practice resting on a model of regulatory
formalism to a process for decision-making and planning that
mobilizes and empowers the children's kin and community. It
does not replace the formal processes of the court system, butand this is surely the potential of restorative justice in modern
societies-it enables both formal and informal care and control to
enrich and constrain each other.
Threats to Implementation in the United States
So much for theory, principles, and promise, but what of the
challenge of translating these into policy and practice in the
United States? Bringing about such a fundamental shift in the balance of power between child welfare professionals and families,
a shift from domination to partnership, is both at the heart of
FGC and a daunting task. Even the New Zealand model, the gold
standard for those who emphasize this aspect of FGC, in practice
has the potential to be subverted by social workers' reasserting
their control over the process and outcome (Lupton & Nixon,
1999, Walker, 2003).
In the United States, there are many variations on FGC, most
of which increase this potential to weaken FGC's radical core.
These variations both reflect and highlight the political and bureaucratic difficulties faced by those who wish to adopt this innovation in their child welfare systems.
In the remainder of this article, we explore the variations and
the threats to implementation in an American context, and discuss
possible reasons for them. We discuss the case of Hawaii, which
provided a particularly favorable environment for the adoption
of its own version of FGC. The cultural relationship and contacts
of Native Hawaiians with the Maori of New Zealand who provided the early impetus for FGC, the small size of the state, and
its pattern of political-bureaucratic centralization allowing for
statewide adoption of a uniform program, all made for statewide
adoptability of this innovation. All this is considered in order to
arrive at a realistic and sober assessment of the difficulties involved in adoption of FGC as an empowering, paradigm-shifting
practice, and to suggest what systemic changes are needed to
support the full realization of FGC's potential.
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Model Variations
Pennell (2003) stresses the importance of model fidelity among
the variety of conferencing programs across the country and articulates several minimum components required for conferencing.
Without legislative mandates or judicial guidance in the United
States, as is the case in New Zealand and England, the practice
models of FGC in the U.S. vary widely. Of particular concern is
the fact that even before the basic model of FGC has been implemented widely and empirically tested, criticisms are beginning
that the model is too expensive; should be limited to certain types
of case; and does not need specially trained staff or extensive
preparation time. We lack empirical research with a robust design
that compares outcome variables of family conferencing with
matched control cases. Given this paucity of empirically tested
outcome research on conferences, there is little to guide policy or
social work practice. However, how do we get to reform if we do
not vigorously implement and test new models of practice?
Pennell (2003) identified nine key principles and practices for
assessing family conferencing model fidelity. Using the North
Carolina Family Group Conferencing Project, she developed a
25-item questionnaire to evaluate if the family participants, coordinators, and service providers understood the conferencing
process, actually experienced it during the conference and agreed
that the listed conferencing practices had been conducted and its
purposes achieved. Participants were asked questions like "[Was
the] FGC coordinator respectful of the family group?" and "[Did]
the family group have private time to make their plan?" (Pennell,
2003, p. 19). Her findings are encouraging for two reasons. One,
the participants generally agreed that the core principles of FGC
were indeed being implemented and experienced. Secondly, and
perhaps most importantly, Pennell is asking the correct question:
"How widespread is FGC and is there model fidelity?" MerkelHolguin (2003) reports that in 2003, more than 150 communities
in 35 states and approximately 20 countries are implementing
FGDM initiatives. This suggests that a revolution in child welfare
practice is under way. However, given the challenges in implementing such a model, we are concerned about the ability of many
states to put this reform in place in ways that are true to FGC's
core principles.
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Good Intentions
While the conferencing model uses the language of family
empowerment, partnerships, and child welfare reform, if it is
to be truly implemented, the role of the state in child welfare
has to be dramatically altered. Recent evaluations underscore the
dangers of basing policy decisions on evaluations of programs
that may depart substantially from the principles of the innovation it seeks to replicate. For example, in the study of the family
decision meeting in Oregon, only a little more than half the family
members reported knowing they could invite others to the conference (Rodgers, 2000). In Miami, 38% of the parents and family
members interviewed reported that the private family time was
"not useful at all" (NCJFCJ, 2002). It is hard to believe, however
that many families who were offered the opportunity to design a
safety plan for their child and believed that their input would be
seriously considered by the child welfare agency could not find
this useful. We wonder if these families were truly offered this
opportunity or if the family members believed that the plan had
been made and agreed to in advance by the professionals. In that
case, private time does indeed become superfluous. We wonder
if private time is really being implemented as a period in which
the family has, and understands it has, the opportunity for taking
responsibility for developing a safety plan. Private family time is
not a part of Oregon Family Unity Meetings, and in Michigan it is
optional. Many communities do not have independent or trained
facilitators and to date, there is no required training for conference
facilitators. What exactly is happening inside the conference circle
in many communities and how radically it differs from traditional
case conferences with the family present is as yet unclear.
Reform is Hard to Implement
FGC uses an exchange-based model of assessment and issue
definition that includes the family in all stages of the decisionmaking about child placement. This arrangement forms a new
collaboration based on shared information and trust between the
state and the family. This is a significant change from the traditional child protection practice in which the public agency and
the court manage most of the information unfettered by the family's questions or inputs. We have previously described the core
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elements of conferencing as: widening the circle, taking/sharing
responsibility for solutions, culturally competent practice, family leadership and empowerment, family driven solutions, community partnerships and private family decision making time
(Adams & Chandler, 2003). Pennell's (2003) key principles and
practices include these and add a few more. She includes creativity in planning; ensuring the conference belongs to the family group and "chang[ing] policies, procedures and resources to
sustain partnerships among family groups, community organizations and public agencies" (p. 17). Creative social workers may be
able to apply an empowering model of practice and participate in
conferences that meet many of these principles. However, changing policies, procedures, and resources to promote such practice
is a profound administrative challenge. It is likely that it will be
difficult, in the metaphor of diffusion of innovation as contagion
(Smale, 1996, 1998) to infect the public child welfare agency with
the conferencing bug and infuse it throughout the system.
Possible Reasons for the Variations
Merkel-Holguin (2003), after reviewing the FGC literature in
the United States, concludes that the model is not well diffused
across the nation and is at best a marginalized practice in most
communities. When one considers the significant change in values, practice, behavior, and policies of FGC if implemented on
a large scale, it is not surprising that this system reform has not
taken root in many places. The reluctance of professionals to fully
enable consumers to describe their own needs has been reported
(Lupton & Nixon, 1999). This has been seen in the struggles
toward the development of a person-centered practice in the fields
of mental health and developmental disabilities. In these areas,
federal and state laws were required in order to compel state
agencies to implement initiatives that involved consumers and
their family members in case planning as well as policy making
(Rothman, 1990; Stroman, 2003).
Implementation Barriers (Real and Perceived)
Lupton and Nixon (1999) suggest an intriguing reason for
social workers' reluctance to partner with their clients-that professional autonomy was declining in public child welfare agencies
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due to frequent litigation, class action suits, and court consent
decrees. Their theory suggests that whenever a state lost a lawsuit
or settled a consent decree, the public agency would hunker
down further under their rules, make new rules, and constrict and
constrain workers' discretion in an effort to demonstrate and document that the state was complying with the lawsuit (Rothman,
1990). Often the court's or plaintiff's monitoring process resulted
in the agency's becoming less responsive and less innovative. An
unintended consequence was more bureaucracy and paperwork
and less communication and openness with consumers. Rarely is
this a time of creativity and reform even though that may be what
is required and often what the suit is demanding.
Even professional, masters level social workers lose discretion
in these circumstances and see themselves subject to surveillance
by even more levels of supervisors who oversee multiple elements
of each case, presumably concerned about the case holding up
under attorney scrutiny in court. When this siege mentality sets in,
individual social workers believe that they will be held personally
accountable for any negative case outcome such as re-abuse of
a child, whether in foster care or in the biological home. Fear
of making a mistake leads to high turnover, job burnout, and
dissatisfaction (US-GAO, 2003). While there is logic to the idea
that social workers should embrace reform efforts that result in
the sharing of some of the responsibility with family members
and community partners, since this is deeply embedded in their
core values (see NASW Code of Ethics), it is difficult to discern
this level of empowerment in many child welfare agencies.
Threats to the implementation of FGC abound. Implementation may be seen as requiring too much time and overtime pay
for workers, as too expensive or just unnecessary since there is
little evidence to support its superiority. With its creativity and
variety of elements, a family's safety plan is likely to look very
different from one drawn up by a public child welfare agency
and a traditional agency may be unenthusiastic about embracing
such differences. Child welfare workers in Hawaii estimate that
over 80% of the compliance plans in child protection cases include
some or all of the same components: substance abuse treatment,
anger management, and parenting classes (Hawaii Department
of Human Services, 2002). This seems to be what the CPS workers
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believe is necessary and the courts like to see. There is a strong
belief that these address the deficits that almost all families in
CPS have.
If professionals in child welfare are experiencing a continuing
loss of discretion and autonomy (Lupton & Nixon, 1999), it is
to be expected that they will not readily embrace a concept of
sharing responsibility that appears to put them professionally
at risk (Adams & Krauth, 1994). NCJFCJ (2002) reported that
workers often do not refer cases to FGC, believing that families in the child welfare system do not have the capacity to be
decision-making partners. Social workers may have been trained
to do comprehensive assessments of family deficits rather than
focusing on the strengths of larger family systems as a base for
building solutions. These are just some of the barriers that are
likely to prevent FGC from moving into the mainstream.
We suggest that the wide variety of models now being practiced, while at best creative and responsive to local conditions
and stakeholders, at worst compromises FGC principles in an
accommodation to prevailing legal, bureaucratic, and professional norms. Nonetheless, the experience of FGC in Hawaii
indicates the potential as well as the challenges of implementing
a statewide model, of taking a conferencing pilot project to scale
(Schorr, 1997). It indicates that FGC can be the practice of choice
and not a marginalized or fringe project of child welfare reform.
The Case of Family Group Conferencing in Hawaii
The experience of the State of Hawaii illustrates the kind
of collaborations and political and community support needed
to implement FGC as a model of child welfare reform. FGC
in Hawaii (called 'Ohana Conferencing; 'Ohana is the Hawaiian word for extended family and/or supportive networks) was
implemented as a pilot project in November 1996 as the result
of collaboration between the Family Court in Honolulu and the
Department of Human Services (DHS). (In discussing this experience, we draw on the first-hand knowledge of one of the
authors, Susan Chandler, who was the state director of human
services from 1995 to 2002.) Hawaii's conferencing program was
originally one of four demonstration court diversion programs

110

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

funded by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges (NCJFCJ, 2003) to facilitate systems change in the processing of child abuse and neglect cases (NCJFCJ, 2000).
After several staff trainings conducted by experts from New
Zealand, Honolulu was selected as the pilot site for a conferencing
project. The state agency chose to contract out all of the needed
conferencing services, including the initial planning and organizing of the conferences, as well as the facilitation of the conference.
The state contracted with the private agency, Effective Planning
and Innovative Communication (EPIC) for all staff training of
community-based facilitators as well as the CPS workers. The
decision to privatize this reform effort, which had support from
many community organizations, social services agencies, and
State legislators, is believed to have been an essential factor in
the successful statewide implementation of conferencing. EPIC
was a newly formed, non-profit agency with the single goal of
conducting family group conferences. It immediately established
high standards of professional practice for its entire program staff.
Conference facilitators are required to have at least a bachelor's
degree and experience in working with children as well as demonstrated multi-cultural practice experience. In each conference,
there must be a professionally trained group facilitator as well
as a neighborhood-based community facilitator to insure family
comfort and participation.
The pilot project began as a court diversion effort using conferencing to divert CPS cases away from the judicial system.
This diversion goal, rather than family empowerment or child
welfare reform, perhaps is one reason why conferencing in these
first demonstration projects has been implemented successfully.
The judges in Honolulu wanted to test strategies that included
parents and other family members early in the case processing
and have them actively participate in the decision-making related
to their children. The court wanted to open up its proceedings
and make the whole experience more humane. The project also
aimed to increase family participation as a strategy to move the
cases through the system more quickly.
The child welfare agency director in Hawaii was a strong
supporter of this practice reform. Improving communication with
family members and providers, and diverting cases out of the
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system completely or having families spend less time in the
system was a primary agency goal. After one year, the court
stopped funding the project and since 1997 the Department of
Human Services has been the primary advocate for conferencing
and now finances the entire program with state and federal funds.
Elements of a Successful Innovation
"A key ingredient for organizational change is the commitment and involvement of leaders throughout the agency," according to Sahonchik (2003, p. 1). This is classic management
advice, however leadership in a child welfare agency is often quite
decentralized with local branches, or county structures. Daft and
Marcic (2001) suggest that political appointees at the top of a public human service agency rarely can bring about lasting change,
since the permanent civil service staff may decide to just wait out
their latest reform idea and wait for the next political appointee to
arrive with yet another agenda for change. To inoculate against
this known resistance to change strategy, seven-year contracts
were written in Hawaii with EPIC to ensure that FGC would
endure past the changes of the political administration.
Where conferences have taken hold, there has been a confluence of forces, from inside the public child welfare agency and in
the external environment that joined to make conferencing possible (see special FGC issue of American Humane's ProtectingChildren (2003)). Smale (1996) wrote that "changes in practice come
about through 'convergent' thinking and 'contagious processes'
" (p. 20). The first ideas about conferencing came from visits
from Maori leaders meeting with Hawaiian leaders concerned
about the high rates of incarcerated Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian
youths and an overrepresentation of Pacific Islander children in
the child welfare system. This dialog, along with broad legislative
and community-wide support for a blueprint for child welfare
reform initiative as well as a new Director of Human Services with
a social work background, focused attention on conferencing as
a strategy for improving child protective services. However, like
many reform efforts, many inside CPS did not see the need for
any innovation or reform, because they did not see a problem.
To introduce change into a system that does not see a problem,
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rarely succeeds. However, when discussions focus on finding a
consensus on a common vision, values, mission, and principles,
agreements can often be found. Trainings that were titled, "How
to reduce your caseload using family group conferencing" were
popular.
One strategy used in Hawaii's DHS to infuse the idea of
conferencing throughout the agency was to make trainings and
workshop attendance competitive rather than mandatory, which
had been the usual custom. Staff needed to submit in writing
why they wanted to attend and the number of participants was
limited. This made the training seem like a scarce commodity and
seemed to draw people to it.
After the first few trainings, a core group of innovators affectionately called the "bungee jumpers" emerged. These were
the staff that immediately liked the idea of conferences as a philosophy of practice and volunteered to try it out. One rural unit
became the first test site. Subsequently, the model of expansion
and diffusion was to move unit by unit geographically as the
staff got trained. The hope was that conferencing would become
contagious. The use of a private, not-for profit agency to conduct
the conferences allowed the workers who first adopted the reform
to get help with their cases, which was a strong incentive. As
conferencing spread throughout the units, it became clear that
some supervisors supported the reform and some did not. When
supervisors did not support conferencing, their units made little
use of it. To better track the level of infusion of the innovation, the
agency established a goal of two conferences in every unit each
quarter, monitored each unit's progress, and publicized the data.
Supervisors who did not have conferences were reminded about
the goal and were encouraged to send staff (or go themselves) for
more training.
Resistance to adopting the model came in many forms. Mostly,
workers explained their resistance by saying that the families in
the caseload did not have the capacity to attend a conference
or there was no extended family or supports to draw upon.
Of course, if a worker does not look for such support, he or
she will rarely find it. Some workers complained that certain
cases were just not appropriate. Although never explicit, this
became a belief among the non-reformers. Agency-wide policies
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and procedures needed to be developed to provide incentives
for workers to participate. Flex-time and glide time working
hours were implemented so workers could attend conferences
in the evening or on the weekends as well as use comp-time or
overtime to encourage worker participation. To insure that family
agreements were honored, a new policy established in 2002 that
no agreement made within a conference could be overruled by
a supervisor who had not attended the conference. There was
concern among the workers who had never attended a conference
that families would design safety plans that were not safe and
social workers would not be able to veto a family's plan. While
there is a written policy that permits such a veto, to date it has
never been needed or used.
While there have been over two thousand conferences convened throughout the state of Hawaii, the reform is still not
consistently implemented throughout the state. Some CPS units
simply do not refer cases to conferences. The strategy remains to
continue training in each unit and work to show social workers
the benefits of conferencing. A state law was passed encouraging
the use of conferencing and requiring CPS workers to explain why
a conference should not be held for all voluntary cases. Families
do not yet have the right to a conference, but perhaps this is the
next essential step to insure its implementation.
Conclusion
In synthesizing his two major areas of work, on restorative
justice and responsive regulation, Braithwaite (2002) provides
a framework for understanding the tension at the heart of social work in general, and child welfare in particular, between
empowerment and control. Family group conferencing brings
to the project of child protection a form of restorative justice
within a framework of responsive regulation that suggests the
potential for improving decision-making, procedural justice, and
compliance. It has radical implications for practice and policy that
generate serious challenges to implementation in an American
legal and professional context, even in a state with many forces
favorable to such an innovation.
Shifting the role of the state away from controller of families in
the child protective services system to one of regulatory partner
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with them is extraordinarily difficult. Hawaii's experience suggests that adoption of FGC in the mainstream of child welfare
and implementation of its core values, principles, and practices
require a reorientation of professional practice and bureaucratic
functioning. The regulatory pyramid provides a framework for
understanding child protection both as a form of state regulation
and as a shared responsibility of families and communities. Far
from abdicating state responsibility to protect children, it situates
FGC within an inexorable process of adapting the level of state
coercion to the response of the family to regulatory intervention.
Far from offering only the appearance of empowerment to mask
bureaucratic and professional domination and appropriation of
informal family and community decision-making control and
capacity, the regulatory pyramid shows the potential and the
value-though not the inevitability in practice-of active family
responsibility and empowerment at its base.
We have argued that when restorative practices work well,
formal and informal care and control constrain and enrich each
other. Perhaps the same may be true of the large-scale adoption
and diffusion of an innovation like FGC, which both depend
upon administrative support and legislative mandate-or at least
a favorable legislative and judicial environment-and also require creative adaptation by local stakeholders and practitioners.
Given the pressures to compromise on core principles we have
discussed, it may be that only adoption on a large enough scale
of FGC as a paradigm shift, a fusion of restorative justice and
responsive regulation in child welfare, can provide the empirical
information we need to improve both theory and practice.
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Family Group Conferencing in Child Welfare:
Responsive and Regulatory Interfaces
JOAN PENNELL
North Carolina State University

A regulatoryapproachcompels the child welfare worker to make decisions
according to set procedures and prevents respondingflexibly to families.
Differential response is a way that child welfare is departingfrom legal
formalism. One means is convening a family group conference (FGC) to
develop a plan. John Braithwaite's regulatory pyramid assists in conceptualizingdifferential response.This articlereports a factoranalysis of data
on achievement of FGC objectives to elaboratethree interfacesfor fostering
responsive regulation. Each interfacekeeps the family group at the center
of planning while firmly maintainingtheir connections with community
and government programs.
Key words: family group conferencing,responsive regulation,child welfare, differential response
A well circulated cartoon shows a child welfare worker being
lynched by an angry mob. The caption for one frame reads, "Social
worker who took child into care," and the caption for the other
reads, "Social worker who did not take child into care." No matter
what the social worker decides, the populace is provoked to take
the law into its own hands. Such vigilante justice is in reaction to
seemingly arbitrary authority. It condemns the social worker and
in all likelihood the child's parents and leaves the child in need of
protection. This gallows humor will continue to resonate as long
as public child welfare is defined solely as saving children from
their parents. Some children need such rescuing but far more need
supports and protections that safeguard them and their families.
The doctrine of parens patriae, however, obligates the state to
substitute as parent when the child's own parents fail to protect because of their personal limitations or those of the wider
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
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society. This same doctrine has raised legitimate concerns about
the abrogation of the rights of parents and children and has led
to an emphasis on due process through the courts. The result
is heightened legalism interacting with the state's liability for
the child's safety. This combination chokes off opportunities for
child welfare to join with the family and community in forming
partnerships of caring.
John Braithwaite's (2002) theory of responsive regulation
points to a viable alternative for child welfare. He posits a regulatory pyramid with a broad base of responsiveness to offenders underneath an apex of legal regulation. Because the state
is charged to care for children in need of protection, child welfare must maintain a firm interface between responsiveness and
regulation. This article examines how family group conferencing
(FGC) achieves this interface. First, an overview is provided of the
movement toward responsive regulation in U.S. welfare, the role
that FGC can play in promoting responsive regulation, and its key
practices in child welfare settings. Then, utilizing a factor analysis
of findings from a FGC study, three interfaces are elaboratedfamily leadership, cultural safety, and community partnerships.
In conclusion, a model for interfacing responsiveness and regulation in child welfare is presented.
Responsive Regulation and Child Welfare
Child welfare in the United States has a lengthy history of
swinging between a priority of child safety or family support
(Jimenez, 1990). Child safety stresses the state's responsibility
to regulate the child's care and ensure that it meets adequate
standards of protection; family support urges a responsive approach to children and their caregivers to promote healthy families. While both regulation and responsiveness are necessary for
safeguarding children, neither approach alone is sufficient for an
effective child welfare system (Pecora, Whittaker, Maluccio, &
Barth, 2000). Family support is limited when caregivers will not,
or more often cannot, change their practices on their own; community services are lacking, inaccessible, or under utilized; and
the broader economic and political systems undermine families
(Pecora, Reed-Ashcraft, & Kirk, 2001).
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The prevailing approach, though, is reliance on regulation,
that is, forensic investigations, court hearings, strict timelines for
termination of parental rights, registering abusers, and so forth.
With precedence given to following legal procedures, workers are
preoccupied with defensible rather than helpful implementation,
parents feel stigmatized by service, and the effects on children
are deleterious (Parton, 1997). Significantly, children of culturally
marginalized groups in the United States are disproportionately
represented in the foster care system (U.S. DHHS, 2000). All of
this serves to alienate workers from their clients and communities
and to increase the workload and responsibility of public child
welfare beyond its capacity.
As a counter measure, some U.S. states have passed legislation permitting a differential response, variously known as
dual track, multiple response, and alternative response (National
Child Welfare Resource Center, 2001). This allows child protective
services to adopt more than one method or "track" of handling
reports of child abuse and neglect. States have at least two tracks
for responding: an investigation track for substantiating child
maltreatment in the more severe situations and mandating interventions and an assessment track for determining need and
involving families from the outset in finding solutions. All cases
screened-in meet statutory definitions of child maltreatment-in
other words, child protective services cannot "walk away" from
these families (North Carolina Division of Social Services, 2002,
p. 7). Differential response is not intended as a means of widening
the net of child welfare cases. It is intended to concentrate legal
interventions on the cases that truly warrant such a response
and in the other cases to engage families in services and foster
supportive community networks.
Concerns frequently raised are that workers will place families in the wrong track, not transfer cases to the investigation track
when necessary, and, thus, endanger the safety of children. The
preliminary findings are that approximately one-quarter of families are placed in the investigation track and about three-quarters
in the assessment track and that cases do not usually change tracks
(National Child Welfare Resource Center, 2001). Social services
workers and collateral agencies prefer this way of working with
families (Virginia Department of Social Services, 1999). Reports
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and re-reports of child maltreatment decrease while reported
incidents for which action is taken increase, children are removed
from their homes at the same rate but spend less time in placement, and the safety of children does not appear to be compromised despite workers' large caseloads and limited resources
(Institute of Applied Research, 1998).
Family Group Conferencing on Multiple Tracks
Braithwaite's (2002) theory of responsive regulation was developed by integrating his work on business regulation and criminal justice. With some qualification, this theory provides a way
of conceptualizing and expanding differential response in child
welfare. The base of his regulatory pyramid is about responding
flexibly to all cases, and this is achieved through using restorative
justice processes. The aim is to repair the harm caused by the
offense, involve the key stakeholders in deliberations, and transform community and government relationships (Schiff & Bazemore, 2002). Except in extreme cases, Braithwaite recommends
that restorative practices are first applied and then only if offenders refuse to comply, is recourse to the law and courts sought.
Once offenders begin to comply, the approach moves down the
pyramid from legal interventions to restorative processes.
Braithwaite's prescription would raise grave fears in child
welfare, or for that matter in domestic violence, where the victims
reside with their abusers and may require immediate interventions backed by the force of the law. In these contexts, the tension between regulation and responsiveness cannot be relaxed.
Nonetheless, his notion of applying restorative justice processes
early in serious as well as more moderate cases is worth pursuing.
If child welfare clients in whatever service track have a voice
regarding their plans, interventions are more likely to respond
to their conditions and cultures and regulate their actions and
interactions.
One way to promote families' voices in child welfare is by
using family group conferencing. The "family group" is composed of the family members along with their relatives, friends,
and other close supports, and the "conferencing" refers to holding a decision-making forum to resolve areas of concern. This
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restorative justice process is now applied in child welfare as well
as other arenas including schools, youth justice, and adult services
in many countries and cultures (Burford & Hudson, 2000). Like
restorative processes generally, family group conferencing (FGC)
reflects traditional practices and, in particular, decision making
among the New Zealand indigenous people the Maori (Love,
2000) and, more broadly, South Pacific islanders (Shook, 1985).
The approach was first legislated in the New Zealand 1989 Children, Young Personsand Their FamiliesAct. This law emphasizes the
family group's responsibility for their young relatives, chfldren(s
safety and rights, respect for cultural diversity, and communitygovernment partnerships for the benefit of children and young
people (Hassall, 1996).
FGC is not uniformly implemented in child welfare (MerkelHolguin, 2000), but desirable practices can be specified (Burford,
Pennell, & MacLeod, 1995; Marsh & Crow, 1998; North Carolina
Family Group Conferencing Project, 2002; Paterson & Harvey,
1991). A family is referred to a FGC usually by their social worker.
The referral is sent to a FGC coordinator, who is responsible
for organizing and convening the conference but who does not
assume case-carrying responsibility. By only having one role with
the family, the coordinator avoids confusing the family group
and helps them focus on how to plan the conference rather than
negotiating other services.
In advance of the conference, the FGC coordinator explains
the process to the family members and emphasizes that they have
the option of whether to attend or not; collaboratively develops an
invitation list of who are family and 'like family'; checks out the
family group's wishes on the meeting including its place, timing,
food, and opening; assesses potential risks for participants and
builds in needed supports and protections; arranges travel, child
care, and other logistics; and generally prepares family group and
service providers to take part safely and effectively.
The service providers often need help in understanding their
roles. The FGC coordinator stresses that these do not change
at the conference. The child protection workers retain their responsibility for child safety and have the final say over whether
the FGC plan goes into effect. The other service providers, such
as a substance-abuse counselor or domestic violence advocate,
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are there to share information that will help the family group
produce the best plan possible. The coordinator assists the service providers on how to present information in a way that is
understandable and respectful of family group.
The conference can be viewed as having distinct stages: the
opening, information sharing, family's private time, finalizing
the plan, and closing. To signal that the conference belongs to
the family group, it is commonly held in a community center
and opens in a way fitting the family's traditions. This may
mean a welcome by a senior family member, a prayer, or simply
choosing one's own seat. The FGC coordinator ensures that all
participants are introduced and informed about the purpose of
the conference and its format. Then the service providers and
family group overview the situation along with possible resources
for remedying it. If the child welfare worker has "bottom lines" or
matters that are not open to negotiation such as keeping a sexual
abuser away from a child, then these should be clearly stated at
this time. Once the family group has sufficient information about
the concerns to be addressed, the service providers including the
FGC coordinator leave the room.
This is the start of the family group's private time to formulate
a plan. During this period, the family group often lends support
to members and challenges them to change their behaviors and
almost always comes up with a plan. Typically the family group
members select professional services but also offer to contribute
their homes and other resources. After developing a plan, the
family group invites back the service providers. The child welfare worker and other involved authorities review the plan to
ensure that it addresses the safety and care issues, approve the
action steps, and authorize the allocation of public resources. In
closing, conference participants may say their good-byes or have
a more elaborated ceremony. After the conference is the work of
carrying out the plan. This is facilitated if the FGC plan includes
a clear system of monitoring and evaluating implementation and
reconvening the group as needed.
As can be seen, FGC is labor intensive in its preparations and
deliberations and intrusive in the sense of conveying so much confidential information to a larger group. Given the nature of FGCs,
workers should have very solid reasons for making a referral.
Although usefully applied to plan family supports, FGCs tend
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to be convened even more frequently in the difficult situations
where workers are uncertain about how to proceed and important
decisions must be made such as whether to place a child outside
the home (Hudson, Morris, Maxwell, & Galaway, 1996; Marsh
& Crow, 1998; Pennell & Burford, 2000; Trotter, Sheehan, Liddell,
Strong, & Laragy, 1999). These cases are usually substantiated and
involuntary and already involved with the legal system.
FGC is a restorative process that is readily applicable to multiple tracks in a differential response system in child welfare.
By amplifying the voice of the family group, more responsive
interventions can be designed on whichever track the family is assigned. If the family is involved with the courts, the FGC plan can
be referenced by the judge at the time of disposition or sentencing.
If the family requires assistance from relatives, the community,
and public agencies, the plan serves to coordinate these services
according to the expressed wishes of the family group. Because
the plans must be approved before they are implemented, the
mandatory authorities retain their legal role while responding to
the family group and community.
Repeated studies have clearly demonstrated that FGC participants like the process (Cashmore & Kiely, 2000; Marsh &
Crow, 1998; Pennell, 2002a; Pennell & Burford, 1995; Trotter et
al., 1999; Unrau, Sieppert, & Hudson, 2000; W. R. McDonald,
1999). They are satisfied with how the conferences are run, the
decision process, and the resulting plans. Although both family
group and service providers rate the process highly, the former are
more enthusiastic and prefer FGC to other child welfare decision
approaches (Marsh & Crow, 1998; Trotter et al., 1999). Some child
welfare workers are more skeptical about the appropriateness
of FGC plans as compared with those generated at other child
welfare meetings (Trotter et al., 1999). The workers' position reflects more general questions in child welfare circles about family
group dysfunction and the worker's and agency's liability if the
plans go awry (Lupton & Nixon, 1999; Sundell, Vinnerljung, &
Ryburn, 2002).
Despite some workers' trepidations, the outcomes of FGC
appear promising. The preliminary findings indicate a greater
likelihood of children staying with their parents or kin, siblings
kept together, placements stabilized, child maltreatment and domestic violence reduced, and a sense of family pride enhanced
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(Crampton, 2001; Marsh & Crow, 1998; Pennell & Burford, 2000;
Shore, Wirth, Cahn, Yancey, & Gunderson, 2002; Sundell, 2000;
Walter R. McDonald, 2000).
Deviations from key practices of the model, however, can
affect its outcomes and capacity to establish a responsive and
regulatory approach in child welfare. To assess for such divergences, the North Carolina Family Group Conferencing Project
developed a series of key practices or "objectives" to be realized
for each conference. These objectives and their measurement are
described next.
FGC Objectives
To guide practice, the model was specified as a series of principles and their related steps. The use of principles helps to prevent
over-prescription (Henggeler, Schoenwald, Borduin, Rowland,
& Cunningham, 1998) that can limit the flexibility necessary in
applying FGC in diverse contexts. This practice guidance was
translated into a measurement instrument called "Achievement
of FGC Objectives" so that adherence to the model can be assessed
(Pennell, 2002b). The questionnaire has 25 items that are scored on
a scale of "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," and "strongly
agree" with space for "don't know" and "not applicable." The
last two along with no response were coded as missing datum.
The questionnaire was used by the North Carolina Family
Group Conferencing Project as a means of assessing model fidelity and a guide for improving FGC implementation, training,
and policy. During the course of the Project, the instrument was
completed by 151 participants from 30 conferences. These participants, in rounded percentages, were 60% family group members,
23% FGC coordinators, 16% research observers (who observed
conferences where permission was granted by all participants),
and 1% service provider. The FGC coordinators and research observers filled out the instrument on their own shortly afterwards.
On average about one month after the conferences, consenting
family group members scored the questionnaire during an interview, usually by telephone.
The majority of respondents in the three categories completed
all items but with the family group members having the least
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number of missing data. This shows understanding of the process
on the part of the family group. The research observers were
likely to give a "don't know" on conference preparations that
they would not have observed. The FGC coordinators circled
"not applicable" for items that they thought were not relevant
to a particular conference. The family group members reported
"don't knows" particularly on items related to the social services'
agency or work taking place after the conference.
A detailed report of the findings and their implications for
practice can be found in Pennell (2003). The general finding was
that for the most part FGC participants saw their conference as
achieving its objectives but with some variation in responses.
This finding is congruent with both the diligence of the FGC
coordinators in carrying out the preparations and the high level
of satisfaction expressed on the evaluation forms distributed at
the conclusion of the conferences and in the qualitative feedback
provided during the after-the-conference interviews. Given that
conferences were more or less implemented according to the
model, the data from the North Carolina FGC Project provide
a means of uncovering the factors or main forces underlying its
key practices or objectives.
Underlying Model Factors
What are the model's underlying factors? In order to address
this question, a factor analysis was carried out of FGC participants' views of the extent to which the key practices or objectives
of FGC were achieved at their conference. The aim was to see
if their views on these objectives coalesced into associations and
could be reduced to a smaller number of underlying factors. The
assumption is that their pattern of correlations can be explained
by these factors shared in common by groups of variables. Because the objectives are steps in the model, conceptually they can
be viewed as not causing each other and thus are amenable to
factor analysis which looks for commonalities among variables
rather than causal paths between variables.
In this study, the factor analysis can be characterized as a
heuristic device for specifying patterns among variables (Kim &
Mueller, 1978). Although the author did not anticipate the pattern
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of correlations among the objectives, the instrument for measuring achievement of FGC objectives is based on theory and
practice guidance developed out of the author's long-term experience with FGC and its study. The author conceptualizes FGC
as "widening the circle" of those committed to safeguarding children and other family members (Pennell & Burford, 1994) and
theorizes three ways of achieving this end (Pennell, forthcoming
2004):
" Family leadership-a relationship in which the family group
members are central and their efforts are supported by community organizations and public agencies
" Cultural safety-a context in which family members can speak
in their own language, express their values, and use their experiences and traditions to resolve issues
" Community partnerships-a local collaboration in which each
partner retains its distinctive role while striving to realize common goals.
A factor analysis requires that correlations have the same sample size. In order to perform the factor analysis, nine questionnaire
items with extensive missing data were initially removed. Priority
was given to retaining items answered for the most part by family
group members. Later two more items were removed which did
not pertain to the extracted factors and had missing values. This
left a total of 14 variables in the final analysis. After their removal, some cases continued to have missing data, they likewise
were deleted with the total sample size reduced from 151 to 111.
Despite these reductions, the overall profile of the respondents
remained similar to the original sample. The retained cases were
as follows in rounded percentages: 59% family group, 28% FGC
coordinators, 13% research observers, and 1% service provider.
These respondents came from all of the original 30 conferences.
The first step in the factor analysis is to compute a matrix of
correlation values to "load" into the factor analysis. Because the
measurement scale for the objectives was ordinal, the polychoric
correlation was selected in the Statistical Analysis System (SAS).
The polychoric correlation looks at the data as if their ratings were
made on a continuous scale, instead of strictly in the ordinal categories of "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," or "strongly
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agree." The polychoric analysis assumes that respondents in one
ordinal category had a range in views rather than being tied.
From this premise, it asks what continuous distribution would
be needed in order to derive the same groupings once all the
answers are placed into categories.
From correlations among the 16 objectives, principal component analysis extracted three main factors whose eigenvalues
were respectively 7.55, 1.77, and 1.29, and that accounted for
66.3% of the total variance. Although a fourth factor had an
eigenvalue slightly above unity, limiting the extraction to three
factors was supported by the scree test. Varimax rotation was
utilized to ease interpretation. The orthogonal transformation
matrix highlighted the loadings of the objectives on each factor.
The eigenvalues for the rotated factors were 3.67, 3.48, and 3.46.
The relationships were further explored by assessing the contribution of each objective to its factor's total Cronbach Coefficient
Alpha, which is usually employed to check the reliability of a
measurement tool such as a questionnaire. Two variables were
removed because they were shown to reduce the alpha coefficient
for their factor and theoretically did not fit well in the factor. The
correlations of the 14 remaining variables with their factors are
shown in Table I below. Two of the factors have four items, and the
third factor has six items. Correlations of the objectives with their
factor ranged from .429 to .693. With one exception, all of the items
if deleted would reduce the alpha for their factor. The removal of
item 17, however, would increase the alpha very slightly from
.761 to .763. It is noted that each of the three resulting scales has
a Cronbach Coefficient Alpha near 0.8, which is well above the
usual norm of 0.6. Thus, the reliability of the scales is assured.
Review of the objectives in each factor shows convergence
with the author's FGC theory on "widening the circle" through
establishing cultural safety, community partnerships, and family
leadership. The four items in the first factor, labeled "cultural
safety," each pertain to holding the conference in a way that
feels right to the family group. Three objectives refer to where
the conference is held, how it held, and who is invited. Their
rightness reflects the family group's values and customs and
more broadly their culture. The fourth objective is concerned with
having sufficient supports and protections and can be viewed as
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Table 1
Correlation of Achievement of Objectives with Family Group
Conferencing Factorsand Alpha If Item Deleted (N = 111)
Item

Correlation

Factor 1: Cultural Safety
(Conference held in the right way for family
group.)
10.

The conference was held in a place that felt
right to the family group.

11.

The conference was held in a way that felt
right to the family group (ex., right food, right
time of day).
14. People at the conference were relatives and
also people who feel "like family" (ex., old
friends, good neighbors).
17. The conference had enough supports and
protections (ex., support persons).

Alpha*
.761

.645

.666

.660

.658

.530

.732

.451

.763

Factor 2: Community Partnerships
(Family group and service providers clear
about what doing.)

.782

2.

Each service provider was clear about their
role (ex., child protection, counseling).

.612

.715

6.

The family group understood the reasons for
holding the conference.

.534

.755

15.

The family group was prepared for the
conference (ex., got enough information on
what happens at a conference).
The service providers were prepared for the
conference (ex., got enough information on
what happens at a conference).

.560

.745

.653

.699

16.

Factor 3: Family Leadership
(Family group empowered to make a plan.)
3.

The FGC coordinator was respectful of the
family group.

.754
.511

.722
continued
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Table 1
(Continued)
Correlation

Alpha*

The only job of the FGC coordinator was to
organize the conference. He/she did not have
other jobs to do with the family.
More family group than service providers
were invited to the conference.

.481

.723

.429

.743

Service providers shared their knowledge
but they did not tell the family group how to
solve the problems.
20. The family group had private time to make
their plan.
21. The plan included ways that the family group
will help out.

.453

.733

.693

.676

.501

.717

Item
4.

12.
19.

*CronbachCoefficient Alpha (raw) is given for each factor. The value next to each
objective is the value of the coefficient calculated with that objective deleted.

providing the safety necessary for participation. Whether it fits
in the factor on cultural safety is debatable theoretically because
it does not relate directly to culture and statistically because it
has a lower correlation with the factor than the other items and
its presence minimally reduces the total correlation. Awaiting
further study, all four objectives were kept together because they
are seen as contributing to a culturally safe context in which
family members can speak in their own language, express their
values, and use their experiences and traditions to resolve issues.
The second factor, "community partnerships," includes four
objectives relating to both the family group members and service
providers being clear about what they are doing at the conference.
Two of the objectives concern the family group-whether they
understood why the FGC was held and were adequately prepared
for it. The other two objectives relate to the service providerswhether they were clear about their role at the conference and
prepared to take part. Such clarity on purpose, process, and
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function promotes the community partnerships necessary for a
local collaboration in which each partner retains its distinctive
role while striving to realize common goals.
The third factor, "family leadership," encompasses six objectives that all can be viewed in terms of the conference empowering
the family group to make a plan. The first two objectives pertain
to the FGC coordinator's relationship with the family group,
and both foster the family group's decision-making efficacy If
the coordinator respects the family group members and engages
with them solely as conference organizer, they are more likely
to be clear about the process and feel acknowledged as decision
makers. The next two objectives reference the power relationship
between the professionals and the family group and encourage
the family group to take charge. If the family group members outnumber the service providers, they are more likely to state their
views; if the service providers give information and refrain from
dictating solutions, the family group members are more likely
to come up with their own plans. The fifth objective concerns a
distinctive feature of FGC-the family group's private time. With
the FGC coordinator and service providers outside the room, the
family group usually can express themselves more freely and
develop their own solutions. The sixth and last objective is a
notable output of conferencing-the inclusion of family group
contributions in the plan. This demonstrates a commitment on the
family group's part to continue to assist their relatives after the
conference. All of these processes advance the family's leadership
by generating a relationship in which the family group members
are central and their efforts are supported by community organizations and public agencies.
Interfacing Responsiveness and Regulation
A regulatory approach to child welfare places the onus on
the worker to make decisions in accordance with set procedures.
As depicted in the lynching cartoon, this approach damns social
workers whatever decision they make because they cannot respond flexibly to family situations and as a consequence, provoke
community outrage. Child welfare is seeking to move away from
legal formalism to a differential response so that they do not
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have to treat all families the same way. One means of generating
a differential response is convening a family group conference
(FGC) to develop a plan. This approach transforms a vigilante
mob into a community of concern who participate in making
and carrying out plans to safeguard children and other family
members.
John Braithwaite's (2002) regulatory pyramid assists in conceptualizing this movement in child welfare. He theorizes a pyramid with a responsive base of restorative practices as the first
site of recourse and then only if dialogue fails, escalating to
the regulatory formalism of the courts and correctional services
but de-escalating back to restorative processes as offenders come
into compliance. In child welfare, the tension between regulation
and responsiveness has to be maintained throughout because the
children may need protection from their caregivers with whom
they reside or from whom they must remain separated at least
for some time. One way to qualify Braithwaite's pyramid is to
convert it into a series of concentric circles in which the child's
family group is interfaced with government and community. As
depicted in Figure 1 below, at the center is the child's family group,
the outer ring is the community and government who both play
crucial roles in safeguarding children and other family members,
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and between the two are three interfaces promoting responsive
regulation.
The three interfaces are based on theory and a factor analysis
of data from the North Carolina FGC Project. Family leadership
encourages the family group's taking initiative in planning, not in
isolation and instead with the support of public agencies and community organizations. Cultural safety fosters a context in which
the family group can access their traditions to find solutions; nevertheless a child welfare conference always remains bi-cultural in
the sense of including the family's culture as well as community
standards and legal processes for protecting children. Community partnerships include the family group in safeguarding their
relatives without the public agencies or community services' jettisoning their functions. All three interfaces work together to keep
a firm and productive collaboration between the family group
and their community and government programs.
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Achieving Justice in Child Protection
RoB NEFF

School of Social Work
University of Hawaii-Manoa

As formal systems for the protection of children have evolved in this
country, certain barriers to achieving justice within the child protection
system have emerged concomitantly. Specifically, these barriers involve
ambiguous definitions of abuse and the appearanceof social inequality
and bias within the child protection system. One means of surmounting
these barriersto justice is family group conferencing (FGC). Support for
this assertion comes from the integrationof the restorativejustice model
and proceduraljustice theory. When applied to the practice of FGCs in
child protection, the integrationof these theoreticalperspectives providesa
strong rationalefor the use of FGCand a theoreticalframework from which
the outcomes and causal mechanisms of FGCs may be evaluated.
Key words: family group conferencing, proceduraljustice, restorative
justice, child protection, child abuse, child neglect
Introduction
Much of the research on Family Group Conferencing (FGC)
in child protection has been descriptive in nature. Many of these
program evaluations have emphasized aspects of program fidelity and somewhat superficial outcomes, such as levels of participation, duration of conferences, rates of accepted plans, and
participants' satisfaction. Although this kind of research is useful
for describing FGC, it falls short of explaining how the model
works to transform the child welfare culture or how it achieves
greater safety and stability for children and families. In this paper
I will provide a conceptual integration of two models of justice:
restorative justice and procedural justice. In so doing, I will provide theoretical support for the use of FGC as a means of achieving
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume )CCI, Number 1
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justice and improving outcomes in field of child protection. The
integration of these two paradigms also establishes a framework
from which FGCs may be evaluated.
Restorative Justice
FGC is one of several conflict resolution models founded on
the values of the restorative justice movement (McCold, 1999).
Restorative justice seeks to redress wrong-doing through the inclusion and open dialogue of those parties affected by a particular
offense. Models based on restorative justice values offer an alternative to prevalent models of justice emphasizing retribution and
rehabilitation (Braithwaite, 2002). The aim of restorative justice
is to solve problems in a manner that elicits and integrates the
perceptions and desires of those affected by the problem, thus,
promoting active responsibility for solving problems. "Active responsibility is the virtue of taking responsibility for putting things
right." (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 129). Thus, central to all restorative
justice practice is the idea that direct contact between offender and
victims under the protective cover of the community is essential
(Cohen, 2001).
Retributive justice, on the other hand, is more concerned with
punishing an offender than it is solving the problems associated
with an offense. As Braithwaite argues, restorative justice places
the focus of interested parties on the problem rather on the person.
"Through blaming the other, we declare ourselves blameless as
we abrogate the possibility of us taking active responsibility for
righting the wrong." (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 129). Restorative justice models place the centrality of concern on understanding and
solving problems as opposed to blaming and punishing offenders. Placing the focus on problems as opposed to persons encourages parsimonious solutions, because the extraneous influences
of retribution are omitted from the process (Braithwaite, 2000).
Responsive Regulation
Using a restorative approach towards child protection, the
state operates on a course that is congruent with the needs and
abilities of its citizenry. Braithwaite (2002, p. 29) describes this as
"responsive regulation", where government is responsive to the
conduct of those they seek to regulate. According to Braithwaite's
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model of responsive regulation, the responsibility for regulation
is first and foremost a function of those being regulated.
It is important to note that, in the case of child protection,
the application of Braithwaite's model of responsive regulation is
not based on interventions; rather, it is based on decision control.
Interventions in child protection may appear to be retributive,
but they are quite simply resources designed to help families.
For example, out-of-home placement may be an intervention that
is actively sought by a family, and as long as it is the family
that has made that decision, the regulatory process is responsive.
Similarly, if a family is incapable of resolving protection issues
and CPS decides unilaterally to place a child in an out-of-home
setting, the same intervention, out-of-home placement, will fall
at a different point on the regulatory pyramid, but the process
is still responsive. This is because the decision-making power is
placed first with the family, and only as a last resort does the
state's authority supercede the family's authority.
The ascendancy in regulatory control by the state is predicated on an explicit failure of the family to resolve problematic
situations free of the state's influence. Thus, the state responds
to families in accordance with their needs. If a family has the
wherewithal to provide adequate care for their children, state
intervention is not needed. Conversely, if a family fails to provide
adequate care for a child, the state must then partner with the
family to establish means by which their complete independence
can be restored. Continual failure by families to meet their responsibilities leads to incremental increases in the state's exertion of its
regulatory authority. Thus, no matter how invasive interventions
may appear, they are not retributive. It is the state's perfunctory
denial of a family's right to self-determination that is retributive.
Achieving Justice through Responsive Regulation
The notion that the families should be given the opportunity
to self-correct before the state asserts its control over families
comes from Braithwaite's (2002) model of responsive regulation,
and it provides a critical theoretical underpinning for understanding the redistribution of power that FGC inspires among
families and state authorities. The family retains its autonomy
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hence, decision-making power, to the extent that it is able to
act responsibly. As state agencies become more responsive to
the needs of the families vis-az-vis FGC, their involvement will
be legitimated concomitantly. This, in turn, strengthens those
agencies rather than weakening them.
Under an FGC model, although child protection workers
continue to retain the authority vested in them by the state,
the exercise of that authority is largely determined through the
collaborative efforts of the state and family rather than by single
entities. FGC allows for negotiated exchanges between the state
and the family to occur. More importantly, these exchanges are
likely to be perceived as fair by the participants, because the
distribution of power between the state, the family, and the victim
are brought into balance through the FGC process. This balance
is achieved by affording FGC participants greater power in the
form of decision-making control.
In his seminal book, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, Braithwaite (2002) identifies procedural justice theory,
among a host of other theories, as a means of explaining why
restorative justice models may reduce reoffending and enhance
restoration. However, very little effort has been made to test
Braithwaite's assertion. The concept of procedural justice is rarely
mentioned in the restorative justice literature, but whenever research has examined procedural justice, it has been found that
people always make procedural justice judgements, and that
those judgements are always important (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p.
141). There is universal appeal to being treated fairly, and procedural justice is important to people regardless of their cultural
affiliations (Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997), or their gender (MartinezTur, Ramos, and Peiro, and Garcia-Buades, 2001). As I will illustrate in subsequent sections, procedural justice theory is highly
relevant to restorative justice practices, particularly in relation to
the practice of FGC as applied to child protection.
Since a central function of FGC is to place the responsibility,
hence greater control, with families themselves, it follows that
FGC participation will result in higher appraisals of procedural
fairness and increases in satisfaction among participants in a
decision-making process (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 79). Furthermore,
to the extent that the family maintains control over the procedures
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and outcomes, dissatisfaction, resentment and other maladaptive
responses towards CPS interventions will be minimized. Legitimacy has a procedural justice basis; therefore, "legal authorities
can deliver unfavorable outcomes to citizens without harming
their legitimacy if those outcomes are delivered through procedures people view as fair" (Tyler, 1990a, p. 175).
ProceduralJustice
Procedural justice theory emerged from earlier formulations
of social exchange theory (Blau, 1964 Homans, 1974; Thibaut and
Kelley, 1967) and equity theory (Adams, 1963). Early formulations
of social exchange theory emphasized the outcomes of social
exchanges and evaluations of fairness of those outcomes (distributive justice). Social exchange theorists and equity theorists
assumed that individuals judged the fairness of an exchange
solely on the merit principle, which dictates that fairness exists
when rewards are proportional to contributions (Adams, 1963;
Homans, 1974). Procedural justice theorists, on the other hand,
suggested that evaluations of fairness were more complex than
the unidimensional concept of fairness suggested by equity theory, and that the merit principle was but one aspect of individuals'
appraisals of justice (Leventhal, 1980).
Thibaut and Walker (1975) argued that judgments of fairness
were determined by both process control (procedural justice) and
outcome control (distributive justice). This argument has been
supported by a series of experiments which have consistently
demonstrated that how one perceives the fairness of a procedure
is largely a function of the amount of control that he or she has
over the process and is an important determinant of satisfaction
with the outcome of a procedure (Musante, Gilbert, Thibaut, 1983;
Thibaut and Walker; 1975).
The Constructof ProceduralJustice
In a critique of equity theory, Leventhal (1980) expanded
Thibaut and Walker's work by suggesting that procedural justice may be evaluated by examining one or more of the following seven procedural elements: selection of agents, setting
ground rules, gathering information, decision structure, appeals,
safeguards, and process change mechanisms. Leventhal (1980,
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p. 39-46) further speculated that each of the seven procedural
elements may be evaluated according to six "procedural justice
rules": consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativness, and the ethicality. The consistency rule dictates that
allocative procedures should be consistent across persons and
stable over time. The biassuppressionrule dictates that self-interest
and bias should be prevented throughout the allocative process.
The accuracyrule dictates that the allocative process must be based
on as much good information and opinion as possible and that
information should be applied to the procedure with minimal
error. The correctabilityrule dictates that opportunities must exist
to modify or reverse decisions made throughout the allocative
process. The representativenessrule dictates that all phases of the
allocative process must reflect the basic concerns, values, and
outlook of important subgroups in the population of individuals
affected by the allocative process. The representativeness rule
is analogous to Thibaut and Walker's (1975) conception of process and outcome control; however, Leventhal does not explicitly
differentiate the two kinds of control. The ethicality rule dictates
that procedures must be compatible with fundamental moral and
ethical values of the individuals involved. Leventhal's conception
of procedural justice has been used extensively as a guide for
assessing procedural justice in the social psychology literature,
and significant support for Leventhal's rules of procedural justice
have been established in applied and experimental research (Jackson & Fondacaro, 1999; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Makkai & Braithwaite,
1996; Tyler, 1988).
Tyler (1988) empirically tested the theoretical criteria used to
assess procedural justice. Combining and extending the criteria
suggested by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980),
Tyler examined the importance of each criterion to citizens' assessments of procedural justice. Using a sample of 652 Chicago
residents whom had experiences with the court or police in the
previous year to explore individuals conceptions of procedural
justice, Tyler (1988) found that when people evaluate fairness,
procedural justice was more important than distributive justice
was. In terms of the relative importance of the criteria used to
assess procedural justice, Tyler found that there were seven aspects of procedural justice that made independent contributions
to assessments of fairness: efforts of authorities to be fair; whether
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their behavior was consistent with ethical standards; whether
opportunities for representation were given; the quality of the
decisions being made; whether there were opportunities to appeal
decisions; and whether authorities showed bias. Factor analysis revealed that there are two underlying factors of procedural
justice assessments. The first factor concerns the qualities of the
experience itself: representation, impartiality, and accuracy of
decisions. The second factor concerned external referents: consistency, as compared to past experiences or the experiences of
others; and ethicality, which compares the experience to external
standards. Tyler noted that the efforts made by authorities to
be fair was a key overall factor in assessing procedural justice,
suggesting that trust constitutes a distinct criterion for evaluating
procedural justice.
Tyler (1988) demonstrated that there are common criteria for
the evaluation of procedural justice that may vary in their relative
importance depending on the nature of the experience, a finding
consistent with Leventhal's (1980) theory. Tyler also discovered
that in a given situation, there was little variation in the relative importance of procedural justice criteria among individuals.
These findings led to Lind & Tyler's (1988) group-value theory of
procedural justice. According to this theory of procedural justice,
group membership mediates concern with justice and the influences the evaluation of procedural justice. Specifically, groupvalue theory posits that procedural justice standards arise from
two sources: "(1) the groups overall social values; and (2) the
interest of the individual being treated as a full fledged, full-status
member of the group" (Lind & Earley, 1992, p. 232). Tyler and
Lind (1990) found that group standing influenced concerns about
justice. Socially marginal group members were found to care the
least about justice, while those who were central to groups cared
the most about justice. Tyler and Lind's findings make sense when
considered in light of the tendency for those deprived of power in
social exchanges to adapt to deprivation accordingly (Thibaut &
Kelley, 1967).
Achieving ProceduralJustice through FGC
Concerns about procedural justice are particularly salient in
child protection practice. The creation of a group that includes
all those with an interest in protecting an individual child and
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assures that their voices are heard is, itself, an important contribution to achieving justice and improving the functioning of
child protection agencies. People tend to be less concerned with
justice when dealing with others outside of their social or ethnic
group (Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara & Huo, 1998). This may
be particularly true when group differences are accompanied
by power imbalances that give advantages to one party at the
expense of another.
The FGC model expands the boundaries of the system for
protecting children, which, according to the group-value theory
of procedural justice, encourages legitimization of the state's authority and diminishes individual concerns in favor of group
needs (Smith & Tyler, 1996, p. 175). Tyler (2000, p. 120) argues that
"procedural justice is central to creating and maintaining internal
values that support voluntary cooperative behavior on the part
of members of groups." Hence, collectivism overrides individual
concerns in favor of group needs (Lind & Earley, 1992). Although
the importance of creating egalitarian groups with a common
purpose is a significant factor for achieving justice through FGC,
the actions of the participants and coordinators of the group
clearly contribute to the overall achievement of justice as well.
Applying the aforementioned rules of procedural justice to
the FGC model illustrates the potential that FGC has for achieving
justice in child protection practices. The values and principles
of FGC are highly attuned to a variety of aspects of procedural
justice.
Consistency. Consistency is achieved thorough the application
responsive regulatory practices, providing opportunities for
equal input for FGC participants and fidelity to the FGC model
in repeated conferences. Families are informed of the conditions
required to maintain autonomy, thus reducing perceptions that
the actions of child abuse agencies are arbitrary.
Representativeness. Compliance with the representativeness rule
of procedural justice is perhaps the most important aspect of
FGCs. Thibaut and Walker (1975, p. 121) argue that in relation to
procedural models, the distribution of control appears to be the
best predictor of fairness and thus, satisfaction with the outcome
of the procedure. Lind, Kanfer & Earley (1990) found that having
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a voice in a given procedure corresponds with a greater sense
of fairness. The importance of voice was significant whether it
influenced the outcome or not. Hunton, Hall and Price (1998)
have replicated these findings; they determined that perceptions
of fairness, control, and satisfaction were more positive as the
magnitude of voice increased.
Representativeness is achieved by giving deference to the
families' wishes and decisions throughout the FGC process. Although not specifically differentiated in Leventhal's (1980) model
of procedural justice, instrumental and expressive forms of control are both important factors in the assessment of procedural
justice. Research has demonstrated that perceived control in relation to decision processes corresponds with greater satisfaction
with procedures and outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and encourages compliance with authorities (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1996).
The FGC model provides opportunities for family participants to
assert a greater degree of control over both the decision-making
process and the ultimate outcome.
With regard to the procedure, families have control over
whether to hold a conference, who to invite to the conference,
and are free to provide input regarding the problem, its effects,
and the means of resolving the problem. Moreover, families are
afforded control over the ultimate outcome of the procedurethe case plan. Although limitations may be applied to those
decisions, such as the need for out-of-home placement or drug
abuse treatment, families typically have a great deal of latitude in
deciding how problems are to be addressed within the boundaries
imposed by state agencies.
Bias Suppression. Leventhal (1980) identifies two potential
sources of bias. First, procedures are unfair if a decision-maker
has a vested interest in achieving a specific decision. Second,
procedures are unfair if they are based on doctrine to the extent
that other points of view are not considered. The suppression of
bias is achieved in FGC by expanding the decision-making circle
to include all those affected by the problem, and encouraging
them to contribute to the decision-making process. The inclusiveness of FGC and its explicit emphasis on resolving problems
as opposed to blaming and punishing offenders, breaks down
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social barriers among participants and creates a common group
identity with the central goal of protecting a child. The vested
interest of all parties is the protection of the child and welfare of
the family. Furthermore, the encouragement of creative solutions
to child maltreatment reduces the reliance on doctrinal solutions
typically employed by child protection agencies. Creative solutions brought about by combining the technical knowledge of
professionals and the idiosyncratic knowledge of families enables
solutions to be derived that do not rely solely on child protection
doctrine.
Ethicality. Respecting family and cultural traditions and integrating those basic values into the decisions achieve ethicality.
Providing families opportunities to make contributions to the
decision-making process that are largely unfettered by influences
from state authorities helps to ensure that their families' own
world views are congruent with final outcome of the conference.
Accuracy. Sharing information in a public space and allowing
input from diverse sources helps to achieve accuracy. The FGC
model specifically sets aside time to share information about the
problem. Information from multiple viewpoints is solicited and
participants are given opportunities to clarify or confirm the perceptions of the other participants. The importance of accuracy is
illustrated by Pruitt, Pierce, McGillicuddy, Welton, & Castrianno
(1993, p.3 2 7 ), who found that compliance with mediated agreements was significantly related to the extent that the information
presented in mediation allowed "all the problems to come out."
Correctability. Correctability is achieved by responsive regulatory practices, which is an inherent aspect of the FGC model. The
decisions made in FGC are subject to correction and modification
based on adherence to plans and the continued relevance of plans.
Subsequent FGCs serve to examine and modify earlier decisions.
Additionally, participation in an FGC does not negate a family's
right to seek judicial intervention.
The values and practice principles that comprise the FGC
model foster procedural fairness in multiple ways, which will,
theoretically, lead to greater satisfaction and compliance with the
safety and treatment plans designed to reunify families. Table I
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summarizes the relationships between the principles of FGCs and
aspects of procedural justice.
Outcomes Associated with Just Procedures
Although not extensively studied with regard to child protection decision-making strategies or FGCs in particular, there is
a diverse body of literature that supports the assertion that procedural justice is an important aspect of participant's satisfaction
with procedures, which leads to greater compliance and increased
legitimization of authorities (Tyler, 1990b; Tyler & Folger, 1980;
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).
In a survey of New York residents, Sunshine & Tyler (2003)
found that perceptions of procedurally just behavior by police
officers was the primary driver of citizens' legitimization of police
authority which ultimately leads to greater compliance with the
law (Tyler, 1990a; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Findings that perceptions of procedural justice lead to greater regulatory compliance have also been observed among healthcare administrators
(Makkai & Braithwaite, 1996); and civil court litigants (McEwen &
Maiman, 1984).
Perceptions of procedural justice have been consistently linked
to greater satisfaction with outcomes in a variety of diverse settings. Martinez-Tur, et al. (2001) found that perceptions of procedural justice positively influenced customers' satisfaction with
the outcomes of hotel guests' complaints. Tyler & Folger (1980)
found that perceptions of procedural fairness predicted satisfaction with law enforcement officials among individuals stopped
by police. Perceptions of procedural justice predicted satisfactions
independently of whether an individual was cited or not by the
police. Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw (1985) found that perceptions
of procedural justice influenced citizens' evaluations of political
leaders regardless of the benefits they received from the government. Consistently, research has indicated that how one is treated
is more important than what one receives.
Considering the potential for restorative practice to achieve
procedural justice, it comes as no surprise evaluations of FGC programs have repeatedly indicated that they result in the creation of
plans that are satisfactory to the courts, protection agencies, and
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families (Rasmussen, 2003; Sieppert, Hudson, and Unrau, 2000;
LeCroy & Milligan, 2002; Gunderson, Cahn, and Wirth, 2003).
Although not directly examined in any published study, there are
indications that FGCs do address a variety of procedural justice
concerns.
Families participating in FGCs feel that they are afforded a
good deal of process and outcome control (LeCroy & Milligan,
2002; Sieppert, et al., 2000). Others have found that FGCs promotes family unity (Pennell & Burford, 2000) and foster a sense
of shared responsibility among family members and CPS workers
(LeCroy & Milligan, 2002). Ultimately, according to case workers'
appraisals, FGCs result in the creation of improved plans compared to those derived using prevailing practices (Rasmussen,
2002). There is also some indication that compliance with plans
derived from FGCs is superior to plans derived from traditional
decision-making processes (LeCroy & Milligan, 2002; Rodgers,
2000). In an evaluation of FGC in Washington State, Gunderson,
et al. (2003) examined 189 FGC cases. In addition to high levels
of satisfaction and plan completion, they found that a re-referral
rate of 6.8% compared to the state average of 8.1%.
Conclusion
The procedural justice literature is remarkably consistent in
its findings that how people are treated during the allocative
processes matters. Indeed, evaluations of fairness with regard to
processes may, in many circumstances, be more important than
the outcomes of those processes. Also, perceptions of just treatment have been consistently associated with greater satisfaction,
compliance, and the legitimization of authorities. These findings,
coupled with the procedural elements of FGC in child protection
provide a compelling argument that FGCs may be a superior
approach to decision-making in child protection. Of equal importance, the integration of the procedural and restorative justice paradigms creates a theoretically grounded framework from
which hypotheses related to causal mechanisms of FGCs may be
derived and tested; thus, the application of this framework may
help to elevate research into the FGC model to a higher level of
sophistication.
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Sharing Power with the People: Family Group
Conferencing as a Democratic Experiment
LISA MERKEL-HOLGUIN

American Humane
Children's Services

Can family group conferencing be leveraged to promote the democratic ideals of voice, freedom, justice,fairness,equality, and respect,and provide the
citizenry with the opportunity to build a more just and civil society? This

article reviews family group conferencing, and various model adaptations,
from a democratic context and through the lens of responsive regulation.
Family Group Conferencing in a Democratic Context
Who knows what is best for the people if not the people
themselves? This question, which reflects the core principles of
democracy, also is central to the practice of family group conferencing. If child protection is seen as a public concern, then the
process of making decisions to keep children safe and healthy
benefits from being democratized.
Beetham (1999, 21) suggested that the defining principles of
democracy are that "all citizens are entitled to a say in public
affairs, both through the associations of civil society and through
participation in government," and that "this entitlement should
be available on terms of equality of all." In other words, in a
democracy, supreme power lies with the people, all of whom
have a right to freedom, equality, and a voice that will be heard
and respected. Family group conferencing promotes the sharing
of power for decision making between family, kin, professionals, state and the community, while balancing responsibility and
accountability among these groups.
I Portions of this article were presented at The Building Strengths Conference,
Manchester, England, October 9,2002 in a keynote address entitled, "Rebuilding
the U.S. Democracy through Family Group Conferencing: Fact or Fiction?
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number 1
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Braithwaite (2000) proposed that it is not possible to achieve
a fully participatory democracy on a large scale, because it is impossible to involve all affected citizens in important decisions. He
contends, however, that this notion gives credibility to the prevailing perspective that representative democracy is all that is possible. Unfortunately, the result is an inactive, non-participatory
citizenry that refrains from developing community and abdicates
its responsibility for building democracy.
Family group conferencing-if implemented in the spirit of
its originators-provides an opportunity to revitalize representative democracy and to build strong, healthy communities and
families. It provides a forum for individuals to come together to
exchange information, share ideas, and demonstrate their care
and concern in a framework that teaches and supports active
responsibility. It establishes a process by which families can work
through their problems and devise their own solutions. From
a responsive regulation perspective, FGC promotes individuals
self-regulatory capacities thereby forestalling the state's need to
transcend the regulatory pyramid. In essence, families have the
opportunity to create plans that regulate their own behavior,
before a more intrusive form of intervention is undertaken.
In an FGC, families have the opportunity to tap into their
own resources to rebuild and strengthen existing social support
networks, form new connections, and forge effective partnerships
with formal systems. When given a choice, most people support
the democratic principle of ensuring that people have a voice in
matters that concern them. If FGC principles are fully supported,
the citizenry has the opportunity to realign bureaucratic systems
and programs to meet community needs.
Family group conferencing challenges years of paternalistic
practice in which professionals have assessed problems, used
clinical tools to determine levels of risk or harm, and developed
corrective action plans with little consideration for or interest in
families' opinions (Turnell, 1998). Since the early days of societies
for the prevention of cruelty to children, child welfare professionals have been taught that it is their job to rescue children,
that they are the experts, and that they have the solutions to
families' problems. Are entrenched and powerful systems ready
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to support a practice model as empowering as family group
conferencing?
Responsive Regulation in Child Welfare
Braithwaite's framework for responsive regulation provides
a new perspective for understanding the compatibility of empowering partnership practice in child welfare with the coercive
power of the state and its responsibility for child protection.
Responsive regulation contends that "governments should be
responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist response is needed"
(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). This theoretical base provides a new
perspective from which to view family group conferencing.
Child welfare is plagued by an overburdened system and limited internal and community-based resources which results in the
standardization and categorical nature of case plans developed to
resolve the concerns that precipitated regulatory action in families' lives. Research in Oregon showed that while caseworkers had
a conceptual framework for individualized services, frequently,
the constellation of services they described for cases were not individualized based on the strengths/needs-based practice model.
(Regional Research Institute for Human Services and the Child
Welfare Partnerships, 1999). Too often, parents are minimally
involved in developing case plans, resulting in plans misaligning
with family needs, capacities, informal supports, and community
resources (National Child Welfare Resource Center for FamilyCentered Practice, 2002). While it is likely that families who come
to the attention of the public child welfare system experience
many similar precipitating concerns such as poverty, substance
abuse, or domestic violence, it seems unlikely that a narrow range
of options could be equally helpful in a wide range of family
circumstances and responses to official child protection services
(CPS) involvement.
Child welfare workers use prescriptive policies and procedures to craft decisions written in case plans. These regulatory
vehicles, coupled with high workloads, prevent them from responding flexibly to families. Braithwaite's regulatory pyramid
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provides a framework for conceptualizing family group conferencing as a way to achieve differential response more adequately
to meet family, community and government needs.
The most restorative dialogue-based approach to achieve
compliance with the law sits at the base of the pyramid. Braithwaite (2002) contends that in all cases of wrongdoing, the first
response should be the offering of a restorative dialogue. In
child welfare, this would present families with the opportunity
to decide their interest in partaking in a non-dominating, lesser
controlling way to create a plan that achieves safety, permanency,
and well-being for children. It conveys a level of respect and trust
between the state, community, and family.
If there is refusal to participate in a restorative dialogue or to
reform after wrongdoing, one ascends the pyramid to a more
coercive form of regulation. In child welfare, the existing research (Pennell & Burford, 2003; Gunderson, Cahn, & Wirth,
2003; Litchfield, Gatowski & Dobbin, 2003; Marsh & Crow, 2003;
Wheeler & Johnson, 2003) suggests that when presented with
the option of a family group conference, families, their support
network and the broader community attend and make plans that
achieve regulatory parameters. Some families because of shame,
strained relationships, or embarrassment will nonetheless prefer
traditional, state-dominated mechanisms for problem solving.
Indeed responsive regulation does not provide for a consistent response to the same wrongdoing. Similarly, family group
conferencing does not result in the same plans based on similar
precipitating problems. Family group conferencing provides an
avenue for family, kin, community and the state to collaborate to
craft original, rich and diverse plans that meet the needs of the various stakeholders. It is not about abdicating state responsibility for
the protection of children, or abolishing states and bureaucracies,
but coalescing the law and community as a mechanism to check
and balance each other to neutralize the possible abuses and
excesses of both formal and informal systems. (Braithwaite, 2002;
Adams, 2003).
However, if the initial plan does not achieve the standards of
safety and permanency, or non-compliance occurs, then Braithwaite suggests an additional restorative dialogue or conference
occur and not an immediate ascent up the regulatory pyramid.
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That said, however, there must be a commitment to ascend the
regulatory pyramid if actions are not taken to prevent recurrence.
If families still refuse to take responsibility for their actions, rebuff
reparation strategies, or partake in actions that compromise children, then coercive control and the need for escalated regulation
is legitimized. In child welfare, outcomes ascending the pyramid
could be placement of children in foster care to the termination
of parental rights.
The Growth of Family Group Conferencing
For hundreds of years, before formal child protection systems existed, families used their own resources, knowledge, and
strengths to resolve problems involving child abuse and neglect,
health crises, and child rearing. They relied on networks of relatives and friends and on religious institutions for support. Currently and unfortunately, more often than not, the traditional child
welfare system serves to disempower and disenfranchise families
and communities rather than to strengthen and sustain them.
For close to a decade, family group conferencing has grown
exponentially throughout the world. In the United States, what
started as an experiment in five communities in 1995 is now a
widely recognized practice embraced by over 150 communities
across the nation (Merkel-Holguin 2000). Similarly, England and
Wales had only four pilot projects in 1994. In 2001, 97 local authorities or nongovernmental organizations are running or considering implementing family group conferencing in those countries
(Nixon, Merkel-Holguin, Sivak & Gunderson, 2001).
Outside of New Zealand and most recently Ireland, where
family group conferencing is a legal right, a number of phenomena have created interest in empowerment approaches that emphasize family and community capacity building (Schorr, 1993).
In the United States, interest in family group conferencing can
be attributed to the emergence of family-centered and strengthsbased practices, the philosophical shift that protecting children is
a shared responsibility among child protection agencies, communities, and families, and federal policies supporting family
involvement in case planning (Merkel-Holguin, 1998; National
Child Welfare Resource Center for Family Centered Practice, 2002).
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A growing body of research and evaluation accompanies
this emerging practice. In 2003, American Humane published
a comprehensive volume of research and evaluation of family
group conferencing in child welfare entitled PromisingResults, Potential New Directions. The 25 studies highlighted-international
in scope-employed multiple-methods and multiple-indicators
evaluation strategies. While many of the studies were implementation evaluations, twelve focused on outcomes such as child and
family safety, permanency, family functioning and child wellbeing. Eight studies utilized comparison groups as a way to
determine whether or not there were any differences between
children and families who participated in FGC and those who
received traditional services. While more scientific and rigorous
research is needed, the initial results of this meta-analysis suggest
that FGC compares favorably to traditional child welfare practice.
The next sections of the article analyze the growth and adaptations of family group conferencing using a democratic and
responsive regulation framework.
The Struggle Between Model Fidelity and Local Adaptation
Burford (2001) argues that there are negative consequences
for social workers-and the clients they serve-when the agencies
and organizations for which they work promote only formal legal,
administrative, and expert-dominated solutions to problems of
child maltreatment. According to Nixon et al. (2001, p. 27) "Family
group conferencing has often been misunderstood as augmenting professional decision making rather than driving decisions
themselves. The ambition to fit family group conferencing within
the procedures, time scales, and assumptions of bureaucracies
has relegated family group conferencing to secondary planning
form or a rubber stamp for professional ideas. The net effect is
that family group conferencing principles and philosophy are
watered down to fit into mainstream orthodox practice." In this
way, bureaucracies sabotage family group conferencing.
As family group conferencing gains popularity in the United
States, local communities are struggling to balance model fidelity
and the adaptation of the approach to fit diverse contexts and
cultures (Waites et al, in press). The concept of model varia-
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tions fits with the principles of family group conferencing. It is a
democratic practice that relies on community strengths, cultural
diversity, creative thinking, and flexible resourcing to safeguard
children and families. That is not to say, however, that all variations are consistent with family group conferencing principles.
But what constitutes model drift and how can variations be
classified as either in-sync or out-of-step with FGC principles?
Pennell (2003) promotes the need for clear model definitions and
measurements. Developed for the North Carolina Family Group
Conferencing Project, a series of key principles and their associated practices for measuring model fidelity provides a framework
for helping communities determine whether variations support
or contradict FGC (Pennell, 1999). Using a comprehensive and
standardized key principles framework in concert with FGC theories of community building, democracy and family leadership,
local communities, in partnership with its citizenry, should critically analyze the proposed variations to determine their congruence with FGC principles.
The implementation of family group conferencing is at a
critical juncture worldwide. While over prescription of a model
conflicts with the practice philosophy, model variations that stray
from the key principles can equally damage a practice. In some
communities, powerful professional and organizational agendas
are colonizing the model for institutional and systematic gain. For
example, a few public child welfare agencies are structuring and
controlling FGCs to attain the benchmarks for system-imposed
outcomes, such as increasing the number of adoptions or children living with kin. In an FGC, however, outcomes should not
be prescribed. That occurrence defies the responsive regulatory
nature of family group conferencing. The next section reviews
some of the adaptations, either intended or unintended, that compromise the inherent democratic and principles of family group
conferencing.
Comprehensive Preparationin the Pursuitof Democracy
It is the preparation phase of the FGC that supports the democratic ideal. Comprehensive preparation ensures that the wider
family, its support network, and the broader community have
information about the child maltreatment and the FGC process.
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It is during this phase that the coordinator identifies and engages
various participants, shows genuine respect for the family system,
establishes trust, and strives to build a safe environment so the
group can join together to create a plan that achieves child safety
permanency, and well-being. Family members are positioned and
encouraged to become active leaders in balancing accountability,
responsibility, healing, apology, and remorse. A number of communities intentionally and strategically construct FGC processes
in a way that family members and their support network outnumber professionals in attendance (Merkel-Holguin, Nixon &
Burford, 2003).
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that inclusive and
wide-ranging preparation is not always supported as part of the
FGC process in the United States. High level of time and personnel resources required to prepare families; FGC coordinators'
varying levels of comfort, skill, and expertise in preparing participants; and the unwillingness of systems to give family systems
information are possible rationales for minimizing preparation
of FGC participants. Independent of the reason, however, the
result is that professionals and institutions maintain power, and
the community-based thrust of this practice is absent. Family
and community members' voices, perspectives, resources, and
opportunity to take responsibility, are marginalized, the chance
for the citizenry to revitalize representative democracy doesn't
materialize, and the effectiveness of the responsive regulation is
compromised.
Facilitationor Coordinationto Achieve Democratic Principles?
In the 1990s, U.S. communities introduced numerous family
involvement models that supported a spawning of practice variations. Research has long documented the importance of the coordinator in the FGC process (Paterson & Harvey, 1991; Maxwell
& Morris, 1993). Yet, one of the most significant adaptations, not
reviewed in the literature, relates to the structure and function of
the coordinator role.
A number of US communities implementing FGC in child
welfare intentionally created a structure where both a coordinator and facilitator have active roles in the conferencing process.
The coordinator works to prepare the family for the FGC, and a
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different professional facilitates the FGC. While the perception of
neutrality is the main reason given to support this structure, are
there unintended consequences in having different professionals with distinct responsibilities involved in the FGC process?
Is the achievement of neutrality the most pressing need or is
fairness more important? Increasingly, FGC practitioners caution
that this bifurcated role may unintentionally harm families by
compromising their safety at the FGC. When a family partners,
engages, and builds a trusting relationship with a coordinator
during the preparation phase, what is the family's perspective
when another person with little or no information facilitates their
FGC? The concern is that this structure encourages facilitators to
pursue a more active, dominant role in the FGC process, thwarting the opportunity for family members to emerge as leaders and
undermining the family's capacity to self-regulate.
In addition, there is increasing concern that model variations
allow professionals to dominate the family group conference
through prescriptive and subversive facilitation techniques. The
Oregon Family Unity Model's information sharing stage is structured to facilitate a meaningful dialogue with all participants
about the family strengths and the concerns that precipitated the
FGC (Graber and Nice, 1998). While at first blush, this would
appear to support key FGC principles, this strategy may benefit
professionals more than families for a number of reasons. First,
it can increase their control of a perhaps uncomfortable process
where family members likely outnumber professionals by directing conversation toward a professional facilitator. Second, there
is anecdotal evidence that suggests that facilitators' dogmatic
adherence to this methodology increases their power to influence
the meeting. Third, it gives professionals a sense, which may be
unwarranted, that they are engaging in strengths-based practice
with families by asking families and professionals to identify
family strengths that can be harnessed to resolve the concerns.
Some research is showing that under this approach, the information sharing stage far outlasts private family time (LeCroy &
Milligan Associates, 2002), thereby minimizing the opportunity
for family leadership, participative democracy directed by families, and self-regulation. Another question to be asked is does
this facilitated dialogue elicit private information from family
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members with a myriad of professionals present? Even with a
skillful facilitator, anecdotal evidence suggests that families divulge private information and unintentionally begin deliberating
in the presence of service providers, thereby compromising their
family deliberations.
While eliciting strengths and understanding a family's perspective of the major concerns is important, can it be achieved
during the preparation phase of the conference? Comprehensive
preparation that embodies the principles of strengths-based practices, coupled with the information sharing stage as devised in
New Zealand where the professional presents case information to
the family, followed by an opportunity for any participant to ask
questions, may better actualize the key FGC principles defined
by Pennell (1999). According to Moore and McDonald (2000), in
conferencing, it is the facilitator's responsibility to safeguard the
process to keep it true to principles of deliberative democracy.
Family group conferencing is intended to give family members
and their support networks a voice-thereby rebuilding their
investment and say in issues that matter to them, and affording them an opportunity to forestall a formalized governmental
response. It has the potential to move beyond being a familycentered practice to one that is family-driven. If communities
implementing FGC believe and trust in families' ability to safely
create solutions based on their family's culture, history and experiences, then an overly prescriptive and dominant facilitator or
information sharing process may contradict the espoused FGC
principles. Minimizing the facilitators' presence and voice may
better support the democratic nature and responsive regulation
framework of family group conferencing.
The Impact of ProfessionalInfluence on Referral Practices
Nationwide, while family group conferencing is becoming an
increasingly common practice, most FGC initiatives are marginalized by limited funding, administrative support, and staffing.
This translates into few families having the opportunity to participate in FGCs. Professionals' and systems' selection of families to
participate in FGCs requires analysis to safeguard against issues
of domination and bias. Employing expansive selection criteria,
some projects use FGC with a wide range of issues and severity
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of cases (Burford & Nixon, 2003). At the same time, many projects
struggle with social workers not referring families for FGCs. In
addition, research from a number of communities suggests that
a high percentage of families referred for FGCs do not move forward with the process, and that Caucasian families disproportionately participate in FGC when compared to minority populations.
(Merkel-Holguin et al 2003)
Can social workers who themselves may be disempowered by
system regulations and oppressive structures possibly practice in
ways that empower citizens; that build collaboration, and that result in community responsibility for the protection of children in
a responsive regulation framework? Numerous evaluative FGC
studies strongly suggest that social workers are satisfied with
FGC, including their level of say, voice, influence, perception
of the conference as a positive experience, and assessment of
FGC plans in promoting child safety and permanency. Other byproducts of FGCs, reported by social workers, include reduced
conflict with families and increased post-FGC service coordination. (Merkel-Holguin et al, 2003)
Social workers who refer few or no families to FGCs cite issues of confidentiality, liability, potential for increased workload,
and a fundamentally different philosophy about child protection
(Schmid & Goranson, 2003). FGC philosophies and processes
confront the assumptions upon which services, organizations,
institutions, and structures have been predicated since the welfare
state emerged. It is unsurprising, then, if some social workers are
unsettled by this practice. FGC redefines an entrenched perspective that social workers and service providers are the experts.
Under the FGC paradigm, professionals play the role of information giver, community organizer, lender of their expertise, and
resource provider based on family identified needs, contradicting
decades of practices and beliefs.
At the outset, do decisions about referrals radically influence practice, and create a mechanism for child welfare systems
to limit family processes of decision making and to continue
decades of professional domination? Certainly referral practices
require further review to guard against potential cultural bias
and to understand why such a large number of families decline
to participate in FGCs. It would appear that lack of system sup-
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port of FGC practices from referring social workers and unclear
referral policies, coupled with the minuscule number of families
who can avail themselves to this practice in most areas are simultaneously converging to bolster professional influence on family
group conferencing. Until FGC is propelled from the margins to
the mainstream, and adequately resourced, these phenomena will
likely continue to occur.
Perhaps, however, there is an opportunity for the community
to shape FGC referral practices. When FGC is envisioned as a
community process that re-establishes collective responsibility
and builds a sense of shared commitment and collaboration,
the community can also become a primary referral source. Bureaucratic, orthodox, and regulated systems can in essence be
leapfrogged by the community's engagement and participation
in FGC processes. A few illustrations. Instead of families awaiting
an invitation to participate in an FGC from a social worker, they
would have the opportunity to self-refer. Or, a leader in a faithbased community could refer a vulnerable or at-risk family to
participate in a restorative dialogue. Or, the role of coordinating
a family group conference could be de-professionalized and/or
rest within the community at-large. In effect, all of these strategies
would actualize the community's investment in FGC and help
actualize participatory democracy.
PredeterminedOutcomes
If the state's role is to safeguard a process, and to ensure
that decisions meet the standards for safety, permanency and
well-being, then professionals using family group conferencing
to coerce participants into making decisions that help systems
but not necessarily families, promotes the antithesis of democratic
and conferencing principles. This is often the case when the model
is launched as a managerial strategy to contain costs or when
communities equate family group conferencing and kinship care.
Families must be given the latitude and flexibility-using their expertise, wisdom, and experience-to make decisions that ensure
children's safety and well-being. While increasingly the international data suggests that the vast majority of children who require
out-of-home placement remain with extended family (MerkelHolguin et al, 2003; Gunderson, Cahn, & Wirth, 2003; Litchfield,
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Gatowski, & Dobbin, 2003; Crampton, 2003; Schmid & Goranson,
2003; Thoennes, 2003; Lupton & Stevens, 2003; Nyberg, 2003),
families must also have the freedom to decide that non-familial
out-of-home care is the best option for the child and their family. Predetermined outcomes usurp power from families and relocate it within bureaucratic and professionally dominated and
sophisticated child welfare systems, and in doing so, trample on
the democratic principles of family group conferencing and the
values of collaboration and partnership.
Children's Connection to FGC Processes
Should children participate in FGC processes where important, life-altering decisions are being made? The research suggests
that children's involvement and participation varies considerably
across FGC projects, and likely correlates to organizational and
practice assumptions and cultural differences (Burford & Nixon,
2003; Sieppert & Unrau, 2003). FGC provides the opportunity to
teach young children, at a young age, the value of civic participation. For example, by taking part in an FGC, participants are
engaging in democratic deliberations and their contributions to
the plan are a form of civic engagement. Also, when children and
young people take part in the process, and observe the important
adults in their lives positively and humanely participating in
difficult deliberations, they are better prepared to become citizens
contributing to a civil society. When family group conferencing is
placed in a democratic context, it may be seen as impelling child
welfare systems to discover ways to safely and effectively engage
children as participants.
Community Involvement
Extensive community involvement in the design and implementation of family group conferencing is a critical element
related to sustainability, but also one that actualizes it as a community-based practice. As described by Adams (2000), FGC is
devised to work on two levels: changing relations and sharing responsibility between families and authorities, and also between the state and community. It is a practice that acknowledges
that services and resources identified in plans should be closely
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aligned with the real needs of those involved. By doing so, it
clearly aligns itself with the theory of responsive regulation.
Moore and McDonald (2000) suggest that FGC processes expand beyond the nuclear and extended family to include the
broader community. By creating or strengthening informal and
formal networks, family group conferencing has the potential to
build communities and social capital. In many instances, however, the broader community has not yet been engaged as partners
in FGC development and implementation.
The potential role of the community in family group conferencing, however, is significant. According to the Merkel-Holguin
et al (2003, 7), "the [summary of 25 evaluative] studies propose
that FGC plans frequently include both family provided resources
and supports and requests for services from a range of agencies.
Many of the studies imply that FGDM does not diminish the need
for formal services provided by statutory or community-based
agencies and that FGC is not an alternative to providing quality
services to children and families." In addition to providing resources, the community can play multiple roles including: serving
on an advisory board guiding FGC implementation; attending
conferences to listen to families' needs and match services accordingly; working collaboratively, based on families' perspectives
and needs, to decategorize services and realign them if necessary.
FGC has the opportunity to revitalize the community's interest and responsibility and shared vision for protecting children and supporting families. However, there are two overriding
concerns being generated from communities (Lupton & Nixon,
1999; Lupton & Stevens, 1997; Lupton 1998): 1) Family group
conferencing is being implemented to minimize the public authorities' or broader communities' responsibilities, and family are
expected to maximize their resources to implement their plans. 2)
Typically, complex, bureaucracies are not flexible enough to meet
the needs that families identify during conferences. In either case,
inadequate or inappropriate resources can sabotage family plans.
If communities pursue family group conferencing in a democratic
context, then system collaboration and partnership with families
are the hallmarks of practice that drive the engagement and
service provision. Ultimately, families become the drivers of the
services in the community.
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Constructing a Social Movement
for Family Group Conferencing
As the 2 1st century commences, new leaders are emerging and
challenging commonplace child welfare practices and policies.
One such legal scholar, Roberts (2001), provides a perspective that
integrates issues of class, race and child abuse and neglect. She
describes a cultural devastation in the United States not unlike
the one that has been described to be occurring almost 20 years
ago in New Zealand (Walker, 1996). In that democratic society,
the victims were Maori. The child welfare system severed family
ties and broke cultural bonds by removing indigenous children
and youth from their homes and placing them in foster care at
alarming rates. In reaction to the problem, a body of leaders
formalized into policy a new way of working with familiesindeed, it was family group conferencing.
Building Family and Community Leadership to MainstreamFGC
Pranis (2000, 48) suggested "democracy is undermined by
dependence upon professional classes to analyze and solve community problems." When child welfare decision making is driven
by professionals or service systems, the opportunity to reconnect
government to the people, to foster individuals participating in
matters that are important to them, and to support democratic
ideals of freedom, independence, and rights is lost. FGC affords
social workers the potential for genuine partnership with families and the broader community in which they can collectively
examine and create options to resolve the identified problems.
A tenet of family group conferencing is that the broader family, community, and state-collaborating together-will generate
more workable, comprehensive plans. This practice supports the
quest for democracy by cultivating and respecting the various
stakeholders' voices and perspectives.
Social workers involved in FGC have the opportunity to
support grassroots democratic processes that build family and
community responsibility for protecting children and support
responsive regulation. They can play a significant role in redefining good social work practice through the advancement of FGC;
however, their ability to involve family and the broader community in FGC development, implementation and evaluation, will
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likely provide a more robust, long-lasting result. Whether it be
organized by families, communities, or professional groups, or
through a collaborative effort, a social movement for FGC is a
critical step to mainstreaming it as a practice.
In the context of CPS, responsive regulation requires that the
state's response to the abuse and neglect of children be differentiated according to a family group's (or extended family's) willingness and capacity to regulate itself to keep its most vulnerable
members safe. The state holds back more coercive responses while
family, professionals, and others involved collaborate to enhance
the family's own capacity for care and protection. Certainly, some
of the FGC research is beginning to demonstrate that families
can regulate their behavior in a way that maximizes child safety
(Pennell & Burford, 2003; Gunderson, Cahn, & Wirth, 2003; Litchfield, Gatowski & Dobbin, 2003; Marsh & Crow, 2003; Wheeler &
Johnson, 2003). Yet, while family group conferencing can appeal
to both liberals and conservatives, albeit for different reasons, and
while individuals can support the notion of differential response
and involving individuals in matters that concern them, there is
still a hesitancy to fully support the concept of self-regulation.
The framework of responsive regulation, with its combination
of empowerment at the base of the pyramid with ineluctable
ascent to more coercive responses if that fails, provides a rationale
for empowering families while carrying out more effectively the
state's responsibility for child protection.
Conclusion
Considering FGC in a democratic and responsive regulation context provides a theoretical construct to mainstream this
marginalized practice. It challenges years of professional domination. It demands new strategies for engaging the citizenry as active participants in creating a community-based and responsively
regulated system that protects children and supports families.
The growing appeal of family group conferencing reflects the
energy, enthusiasm, and commitment of individuals to involve
families in decisions that are of the highest level of importance to
them. The mainstreaming of family group conferencing lies in a
collective understanding of this model as a practice that supports
the pillars of democracy, one that promotes self-regulation, and
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one that fosters responsive regulation by encouraging differential response to families through individualizing plans to more
closely meet identified needs. The question that looms is whether
a social movement will be organized to replace current practices
with ones that can strengthen families, protect children and rebuild communities.
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Family Involvement Interventions
in Child Protection: Learning from
Contextual Integrated Strategies
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The use of family group conferencing and related family involvement
interventions in child protection is rapidly increasingin the United States
and many other countries. There is some concern that the child welfarefield
will travel down the same roadas it did with intensive family preservation
services; that is, tremendous enthusiasm later derailed by rigidly designed
evaluations that showed unimpressiveeffects. The work of John Braithwaite
suggests an alternative path for finding justifiable excitement about these
interventions. Drawingupon Braithwaite'swritings and ongoing evaluation research,this articlesuggests a few steps we can take towards an integrative strategyfor developing effective family involvement interventions.
Key words: group decision making, program evaluation, child welfare,
child protection,family involvement, C.P.S. interventions

The use of family group conferencing and related family involvement interventions in child protection is a rapidly growing
practice around the world. For example, the number of communities in the United States trying Family Group Decision Making (FGDM) grew from five in 1995, to over one hundred by
2000; similarly, in 1994, four pilot programs began in England
and Wales, and now fifty-five local authorities or nongovernmental groups have FGDM programs in those countries (Nixon,
Merkel-Holguin, Sivak and Gunderson, 2001). Even as child welfare practitioners are eagerly implementing these programs, researchers are more cautious. For example, Whittaker asks: "While
enthusiasm runs high, many questions remain: Will family group
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume )CXXI, Number 1
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conferencing meet the ultimate test of empirical validation in
rigorous studies with appropriate controls?" (Whittaker, 1999,
p. xv). While clearly stating his preference for more rigorous clinical trials, Barth concedes that: "the assumptions of family group
conferencing are so compelling that variations on this practice will
undoubtedly continue to develop without evaluation endorsements" (Barth, 2002, p. 201). Gelles is more critical in saying: "This
service is being widely touted as effective and widely adopted
without a shred of scientifically reputable evidence that this intervention actually works. This is an echo of what happened with
Intensive Family Preservation Services" (Shirk, 1999, p. 18). Many
researchers would agree that the potential of Intensive Family
Preservation Services was hurt by an early push for a specific
family preservation services model, called Homebuilders, when
there was no evidence ( pro or con) to suggest that this specific
program model was effective (Adams, 1994). Therefore, with family involvement interventions it may be prudent to more quickly
involve evaluation in the development of the intervention. On the
other hand, some FGDM proponents are wary of evaluation research: "Research has, for the most part, been done by someone, to
someone else, to produce data that was used by yet someone else.
It was experienced as having mystical importance and complexity
but very little practical value at best and at worst was a tool to justify the continued oppression of others" (Nixon, Merkel-Holguin,
Sivak and Gunderson, 2001, p. 29). What is needed is an approach
to family involvement research that is consistent with the intervention's values of community and family empowerment. John
Braithwaite's work on restorative justice may provide some theoretical concepts (Braithwaite, 2002a) and a method for developing
theory (Braithwaite, 1993) that could be useful in current efforts to
use family involvement interventions in child protection. In this
article, I describe some key ideas from Braithwaite's work and
then illustrate their applicability using evaluation research of family involvement programs. Family Group Decision Making and
Team Decisionmaking are discussed under a rubric I call family
involvement interventions. Both of these models focus on a plan
for the care and protection of a child that is developed through a
meeting of child welfare professionals and the child's extended
family in cases of child abuse and neglect. I chose to discuss these
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models together because I believe they share many procedures
and values with each other and with Braithwaite's restorative
justice. However, I acknowledge that some proponents of Family
Group Decision Making and Team Decisionmaking believe that
these models are more different than they are similar. A person
who is supportive of TDM and a person who is supportive of
FGDM both read a previous draft of this article and both people questioned the validity of discussing these models together.
My argument is that we should follow Braithwaite's contextual
integrated strategy and explicitly identify differences and best
practices in family involvement intervention both theoretically
and empirically in order to determine the most effective ways
to involve families in child protection. Comparing the models
and discussing the differences helps us learn and improve our
practice.
John Braithwaite and Restorative Justice
There is some concern in Family Group Decision Making that
the practice has outrun the development of relevant theory (Burford and Hudson, 2000). One possible solution to this perceived
problem is to look towards theory from related practices such as
mediation and restorative justice. Following this strategy, there is
considerable interest in the work of John Braithwaite within the
Family Group Decision Making field. For example, he was asked
to deliver the Closing Address at the 2002 Family Group Decision
Making Roundtable held in Monterey, California (Braithwaite,
2002b). This special issue of the Journal of Sociology and Social
Welfare further suggests that his work has broad appeal within
social welfare.
Braithwaite has written extensively on both business regulation and criminology and recently brought these two areas of
research together (2002a). In this latest work, Restorative Justice
and Responsive Regulation, he suggests a theoretical approach to
addressing a wide range of social problems and to improving
democracy itself. Simply put, restorative justice is a process in
which stakeholders come together to resolve a dispute. The specific organization of this process is less important than its core
values, which include healing rather than hurting, moral learning,
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Figure 1
An example of a Regulatory Pyramid(Ayres and Braithwaite,1992).

community participation and community caring, respectful dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, apology, and making amends
(Braithwaite, 2002a). The key point here is that the values emphasize restoring whatever was disrupted in the dispute. In the case of
a crime, ideally the victim's sense of control is restored through an
apology from the offender. However, Braithwaite insists that this
does not mean restorative justice should require the offender to
apologize. It is the values rather than the mechanisms which must
be implemented. Similarly, responsive regulation is not a clearly
defined program or a set of prescriptions concerning the best way
to regulate. Braithwaite argues that the best regulatory strategy
depends on context, regulatory culture, and history (Ayres and
Braithwaite, 1992). Braithwaite illustrates his approach with a regulatory pyramid. At the base of the pyramid are those regulatory
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approaches that should be used first and most often. When these
restorative approaches fail more confrontational means are necessary. Regulators should move from the means at the base of the
pyramid up towards the point only when restorative processes
are not working to elicit reform and repair.
Braithwaite then combines restorative justice and responsive
regulation to suggest that, in a wide range of legal and policy
concerns, we should begin with a restorative approach, and move
to more confrontational practices only when restorative practices
are not producing resolutions. For example, he applies this framework to world peacemaking.
Following arguments made by Desmond Tutu and others,
Braithwaite suggests that securing peace in regional conflicts such

Figure 2
A Responsive Regulatory Pyramidfor InternationalDiplomacy (Braithwaite,
2002a).
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as in the Middle East, South Africa, and the former Yugoslavia
requires the use of restorative processes that convince people
that their human rights are respected and that give them an
opportunity to mourn and forgive (Braithwaite, 2002a).He cites
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an
example of bringing restorative practices to the grassroots level
where they must be employed in order to promote sustainable
peace. The pyramid illustrates that economic sanctions or military
interventions should only be used when restorative processes
have failed.
For those who are concerned that current family involvement
interventions in child protection are under-theorized, Braithwaite's work provides both useful theory and a useful model
for thinking about theory development and evaluation research.
The next section describes Braithwaite's approach to evaluation
research and its congruence with the evaluation of family involvement interventions. The paper concludes with a discussion of
how to use Braithwaite's theory to advance the use of family
involvement interventions.
The Role of Theory in Program Evaluation
Modern social program evaluation emerged during the Great
Society of the 1960s, when there was a dramatic increase in social
program spending and a corresponding demand for evaluation of
these programs (Shadish, Cook and Leviton, 1995). This demand
supported the development of evaluation as a profession. Social
scientists who have taken on this work come from a wide variety
of training and backgrounds, which has resulted in a lack of
unified theories of how to evaluate programs. Early program
evaluation guides focused on outcomes and quantitative analysis,
while more recent ones have included process and qualitative
methods. This shift has resulted in debates in the evaluation field
about whether quantitative methods are superior to qualitative
methods and whether positivist theories are superior to interpretivist theories. There are similar debates in the field of social work
regarding which methods and epistemologies are best suited for
social work inquiry (Allen-Meares and Lane, 1990; Ristock and
Pennell, 1996). Lin (1998) suggests that a positivist approach seeks

Family Involvement Interventions

181

to identify those details with propositions that can be tested or
identified in other cases, while an interpretivist approach seeks to
combine those details into systems of belief whose manifestations
are specific to a case. Lin further suggests that both approaches
are useful in program evaluation because we need to demonstrate
that policies have their desired effects with positivist analysis and
demonstrate how they work using interpretivist analysis.
Braithwaite's theories are developed in a broad array of
empirical investigations of occupational safety, nursing home
regulation, consumer protection, and criminal justice. In a 1993
article, he describes the contextual integrated strategy he uses
to contribute to better public policy in these numerous domains
(Braithwaite, 1993). Braithwaite's approach to the positivist vs. interpretivist debate described above is eclectic (Braithwaite, 1993).
He agrees with interpretivists who believe a theory developed in
one context cannot be willy-nilly applied in another and that we
are unlikely to discover universal theories of say, crime prevention. However, he also argues that theories developed in another
context can be useful metaphorically for thinking about a new
problem in a new context in different ways. He suggests that
his approach to theory is similar to those of Allison (1971) and
Morgan (1986). An example of Braithwaite's use of metaphoric
theory is the pyramid described above.
While using theory as interprevitists do, Braithwaite still sees
a role for positivistic quantitative methods in testing key claims of
a theory: "one should definitely be discouraged in one's support
of a particular element of an integrated long-term strategy if all
the evaluation studies show that in the short term, this element
never makes any difference" (Braithwaite, 1993, p 388). Or to put
a positive spin on this, if one finds a statistically significant relationship between certain offender behaviors during a restorative
justice conference (e.g., expressing remorse) and reductions in
their future criminal behavior, this information is very helpful
in improving the intervention and the theory behind it (Morris, 2002).
Finally, Braithwaite's contextual integrated strategy combines
metaphoric theories and positivistic research through the engagement of key stakeholders from the context in which one is
developing the intervention. He suggests we take the theories
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and the results of previous research and discuss them with the
stakeholders from the community that is developing an intervention and learn from the community members the extent to which
the theories and findings are relevant to their own community
context. Then we develop a specific intervention strategy that
is responsive to the stakeholder discussions of the theories, the
previous research findings, and the specific community context.
Lastly, the stakeholders would participate in the implementation
of the intervention and the researcher's efforts to monitor the
implementation.
Applying These Ideas to Family Involvement
Interventions in Child Protection
Following the methodology described above, those aspiring
to develop family involvement interventions for child protection
would begin with Braithwaite's theory of restorative justice and
responsive regulation. The restorative values he describes can be
used to discuss the values that will drive the effort. Each community considering the use of family involvement interventions
in child protection should review Braithwaite and his critics to
think about which restorative justice values are applicable to child
protection in their own community. For example, what is the role
of apology, remorse, and shame in this process (Van Stokkom,
2002)? Family meetings are an emotional process and it is useful
to discuss which emotions may emerge and how they can be used
to facilitate child and family well being.
Braithwaite's pyramid can be used to think about the context of the intervention and under what circumstances it will be
used. His pyramid also highlights the importance of not simply
starting yet another new program. As Adams and Krauth point
out: "There is a strong tendency in American human service
systems for innovations such as family-based services to take
the form of discrete packages of services produced for sale on
the human services market. Innovative approaches to practice
tend to become reduced to specific programs. Although there are
attempts to reform whole systems toward family-based practice,
the stronger tendency is for such work to be isolated in specialist
units while the rest of the system continues largely unchanged"
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(1995, p. 92). Instead, family meetings can be used in a broad
context of community- and neighborhood-based accountability.
For example, Team Decisionmaking is one part of the Annie E.
Casey Foundation's Family to Family Initiative which also includes strategies to recruit and support resource families and
community partnerships as well as self evaluation procedures
for determining how well the entire reform effort is working
(DeMuro and Rideout, 2002).
By placing family meetings in the middle, rather than the
base of the pyramid, I hope to clarify the role of family meetings in child protection. Prantis (2000) suggests that conferencing
can strengthen or weaken community cohesiveness and sense of
efficacy. Family meetings can be part of a broader effort to reinforce mutual accountability and responsibility or it can become
another way professionals undermine community by creating
dependence on formal services to solve community problems.
Prantis is concerned that, for example, "community members
have increasingly removed themselves from taking responsibility
for the behavior of children and youth in public places" (p. 46) and
that we need to ensure that family meetings reinforce rather than
undermine a restoration of this sort of community accountability
for children and families. Similarly, Braithwaite and Strang (2002)
suggest that there should be synergy between public and private
regulation and that we should simultaneously strengthen the regulatory capabilities of families, communities, non-governmental
organizations and the state with respect to family violence. The
American Humane Association's Front Porch Project is an example of an attempt to bring back this community response to
child welfare (Wilmot, 2002). TDM is another example in that it is
always implemented along with other Family to Family strategies
that include strengthening community involvement.
Consistent with Braithwaite's pyramid metaphor, families
and communities can move up and down the pyramid in Figure 3
as they demonstrate their capacity to care for children. Ideally,
over time, professionals would be convening fewer meetings
because the community would be organizing the meetings and
other forms of support themselves. Family meetings would be
convened when community accountability is not sufficient to
keep a child safe. Initially, these family meetings could be used
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A Responsive Pyramidfor Child Protectionand Out-of-home care.
to keep children safely with their current caregivers (parents or
guardians). Under more serious circumstances, family meetings
can be used to place children with their extended family or possibly into formal foster care. In limited (ideally) circumstances,
formal foster care services would be used to make placement decisions and provide services that could include the termination of
parental rights and adoptive placement. Following Braithwaite's
responsive regulation, the level of state intervention would depend on the ability of the families and communities to "regulate" themselves. Communities considering the implementation
of family meetings can use this pyramid to discuss how these
interventions could be useful in their own contexts.
Following Braithwaite' suggestions for positivistic inquiry,
quantitative studies of other family involvement programs and
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ongoing analysis of the implementation of a new family involvement program can inform the development of the intervention.
For example, many communities question the appropriateness of
family involvement interventions in families that have a history
of domestic violence or child sexual abuse. An evaluation of a
FGDM program intervention in the eastern Canadian province
of Newfoundland & Labrador suggests when and how family
meetings can be used in these cases (Pennell and Burford, 2000).
This is not to suggest that family meetings should always be used
in cases of domestic violence or child sexual abuse, but the study
may help communities consider whether they can make it work.
Simple quantitative analysis can also be used to evaluate the
implementation of a program. My own work includes the evaluation of a FGDM program that initially served African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and Native American families
(Crampton, 2001). When the program was expanded to serve all
families regardless of ethnicity the level of program participation
dropped. The FGDM staff suggested that Caucasian families were
less willing to try FGDM than other families. A simple bivariate
analysis confirmed that African American families were more
willing to try FGDM than Caucasian families. However, in a multivariate analysis, race and ethnicity were no longer significant.
Whether families had extended family members who were willing to participate was a better predictor of FGDM participation
than race and ethnicity. This simple positivistic analysis helped
the staff look for alternative explanations for the drop in program
participation. An alternative theory suggested that the expansion of the population served without a corresponding increase
in program resources, prevented the staff from fully exploring
family resources and therefore limited the effectiveness of the
program. Recent preliminary analysis of Team Decisionmaking
in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (which includes Cleveland) suggests
that children are more likely to be placed with relatives rather
than in foster care when relatives attended the family meeting.
While this finding may seem self evident, the results highlight
for staff the importance of getting relatives to the meeting.
Braithwaite's approach to involving stakeholders in the evaluation of business regulation and criminal justice is consistent
with many of the early evaluations of Family Group Decision
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Making. For example, the evaluators of the FGDM program in
Newfoundland-Labrador described their approach as follows:
The study used a collaborative action research approach which was
viewed as congruent with its philosophy of forming partnerships.
The study was designed: (a) collaboratively by involving a range of
project participants as well as external consultants, (b) sequentially
by drawing upon learning from earlier phases of the project, and
(c) formatively by revamping procedures on the basis of feedback
from participating families, community representatives, government officials and project staff (Burford and Pennell, 1995, p. 7).
Family involvement evaluators can combine quantitative and
qualitative data and review it with program participants in this
process to develop the program theory, test how well the program
works under the theory, and then use the results to build support
for resources for the program. Given the emphasis that Family
Group Decision Making places on "widening the circle," it is
not surprising that this approach to evaluation is often used in
FGDM and Team Decisionmaking. Pennell, following her Canadian FGDM work, is now taking these lessons to her North Carolina FGDM project and following the same process (Pennell and
Weil, 2000). Communities that are using Team Decisionmaking
as part of the Casey Foundation's Family to Family Initiative also
have a self evaluation process that helps the key stakeholders focus on how Team Decisionmaking works and how it can improve
outcomes for families (DeMuro and Rideout, 2002).
Next Steps
Given the extensive enthusiasm for Family Group Conferencing and related family involvement interventions, there will be
some suggestions to begin rigorous clinical trials. I believe this
would be a mistake. There is a need for additional work in developing the theory behind these interventions and understanding
how they should be adapted in different contexts following the
writings of Burford, Braithwaite, Pennell and others. After using the contextual integrated strategy described above, we can
move towards randomized trials just as Braithwaite and his colleagues began randomized trials of restorative justice programs
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in Australia after they completed contextual integrated theory
building research on these programs.
Evaluating the Essential Elements of
Family Involvement Interventions
A contextual integrated strategy for developing family involvement interventions should focus on evaluating the benefits
of what are perceived to be the key elements of the intervention.
Some Family Group Decision Making advocates have identified
three essential elements of the practice: quality preparation time
prior to the meeting, private family time during the meeting, and
not prescribing the decision prior to the meeting (Mirsky, 2003).
While there does not appear to be anything inherently incongruous in making these prescriptions, there is again an unfortunate
parallel with the experience of Intensive Family Preservation Services. The Homebuilder's model of Intensive Family Preservation
Services has a very explicit intensity (2 cases per caseworker)
and duration (four to six weeks). Evaluations of these services
suggest that this is not necessarily an appropriate programmatic
design. For example, evaluators of the Illinois family preservation
program concluded that the program design was unrealistic due
to the difficulties with targeting and the severity of the issues
faced by the some of families served (Schuerman, Rzepnicki,
and Littell, 1994). Although families in the treatment group in
this study received more intensive services compared to families
in the comparison group, the short-term nature of the services
often prevented the families from getting what they needed. The
evaluators pointed out that while the staff was supposed to involve the extended family in case planning, in practice workers
said they were reluctant to do so because it would heighten
complex family dynamics that could not be managed with timelimited services (Schuerman, Rzepnicki, and Littell, 1994). Following Braithwaite's approach, this finding would not suggest
that family preservation services should not be limited to six
weeks, but it would suggest that stakeholders discussing the use
of these services should consider the trade-off in potential benefit
of intensive services vs. the time demands of involving extended
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family members in case planning. In a similar way, we should
examine the research related to preparation time, private family time, and decision making authority in family involvement
programs to see what lessons can be drawn and reviewed in
places that are considering implementing similar programs. In the
following sections, I review each of these three key practices using
Braithwaite's strategy: what is the theory behind the practice?
What does the research show about this practice? What is the
perception of the stakeholders of this practice?
Preparation Time
FGDM advocates are understandably concerned that there
will be attempts to start FGDM programs with insufficient resources, that these programs will then not produce the potential
benefits of FGDM, and that therefore the reputation of FGDM
will suffer. One way they attempt to ensure program integrity is
to insist that FGDM must include quality preparation time, which
is described as 20-25 hours on average (Mirsky, 2003). Preparation time is therefore a key distinction between these models:
"Without thorough and intensive preconference planning, the
FGC approach reflects more traditional case-planning methods"
(Merkel-Holguin and Ribich, 2001, p. 203).
Research on FGDM suggests that preparation time is often
extensive and that participants believe that preparation time is
important for exploring family resources and beginning to change
the relationships between family members and child welfare professionals (Marsh and Crow, 1998). To my knowledge, there is yet
no research which demonstrates that preparation time produces
these benefits or that preparation time improves outcomes for
children and families. As stated above, my research showed that
expanding the population served by an FGDM program without
a corresponding increase in program resources, prevented the
staff from fully exploring family resources and therefore limited
the effectiveness of the program (Crampton, 2001). Clearly, program resources are important in making family meetings work.
However, I did not find that preparation time itself was correlated with the primary goal of the program which was to divert
children from foster care into kinship care (Crampton, 2001). In
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that study, preparation time was measured in terms of both the
number of days from referral date to the meeting date, and the
number of hours FGDM staff logged as preparation for the specific case between those dates. The average number of days was
about eighteen and the logged preparation time averaged eight
hours. Preparation time was slightly higher and number of days
lower for meetings that developed a diversion plan, but these
differences were not statistically significant. The Calgary FGDM
pilot found that preparation time averaged seven hours (Sieppert,
Hudson and Unrau, 2000). The Calgary researchers noted that
Ban (1996) suggests that preparing for conferences takes approximately four times as long as actually having them. In my study,
meetings averaged two hours and preparation time was eight
hours, so these findings are consistent with Ban's observation.
This would suggest that preparation time in the program was
consistent with some standard FGDM practices, but preparation
time was not significant in predicting which families developed
a diversion plan.
Undoubtedly, preparation time is important in family involvement interventions. However, prescribing a specific amount
of preparation time, without empirical support, is misleading. In
a review of a Cedar Raids, Iowa application of a family-centered
practice called Patch, the researchers points out that: "Patch need
take no more time than conventional practice, but it does require
that time be used differently" (Adams and Krauth, 1995). It may
be possible that family meetings, organized one at a time, are
very time intensive and require 20 hours to adequately prepare.
However, if family meetings are organized in a larger context,
such as the one illustrated in Figure 3, a structure of community
and family support may be readily available thus making the
organization of family meetings much faster. Family involvement
interventions explored through contextual integrated strategies,
may suggest whether this is a viable approach to organizing
family meetings.
Private Family Time
The second essential element cited by some FGDM advocates
is private family time (Mirsky, 2003). During private family time,
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after hearing from the professionals what their concerns are,
the family is left alone to develop a plan. Many FGDM proponents regard private family time as an essential element: "Without private family time, research shows and history documents
that power will not be shared, and the imbalance will persevere
(Merkel-Holguin and Ribich, 2001, p. 211). Insisting that family
involvement interventions must include this element is a potentially contentious requirement because two widely used family
involvement interventions, Family Unity Meetings in Oregon and
Team Decisionmaking in the Casey Foundation's Family to Family Initiative, do not routinely use private family time. Does this
mean that these interventions do not empower families? In order
to answer this question, we need to compare programs with and
without private family time. While definitions of empowerment
are illusive, some FGDM researchers have suggested evaluating
FGDM's ability to empower families by whether programs can
produce successful outcomes (Lupton and Nixon, 1997). Thus far,
we have no outcome evidence that proves the value of private
family time. Proponents of private family time say that it turns
the decision making over to the family, gives them a sense of
control, and symbolizes that the family is in charge (Mirsky, 2003).
It would be useful to ask family members who participate in
family meetings if they agree with these stated benefits.
An ongoing evaluation of Team Decisionmaking in Cuyahoga, County, Ohio is examining a related issue. In this case,
staff are concerned about a tendency for some staff to step out
of the room and consult with each other about a case without the
family's participation. To evaluate this practice, the staff is asked
to record how often this occurs and write a brief explanation of
why it was necessary for someone to leave the room. Preliminary
results suggest that someone left the room in only about eight
percent of the meetings. The explanations show that sometimes
people left the room for legitimate reasons unrelated to staff discussions (e.g. 'went to the bathroom,' 'feeding the meter,' 'infant
being born'). Interestingly, it also includes examples of the family
being left to discuss the case on their own without the professionals in the room. As suggested by Braithwaite, collecting this
information, discussing it with staff, and linking it to outcomes
will help us understand whether variations in attendance during
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the meeting are potentially important to the outcomes for children
and families.
Prescribing Outcomes
Finally, FGDM advocates believe it is important that the facilitator of the meeting not prescribe the outcome (Mirsky, 2003). The
question of who is making the decisions and when the decisions
are made is a controversial issue in the family involvement field.
For example, Team Decisionmaking consultants have written:
"While team decisionmaking shares the same fundamental philosophy and values and is similar in participants and process,
it differs significantly from family group conferencing. In team
decisionmaking, the group is convened for the specific purpose
of making an immediate placement related decision-and the process is used for each and every such decision faced by the public agency in its daily work. The public agency shares but does
not delegate its responsibilityto make critical placement decisions.
Team decisonmaking therefore tends to be a high-volume and
emotionally charged process which requires highly skilled agency
staff to serve as facilitators" (DeMuro and Rideout, 2002, p. 12,
emphasis added). In Team Decisionmaking, a high value is placed
on involving families in decision making, however the primary
concern is child safety. Bartholet, author of Nobody's Children:
Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative, is
explicit in saying: "If social workers are approving most of the
family plans, I find it very troubling, because it says to me that
what FGDM is about is near total delegation of decision making
by the state to the family' (Shirk, 1999, p. 18). Usually in an FGDM
process, the professionals are not supposed to be directing the
family decision making; however, the social workers have an
essential and significant role in both the preparation and the
follow-up to the meeting. In addition, contrary to Bartholet's
statement, typically the referring social worker must approve the
family's plan, based on safety and permanency criteria, so it is
not an abdication of decision making to the family, but a sharing
of it.
While FGDM proponents typically clarify that social workers can veto a family's plan, they also suggest that families are
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making the decisions and that it is problematic to use FGDM to
achieve a prearranged outcome. For example, Merkel-Holguin
(2000) argues that:
While family group conferencing provides families of origin and
communities with a process to share decision-making authority
with formal child welfare systems, it does not prescribe an outcome.
In the United States, a troubling phenomenon is occurring in an
increasing number of communities that, to receive much needed
political support to initiate family group conferencing, are casting
this approach as a cost-savings or containment mechanism, or one
that results in certain outcomes. When this occurs, the intent of family
conferencing is lost (emphasis added, p. 229).
Before an FGDM program makes the claim that they are
not prescribing the outcomes, they should carefully review their
referral process and examine which families are referred to an
FGDM and which are not. In the United States, typically the
public agency social worker most intimately involved in the case
refers the case to an FGDM program (Merkel-Holguin and Ribich,
2001) and therefore, presumably also has the power to not make
a referral. Although this FGDM selection process has not been
fully explored in British studies of FGDM (called Family Group
Conferencing or FGC), researchers from England suggest that
there is evidence "that professionals retain considerable control
over whether and which families are offered the choice of a FGC"
(Lupton and Nixon, 1999, p. 119). Even if social workers are not
prescribing outcomes in FGDM, if they have the power to decide
who gets an FGDM, they do have considerable control of the
outcomes. As Stevens (2003) points out: "Family Group conferencing involves a professionally initiated arena where families
contribute to decisions about the future of their children, which
represents a particular balance of control over decision making.
While families make plans and decisions, professionals define
and raise the specific issues to which families are responding"
(p. 34).
Although the concern about who is making the decision may
be important, it is difficult to develop a means of measuring it. In
my study, we asked the FGDM staff to record the family's reaction
to the child maltreatment report and the recommendation to
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remove the children from their caregivers (Crampton, 2001). Generally, this section is a few sentences long and indicates whether
the family asked any questions about the investigation findings
and whether they agreed with what was said. Family members
typically agreed that the children needed to be removed, but they
often asked questions and had different perspectives on the specific concerns. The study found that families who agreed with the
initial removal decision but asked clarifying questions were more
likely to develop a diversion plan. This is consistent with other
studies showing that information sharing can be important. In
Newfoundland-Labrador, they found that information sharing is
critical: "The impact on the family of hearing the facts with everyone present in the room was regarded as a significant milestone in
the reunification process.... the few exceptions being where the

presentation was "preachy" in the words of one researcher and
in one case where a presenter was described in the evaluation by
several participants as "arrogant" (Burford, Pennell, MacLeod,
Campbell and Lyall, p. 43).
In my study, families completed a seven-question survey
immediately after the family meeting. A convenience sample of
156 surveys from forty-one meetings showed that the families
were positive about the FGDM staff, fairly positive about the
FGDM program and process, less enthusiastic about the role
of the investigating Child Protection worker, and positive but
sometimes disappointed by the outcome of their case. When
social workers and families were engaged with each other in the
process, they were more likely to develop a diversion plan. For
example, those families who developed a plan were more likely to
strongly agree that the coordinator shared necessary information
and that they were given the information they needed to make a
decision.
These observations of family members' reaction to the process
and their responses to surveys seem to suggest that it is the
sharing of information back and forth between the facilitator and
the family that is important in reaching a collective decision. This
may mean it is less important to determine who made the decision
than to determine whether everyone felt they contributed to the
decision. Burford and Pennell (1995) developed an instrument
to measure meeting participants' perception of the amount of
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influence or "say," all the participants had in the meeting. This
instrument was also used in a study of Family Unity Meetings
in Oregon (Rockhill and Rodgers, 1999). The Oregon study suggested that a significant number of family members felt they had
sufficient involvement in the decisions and the study identified
a number of family meeting practices that seemed to improve
the amount of say participants felt they had. For example, when
a series of family meetings were held, the participants felt that
their amount of say increased (Rockhill and Rodgers, 1999).
The findings summarized above begin to provide some ideas
regarding the significance of preparation time, private family
time, and decision making authority. Following Braithwaite's
approach, communities developing family involvement interventions should review the theories related to these and other family
involvement practices, the research findings on these practices
and consider the applicability of this theory and research to their
own community. While some stakeholders groups may reach
similar conclusions about previous family involvement work, we
would continue to expect to see variations in family involvement
practice across communities. When we achieve some consensus
around which practices are critical, we can then consider rigorous
clinical trials that can demonstrate the efficacy of this approach.
This follows the suggestions made by Wells (1994) that family
preservation services research should place greater emphasis on
connecting program design with theory and then, after the theory
is developed, evaluate the links between the conceptualization of
child welfare problems, causes, and their treatments.
Family Group Decision Making and related family involvement interventions are part of a larger debate about the role of
the community and the role of the state in addressing cases of
child abuse and neglect. In the United States, the child welfare
system does not have sufficient resources to respond to all calls
received from people who are concerned about the treatment
of children by their parents (Faller, 1985; Lindsey, 1994; Schorr,
1997). The consequence of this dilemma for public child welfare managers is either to focus limited resources on the most
severe cases or attempt to secure additional resources by developing partnerships with organizations and people who are willing
to help in cases of child maltreatment. Adams (2000) describes
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these alternatives as a debate between the neostatist approach
and the community-based approach to child welfare services
reform. The neostatists believe state intervention should place a
greater emphasis on adoption as the best option for children who
are maltreated (Bartholet, 1999). The community-based approach
emphasizes partnerships between families and communities to
address child maltreatment (Waldfogel, 2000). Adams (2000) cites
Family Group Decision Making as an example of this communitybased approach. FGDM aspires to fundamentally change current
child welfare practice and change it in a way that is very different
from neostatist reform proposals. Not surprisingly, neostatists,
like Elizabeth Bartholet (1999), are highly critical of FGDM and
there is already a "backlash" against FGDM. Research following the methods of Braithwaite and others, can help provide
a response to this backlash. Family involvement interventions
appear to be a useful way to bring more community resources
to the problem of child maltreatment. In order to demonstrate
and promote their use, we should avoid the difficulties posed by
the family preservation services movement and follow the path
suggested by Braithwaite.
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Families and the Republic
JOHN BRAITHWAITE

Australian National University

Restorative and responsivejustice can be a strategy of social work practice
that builds democracy bottom-up by seeing families as building blocks of
democracy and fonts of democratic sentiment. At the same time, because
families are sites of the worst kinds of tyranny and the worst kinds of
neglect,a rule of law is needed that imposes public human rightsobligations
on families. The republican ideal is that this rule of law that constrains
people in families should come from the people. Restorativeand responsive
justice has a strategy for the justice of the people to bubble up into the
justice of the law and for the justice of the law to filter down into the justice
of the people. The role of the social worker is to be a bridgeacross which both
those democratic impulses are enabled to flow. The empowering side of the
social work role fits the first side of the duality where the will of families
bubble up; the coercive side of the social work role fits the second where the
justice of the law filters down.
Key words: social work, responsive regulation,restorativejustice, democratic theory,families, social justice

Social Work and Structural Justice
My thanks to the contributors to this special issue for a thoughtful and gracious set of contributions. When they arrived from Paul
Adams he apologized that there was too heavy an emphasis on
families and child welfare, bearing in mind the way Restorative
Justice and Responsive Regulation (Braithwaite, 2002) ranges across
all domains of law, business regulation and even peacemaking
in international relations. When I was a young sociologist, social
work was not my favorite discipline because it seemed to focus
too much on micro-solutions, pejoratively referred to as bandaids, to problems of injustice that require structural solutions. So
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my energy was directed to studying questions like Global Business
Regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), the role of the IMF and
the WTO, how tax administration can become more effective in
getting rich individuals and powerful corporations to pay their
fair share of tax to support the welfare state, and the like. Some
of our responsive regulatory initiatives in Australia to persuade
multinational corporations to pay some tax seem to have been
surprisingly effective (Braithwaite, 2003), so it is important not to
neglect this part of our work.
We expect social workers to prioritize work with families, but
we can be surprised when evidence-driven tax administrators
do so. An intriguing development has been that a senior tax
official seconded to our research group, Jenny Job, together with
her colleague Monika Reinhart, has found that families hold the
key to tax compliance! This research (Job & Reinhart, 2003) set
out to test Robert Putnam's (2000) influential thesis that social
capital and trust in government is driven by civic engagement
and associational membership. Their AMOS analysis on survey
data from 1,999 Australian taxpayers produced a rich texture of
results the complexity of which I will not try to summarize. But
the basic result was that civic engagement of various kinds-from
not bowling alone, to volunteering, to political activism-had
only minor effects on trust in government institutions, including
the Australian Tax Office. Trust in family and friends (workplace
colleagues really) is what drives their model. If you learn trust in
your family, or failing that in your workplace, you trust strangers
more, you trust other government institutions more, and these
work through to higher trust in the tax authority. Perhaps it is
perverse that we sociologists should be surprised to learn that
families are much more fundamental than bowling leagues to
social capital formation and the cultivation of habits of citizenship
that enable the functioning of institutions like taxation that are so
fundamental to redistribution of wealth from rich to poor.
As Kristin Kelly (this volume) says, partnerships with community organizations are still important and are here to stay; there
are good reasons why these partnerships help secure improved
effectiveness and decency in how we pursue important public
purposes, from the protection of children to the environment. But
what a mistake for Braithwaite the young sociologist to fail to see
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that it is in families that most of us learn most of what equips us
to be effective democratic citizens in community organizations.
The New Zealand innovation of family group conferences is not
merely something the evidence now shows to have promise as
a way of confronting crime, delinquency (see Braithwaite, 2002;
Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2001; Nugent, Williams & Umbreit,
2003) and the care and protection of children (see Neff, this volume; Merkel-Holguin, this volume; Pennell, this volume), it is
a strengths-based strategy for restoring families as a fundamental building block of strong democracies. Children are not born
democratic. They must learn to be democratic citizens-to listen,
deliberate, support others when their rights are abused, speak
out against injustice (Barber, 1992). For most of us these are gifts
of deliberative competence induced by participation in healthy
family decisionmaking. Many who miss out on these gifts in their
family lives learn them in schools that give children a voice. And
some who miss out in both these institutions are lucky enough to
get a job early in their life in a democratic workplace. The bowling
league and other civic associations matter, but are thin reeds
compared to family-school-workplace as pillars of education for
democracy. If the most important pillar of the three is the family,
then the social work road not taken by many young sociologists
of the 1970s was not a band-aid on deeper societal sores, but one
important path to healing wounds at their source.
David Moore shows in his contribution to this volume that
conferences are structured to "get to peace" before they seek to
"get to yes" (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). This helps us see why
restorative and responsive peacebuilding has an important contribution to make in societies in the process of putting down their
guns to recover from armed conflict. In peacemaking contexts like
the Bougainville civil war (in Papua New Guinea) we can see how
New Zealand-style conferences adapted to Melanesian traditions
are playing a major role in securing the peace (Howley, 2003).
Empirical research on what works and what hinders care and protection and juvenile justice conferences will help inform how we
can heal the wounds of children traumatized by atrocities against
their parents in a war, how we can help in dissuading them from
wanting to restart the war to avenge their family's suffering in the
next generation. By connecting the work of our micro-research
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and practice community to the peace movement we inspire our
mundane work with that wider significance. By connecting the
peace movement to the social movement for restorative justice
we can show peace activists a small way of acting locally to
teach the young how to be democratic through their personal
participation in protecting their sibling or mother from abuse,
in how to protect their friend from being bullied in the school
playground (Morrison, 2004). The peace movement can show the
social movement for restorative justice how to make the personal
political; just as restorativists can show the peace movement how
to make the political personal, how to act locally in a way that
gives our global aspirations for peace a more holistic grounding
in the relationships that daily preoccupy us.
We get to peace before we get to yes by seeing conflict resolution as about the transformation of relationships rather than just
bargaining over interests. Mediation reduced to doing deals does
not offer up human relationships that are infused with integrity,
that enable the trust and the social capital formation that Putnam
(2000) rightly saw as fundamental to a flourishing democracy and
economy. The evidence from observational studies is increasingly
consistent with Moore's (this volume) observations that open
expression of affect and a process that is shaped by the participation of stakeholders rather than by professionals is critical to
the success of restorative processes in achieving the purposes they
set for themselves.
Caring for Children
Lisa Merkel-Holguin (this volume) shows the rapid growth
of child protection, as opposed to juvenile justice, family group
conferences from existing in five US communities in 1995 to over
150 by 2000, from 4 pilot projects in England and Wales in 1994 to
97 local programs by 200. While most of these programs are not
the mainstream in their locality, the spread has been surprisingly
rapid intra-nationally and internationally across at least 20 nations. Merkel-Holguin suggests that a lot of the appeal of family
group conferences has been their fit with the idea of strengthsbased interventions. The notion of building out from the strengths
of children and families in turn fits with the aspiration of bottom-
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up education for democracy, a theme nicely developed in MerkelHolguin's essay.
Yet the family group conference is not a pure deliberative
democracy. Sometimes, as Joan Pennell (this volume) implies, the
social welfare professional must enter the conference by communicating a clear "bottom line" such as securing the safety
of a particular at risk child from a particular threat. Whether
emphasizing "bottom lines" up front is the most effective way
of securing safety is a question on which we have no empirical
evidence as far as I know. What I would want to assert is that
there is nothing wrong in democratic principle with "bottom
lines" so long as they are bottom lines that are clearly demanded
by a law voted through a democratic legislature. Bottom lines
that enforce a standard that is not a legal obligation of families,
that enforce merely a personal or programmatic preference of the
professional, are democratically unacceptable. Whether up front
through bottom lines grounded in human rights law or after the
event in court decisions that overturn conference outcomes that
abuse children's rights, a democracy will not be a democracy
unless it builds in checks and balances against tyrannies of the
majority, especially when the majority are adults and the minority
are children dominated by them.
As Philip Pettit (1996) has explained in his republican theory
of governance, the reason democracies are a good thing is that
they advance the protection of all of us, not just some of us, enjoy
from domination by others. Freedom as non-domination is the
condition a republican theorist of democracy seeks to secure. A
pure deliberative democracy where a primary group like a family
or extended family votes for their interests without interference
from legal principles from the wider demos might be viewed as
desirable if one's theory is of maximum democratic choice as a
good in itself. But if we value democracy as a means to the end
of freedom as non-domination, then we want to both nurture
richer deliberation of stakeholders and nurture the checking of
that deliberation by actors with an obligation to protect human
rights. Actually we want to do more. We also want to make
the deliberative democracy of citizens vulnerable to the rule of
the peoples' law (professionals communicating "bottom lines"
may be one way of doing this). And we want the rule of law
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to be vulnerable to the rule of the people. A family group being
able to call in legal aid to contest the legality of a bottom line
communicated by a professional at a conference is one way of
doing this. This helps the legal system to clarify what kinds of
bottom lines are democratically acceptable and which are not.
This is Christine Parker's (1999) idea of the justice of the law
filtering down into the justice of the people and the justice of the
people bubbling up into the justice of the law.
In Joan Pennell's (this volume), Paul Adams and Susan Chandler's (this volume) and David Crampton's (this volume) contributions, responsive regulation is seen as useful for reconciling the
tension between empowering democratic deliberation and intervention to protect children. At the base of the pyramid informal
civic deliberation in families, communities and neighborhoods is
relied upon to prevent the abuse and neglect of children. Then, as
in Crampton's Figure 3, there can be escalation to more structured
family meetings that reach agreements on how to keep children
safe within their existing family When those protections cannot
give enough assurance against a grave risk or when experience
proves them to have failed, the next step in Crampton's pyramid
is family meetings that decide to remove children from their
parents and place them with extended family. The next rung of
the pyramid is formal foster care.
Adams and Chandler, Pennell, and Crampton have all grasped
the basic idea that responsive regulation is a way of thinking,
not a definite list of prescriptions. Some pyramids may specify moving an adult out of the family rather than a child, for
example, or moving an adult member of the extended family
into the household to keep an eye out for the rights of the child.
Indeed the superstructure of the pyramid can be redesigned by
democratic deliberation at the base of the pyramid. So a family
group conference might decide that there will be a trial period
of a family member attending an anger management program.
Further it might agree that if this fails and degrading tirades
of anger persist, there will be an escalation of intervention that
requires this person to move out and live with their uncle. Finally,
if the tirades still come back to haunt the family and spill into
violence, family members may resolve to escalate to lodging a
formal assault complaint with the police. Signaling in advance
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that these escalations will occur if interventions at lower levels fail
can be good protective practice. This is because it communicates
to the actors who need to change their behavior that if change does
not occur, this will not be tolerated. The pre-commitment to an
escalated response can motivate change because of the message
the pre-commitment gives that change is inexorable.
Later, the conference may resolve that if the tirades have
dissipated under the joint influence of the anger management
program and living under the firm hand of the uncle, conditions
may be set for a return to live with the family Signaling a precommitment to deescalate in advance can also be good practice
because it offers a positive incentive for change. The idea of
responsive regulation is that it is better to be at the base of
the pyramid where democratic conversation does the regulatory
work, but that if escalation is necessary the decision to escalate
should always be open to revision, so de-escalation occurs.
A virtue of a restorative approach of plural deliberation at
the base of the pyramid is that the engagement of a plurality of
participants actually opens up new options in the middle of the
pyramid. For example, Crampton (this volume) refers to some
preliminary Ohio data that children are more likely to be placed
with relatives rather than in foster care when relatives attended
the family meeting.
While the accumulation of evidence on the efficacy of child
welfare conferences cited in this volume is encouraging, it is
early days and large studies with excellent designs are yet to
flourish. Some of the most crucial questions of conference design
are still being questioned by empirical evidence, as in the case
of Crampton's (2001) result that preparation time did not predict
success at diverting children from foster care into kinship care.
Lobbying for quality, independent research has paid dividends for restorative justice advocates with criminal and juvenile
justice because early vaguely encouraging results have now become higher quality, more decisively encouraging results (Braithwaite, 2002; Nugent, Williams, & Umbreit, 2003). Independent
evidence is needed to contend with what Crampton (this volume) discusses as the neostatist backlash. Neostatists believe in a
heavy emphasis on state intervention and a greater emphasis on
adoption as the best option if children are maltreated. Cost-benefit
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studies of high quality may be needed to address the concerns
of critics who say family group conferences are too expensive
(Adams & Chandler, this volume). Adams and Chandler describe
the affectionate labeling of Hawaiian conferencing innovators as
"bungee jumpers". Of course most folk in welfare bureaucracies
are not bungee jumpers; they prefer to stand on the bridge and
watch to see if the jumpers survive. They may not jump until there
is evidence showing that it is unequivocally bad practice not to.
Strengths-based strategies are always vulnerable to worldly-wise
cynicism that a particular family, whose details are only understood by this caseworker, is devoid of strengths and supports.
There are no extended family supports that will come if called
upon; the family does not have the capacity to make such difficult
decisions, and so on. Adams and Chandler also point to more
banal bureaucratic obstacles that need to be dealt with, like access
to flextime and overtime to allow conferences to be convened at
times like the evenings and weekends where maximum numbers
of family members might be able to attend.
There is also a tension between being evidence-based and
being democratic of course, as there is to tapping affect to motivate change (Moore, this volume). What happens when citizens
vote for a solution that the evidence clearly shows makes such
situations worse? What should happen when emotion drives people like stampeding cattle toward an outcome that the evidence
shows to be counterproductive? The other side of this argument
is that high quality evidence is no use if people are not motivated
to use it (Pease, 1998). Our biological inheritance is that we tend
not to engage our capacity for evidence-based reasoning unless
our emotions are harnessed to motivate us to do so. Why is the
evidence so strong with criminal cases that restorative justice
processes lead to more implementation of decisions than for cases
in control groups that went to court and other command and
control forms of processing (Latimer, Dowden, & Muise, 2001;
for child welfare conferences see Neff, this volume)? A probable
reason is that democratic deliberation leads to more commitment
to the decision than command and control by a court. But there
is also great practical capacity for monitoring. So, for example,
a next-door neighbor who promises at a conference to check in

Familiesand the Republic

207

on the family regularly to ensure that an undertaking is being
honored is likely to have more practical capacity to do so than
their welfare worker. What we need is a marriage of the evidencebased philosophy and the democratic ideal. We need evidencebased practitioners who provide conference participants not only
with a list of community and professional support options available for the kind of problem the conference is addressing but also
feedback on what the evidence says about when these interventions are likely to be effective and ineffective. It is the amalgam
of deliberation, intelligent analysis of evidence and emotional
intelligence that has delivered the greatest accomplishments of
human beings, not deliberation alone, nor evidence alone, nor
emotion alone.
There is also a need to work harder at connecting restorative
justice practice to rich existing bodies of empirical research that
establish relationships between variables that are strongly in play
during restorative justice processes. An example of how to do this
is Rob Neff's (this volume) illuminating treatment of the issue of
procedural justice and how it can improve not only compliance
with legitimate authority but also the realization of quite a list of
family group conference principles (Neff, this volume, Table I).
Procedural justice is likely to be best secured by neither top-down
legalism nor by pure deliberative democracy, but by the law's
conception of procedural justice being contested by the people's
conception of fairness and by what citizens in a conference feel is
fair being constrained by procedural safeguards in the law.
Finally, there is a need to draw upon the methodological contributions that have been developed in other fields. Joan Pennell's
(this volume) factor analysis of the objectives of participants in
family group conferences to form three factors-cultural safety,
community partnerships and family leadership-is a good example. The factors appear robust empirically and are conceptually
evocative. There is another reason why this aggregating of objectives into conceptual clusters is useful. This is as a response to the
critique that Andrew Von Hirsch et al. (2003) among others, has
made against my work-that every value under the sun seems to
be a restorative justice value, so there is no parsimony about it as
a normative theory.
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Domestic Violence

Peggy Grauwiler and Linda Mills (this volume) contend that
existing policy is not working to deal with intimate abuse. They
cite results from the 2000 National Violence Against Women Survey that only a fifth of all rapes and a quarter of all physical
assaults perpetrated against females by intimate partners were
reported to the police in the United States. Grauwiler and Mills
see restorative justice as having a lot to offer toward correcting
this situation, especially for women of color given the way automatic recourse to criminal prosecution for domestic violence
tends to play out more to the disadvantage of black than white
women (and men). Their idea of Intimate Abuse Circles connects
in an interesting way to the strengths-based theme of the last
section. Grauwiler and Mills argue that without blaming victims,
we should grant victims the dignity of having the strength to
concede that things they have done may have contributed to the
social dynamic that led to violence. The important thing is to
vindicate the victim by making it clear that what was done to her
was unjust and not deserved in any way. Once these things are
secured it makes no sense to treat the victim as someone who has
no power in the situation. She has the power to do things that
make her safer and the power to do other things that add fuel
to the emotional dynamic that leads to violence. Intimate Abuse
Circles comprise an approach oriented to assisting women and
men to acquire greater wisdom about things they sometimes do
that escalate violence as a stepping stone to designing a plan that
will actually work to prevent violence in the face of these cruel
realities. The analysis is courageously articulated in a way that
makes a good case for experimentation and rigorous evaluation
of Intimate Abuse Circles.
Kristin Kelly (this volume) sees the battered women's movement as an exemplar of state-community partnership because of
the attachment it has always shown to both community-based
and statist responses to domestic violence. Kelly believes that
both community and state interventions can be strengthened. She
says liberal legalist trepidation that bolstering community interventions will mean reduced commitment to treating domestic
violence as a serious criminal matter is a false choice. Braithwaite
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(1998) likewise contends that hydraulic arguments about stronger
states weakening communities or markets, and vice versa, are
common but theoretically highly contingent contentions. It is also
a theoretical possibility that we can strengthen one institution in a
social system in a way that reinforces rather than weakens other
systems. Hence, it is absolutely coherent to struggle politically
for a social democratic dispensation of strong markets, strong
communities, and a strong state. Kelly's trilogy of institutions
makes families, rather than markets, the third key institutional
sector. The earlier discussion of Job and Reinhart's (2003) research
on families, community organizations, and state institutions of
taxpaying is actually a nice illustration from a completely different domain of the fertility of Kelly's trilogy.
With domestic violence we can choose politically to struggle
for legal and policing reforms to make criminal prosecution effectively more available to victims of domestic violence at the
same time as we make family group conferences and community support from battered women's shelters more effectively
available. If it is correct that restorative justice is a powerful tool
for securing respect for legal rights, but more powerful if it is
backed by the possibility of responsive escalation to litigated
justice, then an important way of securing equal protection of
rights is to make both restorative justice and responsive regulation as available to the most powerless citizens as they are to
wealthy individuals, powerful corporations, and state regulators.
Too much of the debate around the advantages and disadvantages
of state versus community or family justice is about where the
imbalance of power will be greatest. My suspicion is that there is
a lot of contingency here as well. Sometimes an Intimate Abuse
Circle will dispense justice with less imbalance of power than
is found in a courtroom; in other contexts, the reverse will be
true. If this contingency claim is right then the greatest inequity
will exist when the powerful party has the capacity to choose
whether to go to court or to opt for restorative justice while the
less powerful party is forced to lump one option or the other. It
also follows that simultaneously struggling for greater access to
the justice of the courts and greater access to restorative justice
for weaker parties will strengthen their hand in conflicts with
better-resourced parties. The model in Figure 1 of Kelly's paper
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therefore seems fundamentally right with respect to justice. There
can be synergies between strengthening state justice, community
justice, and family justice where each enhances the capabilities of
the other.
The Language of Reform
The R Word
While the articles in this special issue make a good case that
regulatory theory has some use for changing how we think about
challenges like child welfare and domestic violence, regulation
does not always sit comfortably as a word to describe specific
interventions. Of course there is a brutal truth to the fact that child
welfare bureaucracies do regulate families as Burford and Adams
(this volume) explain in their introduction to this volume. Families are also regulated by other actors in the community sector and
they self-regulate. It is not that pluralist regulatory theories are
unattractive as a way of describing and explaining the reality of
what happens in welfare practice. It is that at the normative level,
the R word is not the stuff of politically resonant practice. My
favored solution when deploying regulatory theory in a context
where the R word turns people sour is to use governance. For
those of us who use regulation in its broadest sense as governing
the flow of events, this works fine.
The Other R Word
The other R word is restorative. David Moore (this volume)
prefers transformative. For years people like David and myself
were working on conferencing in New Zealand and Australia
without using this second R word. Restorative justice was the
term of art in North America. My research group went along with
this mainly because we think social movements matter and they
don't get far unless they share a language that participants find
politically resonant. Also of course America matters in any kind of
global social movement politics in a way Australia does not. But
restorative has some negatives when we are dealing with abuse
and neglect in families. Do we want to restore patriarchal families? No, we would rather transform them. Desmond Tutu would
reply that of course the South African Truth and Reconciliation
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Commission, which he conceives as a restorative justice initiative,
was not about restoring Apartheid. It was about restoring human
dignity, justice, and the rights that are fundamental to our humanity. At the end of the day, it does not matter much that David
Moore is using the T word and I the R word, so long as we are
collaborating effectively to develop ideas, practices, critique, and
evidence that assist the same broad reform movement.
The J Word and the C Word
Another difference in language with David Moore's work is
that David and his colleagues like to speak of conflicts, whereas
I prefer to see restorative justice as about responding to injustice.
This is because of a desire to separate restorative justice from older
versions of mediation and alternative dispute resolution that
feminists in particular have found unattractive for application to
domestic violence and family law disputes. So it seems important
when a rape is being responded to for this not to be conceived
as merely a conflict about which a mediator is morally neutral.
Certainly the restorative justice facilitator must not be biased
against either side. Yet there is moral clarity that there are values
at the heart of restorative justice; fundamental is the value that we
must confront injustices and correct them as best we can. Again
David Moore can and does agree with this while opting for a
different default usage of language. His side of this argument
might point out that injustice is not a particularly apt framing for
a family group conference concerning a conflict over whether
a child should live with a father with a drug problem or an
aunt after the child's mother has died. While no one is being
accused of wrongdoing here, my perspective would be that the
value centering of the process is still about justice in the sense of
securing the fundamental human rights of that child. For all this,
the fundamental point I wish to make here is that we must not
be misled into allowing a disagreement over language to cloud
a more fundamental agreement over practice and underlying
values.
The S Word
David Moore and I have been in the same hot water from
restorative justice folk who don't like the S word-shame. David
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has made a great contribution by documenting, as summarized in
his contribution to this volume, the profound emotional turning
point that regularly occurs in conferences from collective vulnerability or collective shame to acknowledgement that we all have
some ownership of this problem and we are going to fix it. My colleagues Eliza Ahmed and Nathan Harris, among others, have also
done important empirical work showing that when injustice occurs, whether a minor act of bullying or a serious crime, we cannot
understand the productive and unproductive ways of responding
to it without understanding the shame that both the victim and
the bully are feeling (Ahmed et al., 2001). As Tom Scheff points
out, we cannot comprehend the origins of World War II without
understanding the collective shame Germans experienced from
the humiliation of Versailles that Hitler so effectively exploited.
Nor can we comprehend the peaceableness of Germany since
World War II without understanding their acknowledgement of
shame after Nuremberg and their reintegration into the world
community through the Marshall Plan and other gestures that
rejected the path of humiliation of the vanquished that had been
followed after World War I.
A belief that understanding the joint emotions of shame and
pride is fundamental to grasping what is productive and counterproductive in restorative justice processes does not mean that
the language of shame provides a politically resonant discourse
for the social movement for restorative justice. It does not. The
political discourse of shame is dangerous because it is so vulnerable to appropriation by those who wish to stigmatize and
humiliate. Here I think David Moore and I would agree on how to
use language. But we would also agree that simply because some
people take political shots at our theoretical writings as a result
of our seeing shame as central, we should not be deterred from
evidence-based theory development about shame and restorative
justice.
Conclusion
As Burford and Adams (this volume) argue in their introduction to this collection, family group conferences can be conceived
as a strategy for reconciling the rights to autonomy of members

Familiesand the Republic

213

of families and their right to privacy. The conference honors the
private space of the family while leaving the obligation of the
state to protect and safeguard fundamental human rights undiminished (especially for children). Burford and Adams draw an
interesting parallel with my work on enforced self-regulation as
a business regulatory strategy (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992: Chapter 4), viewing the family group conference as a form of stateenforced family self-regulation. Burford and Adams see sociological critics of social work as one-sidedly emphasizing the social
control character of social work while some social work educators
one-sidedly romanticize the profession as about empowerment.
If they are right that my work is of some use for reframing
this central duality of the profession, it is because it involves a
normative rejection of both of those one-sided views and also
of any wishy washy middle ground between the two. Rather it
says that social work should have a strong commitment to being
a coercive agent of the state's law and a strong commitment
to empowering citizens to run their own lives. But those two
imperatives are temporally ordered. Social work's presumptive
strategy should be empowerment. But when empowered citizens
use that power to threaten the safety of vulnerable others, then
escalation to more and more coercive interventions should be
inexorable-until safety is secured. Then, and only then, there
can be a dialogue about deescalating intervention to reinstate
community and family empowerment.
Burford and Adams are right that coercion is inevitable and
just in social work practice. What a pyramidal approach to institutional design can deliver is a strategy for minimizing coercion.
This is because the paradox of the pyramid is that by signaling
inexorable escalation until justice is secured, more of the action
is driven down to the deliberative base of the pyramid. People
are most likely to take responsibility for securing the rights of
vulnerable others when the institutional design shows them that
failure to do so is a slippery slope to responsibility to secure
those rights being taken from them. The state's taking over that
responsibility is not threatened in the foreground but threatening in the background. Social workers should proceed on their
routine work of empowerment not by making judgments that
some people are fit to accept responsibility and others not. By
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assuming that all people have a willingness to take responsibility
for securing the rights of vulnerable others with whom they are
in close relationships until that presumption is proved wrong, by
seeing all people as having multiple selves that include socially
responsible and irresponsible selves, social work practice is about
empowerment to coax and caress the socially responsible self to
the fore. It is about building democratic problem solving, but
equally it is about enforcing the democracy's human rights and
freedoms when democratic deliberation fails to honor them.
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John T. Pardeck (Ed.), Family Health Social Work Practice:A Macro
Level Approach. Westport, CT: Auburn House, 2002. $ 67.95
hardcover.
Family health social work is based on a radical set of principles, values, and beliefs that recognize the critical role of family
as primary. Continuing the philosophy and efforts of social work
legend, Mary Richmond, this holistic approach brings together
a time tested perspective to social work blending individual,
ecological, and systems theories and acknowledging the physical, mental, emotional, social, economic, cultural, and spiritual
dimensions of human life. Central to family health theory and
practice is consideration of unique aspects of contemporary family life, such as neighborhood and culture, often overlooked by
other practitioners of other clinical methods. At last, here is a
perspective that unites family and health, and in addition to
being family centered, will inform the foundation of social work
teaching and practice.
As an emerging field the research and literature in this area of
study and practice has been sparse. The editor, John T. Pardeck,
urges a more thorough and critical review of the relevant material and calls upon students and educators to commit to further
research. The goal of this edited volume was to go beyond direct
practice, broaden our understanding of the predicament of health
care today, and stimulate a change process by focusing on macro
level issues. As a result the text makes a significant contribution
to the advancing knowledge regarding family health social work.
Organized into nine straightforward chapters the contributions include selections on clinical practice, community intervention, policy and program development and program administration. A social work scholar and family health pioneer, the
editor writes five of these chapters to introduce the family health
social work specialization, review the literature, describe various
assessment tools, and outline a cornerstone of theoretical thinking
in this practice, the Minuchin family stress model. Much of this
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will be familiar to seasoned practitioners, however a significant
section is Pardeck's analysis of family policy in the United States.
While mindful to not place blame he offers some explanations
for why a comprehensive family policy in the USA remains elusive, and highlights some of the hurdles remaining before affordable and accessible healthcare, housing and social services for
all Americans becomes a basic human right. I read between the
lines, looking for solutions and strategies, as he describes several
bleak and eroding systems. However, I was most influenced by
the poignant question raised: "How long can a society tolerate
the widening gap between rich and poor families, the tragedy of
children going without health care, and the disgrace of families
literally living on the streets in many large American cities?" An
attempt to suggest an answer to this vital question soon became
jostled by a reminder that politics are complex. Usually national
reform requires more than what is implied by the comment from
the controversial Professor Edward C. Banfield: "Every political
system is an accumulation of habits, customs, prejudices and
principles that have survived a long process of trial and error and
of ceaseless response to changing circumstances. If the system
works well on the whole, it is a lucky accident-the luckiest,
indeed, that can befall a society."
Other contributors add their expertise in the remaining material that covers a family health organizational model, a family
health perspective on social and economic justice, adapting family health principles to Hispanic migrant health care, and developing and managing family health programs. While these authors
provided an overview of key macro family health concepts and
principles, they varied in style and had redundant information.
An example was the repetitive definition of family health practice
that served to bloat the book. On the other hand their attention
to inclusiveness was refreshing, and the updates on the rapidly
changing health care system and recognition that our society's
current family structure is indeed a mosaic made a noteworthy
impression. Their work illustrated how modern families grapple
with health care issues in the context of their cultures, communities, and larger social systems, and they emphasized the value of
formulating policies and programs "outside the box". In addition
to supporting the message of family health practice, their critical
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thinking stresses the importance of social work involvement in
the nuances of politics, public policy, program development, and
administration.
The family health paradigm from a macro level approach
provides solid reading for learning within the classroom, clinical
environments, and policy planning arenas. This resourceful text
includes information on methods and skill requirements, as well
as government and public policy reforms and recommendations.
We can assume that at some point of our lives, we will have
to interface with the health care industry either as a provider,
patient, or caregiver. A personal experience often ignites the political and professional spirit, and the family health social work
prototype offers us new perspective and hopes to keep facing into
the wind. Distinguished from other social work concentrations
this rising field of practice provides a holistic understanding of
family behavior and health in the social environment and gives
momentum toward the possibility of greater acceptance of human
differences, responsibility for unmet social needs and health care
reform.
Marsha Blachman
University of California at Berkeley
Janet Rothenberg Pack, Growth and Convergence in Metropolitan
America. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
$19.95 papercover.
Growthand Convergence in MetropolitanAmericaby Janet Rothenberg Pack contributes to the literature in urban sociology by presenting a quantitative analysis of the 'Frost Belt-Sun Belt' thesis.
Variables for the study were obtained from the U. S. Decennial
Census of Population and Housing, the City and County Data
Book and the State of the Cities Data System of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Census data was
analyzed beginning with the 1960 Census and ending with the
1990 Census. The unit of analysis consisted of 277 metropolitan
areas in the United States.
In this book, Pack examined the shift in economic activity and
population that has occurred in the nation's cities and suburbs
as well as the regional differences which have emerged. She
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contends that the shift in economic activity and population from
the cities to the suburbs, and from the regions of the Frost Belt
to the Sun Belt, resulted in a convergence in per capita income,
poverty, unemployment rates and educational attainment in over
200 metropolitan areas in the United States, revealing what she
calls 'interregional differences in growth rates.' Pack also contends that the these interregional differences have created certain
concentration effects resulting in highly distressed metropolitan
areas and in the South continuing to lag behind the rest of the
country on various socio- economic indicators.
In order to counter the convergence and concentration effects
resulting from this shift, Pack urges the development and implementation of federal, state and local policies which promote
economic growth and improve the well-being of citizens within a
regional growth strategy She promotes this arrangement of policies with the knowledge that the regional approach has declined
in importance since the 1970s and that urban issues have sunk
below the serious threshold of national policy discussions.
While Pack is to be commended for her analysis, her work
has some limitations. First, Pack offers a rather narrow economic
analysis to predict and examine the degree of the shift in economic activity and population from the cities to the suburbs and
from the Frost Belt to the Sun Belt. Although she does mention
policy effects as contributing factors, her argument could have
been strengthened by a more balanced discussion of the political
factors that contributed to the shift. Furthermore, she did not
adequately discuss the role of political entrepreneurs and progrowth coalitions in these trends. These factors are concerned
with identifying persons who assess political benefits and risks in
order to build support among various stakeholders (or coalitions)
which can result in proposing or developing a policy and program
for economic development at the sub-national government level.
Second, while analyzing the shift, Pack presents a selective
discussion of declining industries in the Northeast and Midwest
and the problems associated with the growth in the cities and
suburbs in the South and the West, such as housing prices and
traffic congestion. In addition, Pack's inclusion of qualitative data
was based on the use of secondary sources such as magazine articles, Chamber of Commerce materials and real estate periodicals
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which can present an optimistic discussion of local economic
conditions.
Third, Pack appears hesitant when she states that "no general
regional development policy is called for, but if one is called
for, it should be focused on the metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) in the South" (p. 179). However, Pack could have discussed the background, successes, implications and failures for
creating a regional development policy at the sub-national government level. Further, although Pack appears to support macroeconomic activity as a way of improving the well-being of citizens
in depressed metropolitan areas, her argument could have been
strengthened by providing more detailed discussions on the link
between macroeconomic factors and their effects on growth rates.
Although Pack does not appear to favor the introduction of a systematic local regional development policy, her recommendations
to improve the well-being of persons in depressed metropolitan
areas are clearly political in nature. Finally, noticeably absent is a
substantive review of racial, social class and regional issues which
are embedded in her policy recommendations. At least two of
the recommendations (progressive income tax and business location/relocation decisions) have racial, social class and regional
(urban, rural, suburban) dynamics embedded in arguments for
or against developing and implementing them.
Nevertheless, Pack is to be commended for her quantitative
analysis of the Frost Belt-Sun Belt thesis, and her concern to improve the well-being of persons located in depressed metropolitan areas. However, Pack's analysis is limited by an inadequate
discussions of the political, economic and social factors that are
associated with urban development issues and which are widely
cited in the literature. These have contributed substantially to
the shift in economic activity and population which this text has
examined.
Joseph A. Deering
House Research Division
Missouri House of Representatives

Jerry Floersch, Meds, Money and Manners: The Case Management of
Severe Mental Illness. New York: Columbia University Press,
2002. $22.50 papercover, $49.50 hardcover.
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The type of intervention most likely provided by social workers and other mental health professionals to individuals suffering
from severe mental illness is "case management." The literature
on case management practice has grown and matured over the
years and has spawned a wide variety of theories and models. The
same literature, Floersch points out in Meds, Money, and Matters,
for the most part, argues for the effectiveness and utility of case
management in improving the quality of life of individuals suffering from serious mental illness, by linking them to social, medical,
and mental health services. Utilization of these services, it is
argued, yields many desirable outcomes. Independent living and
a decrease in hospital utilization are seen as highly indicative of
successful case management. Floersch asks and provides answers
to the questions: What does a case manager face on a daily basis
while going about the multiple tasks involved in providing case
management services? What guides the case manager's practice?
What happens when case management fails?
After an introductory chapter describing the theoretical and
methodological consideration that historically have been utilized in the field, Floersch introduces the concepts of disciplinary
knowledge/power and situated knowledge/power. The former
refers to the theories and models utilized in case management
practice, while the latter refers to practitioner produced case
management practice that is local, specific, and contextual. While
acknowledging he has not operationalized these concepts, and
that he borrows from Michael Foucault's ideas and from the
literature on situated learning, he argues that while case managers
are guided and influenced by theories of social work practice,
managed care, and the politics and economics of the welfare state,
case managers also practice and produce effects that are of their
own making, unique and personal.
Utilizing what he describes as a multimethod, interdisciplinary, and critical-realistic perspective, and after describing the
setting for his study and the historical antecedents that gave rise
to the social policy of the deinstitutionalization of the mentally
ill, the remaining nine chapters present his ethnographic study of
case managers. One of the chapters provides a very useful review
of social work's historical role in the formation of community
support services in general, and specifically in High County,
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Kansas, the setting for the study. Another chapter is devoted to the
rise of the case manager practitioner who, it is argued, required
something other that the disciplinary knowledge of the clinic or
hospital social workers. Case managers, when assigned the goal
of keeping individuals out of the hospital, had to learn to monitor
meds, money and manners. Floersch makes this point by recounting the history on one social worker assigned to work within a
case management paradigm shortly after earning her MSW.
One of the most interesting chapters describes the development of the strengths case management model at the University
of Kansas School of Social Welfare and how this model found
what Floersch would call scientific legitimization. In a chapter
on the oral and written narratives of case management, Floersch
analyzes the work of case managers using a strengths perspective.
He analyzes text and oral narratives and presents a case study that
makes the point that the language of the strengths philosophy
found in the written narrative is not necessarily found in the
oral narrative. The consequences of actions taken, or not taken, to
maintain fidelity with the strengths model is explored, as are the
creative ways in which case managers navigate around the limitations of case management practice models to achieve desired
outcomes utilizing situated knowledge. Money and the impact
on the studied case manager's work, is explored by Floersch in
what he refers to as the moral economy of case management.
He examines social work's historical use of money in helping
relationships and reviews some of the questions and difficulties
encountered by case managers in his study involved in managing
and/or assisting clients manage their money.
Psychiatric medications and their role in the deinstitutionalization of individuals suffering from severe mental illness are
briefly reviewed in a chapter dedicated to psychotropic medications. Here, Floersch examines the everyday interaction among
case managers with psychiatrists, nurses, and consumers when
medications are prescribed, and explores the different categories
of the drugs used and their expected impact on targeted behaviors and emotions. Once again, Floersch compares the written and oral narratives of case managers, as well as the notes
taken from case manager's team meetings. He suggests that the
disciplinary/knowledge of medications utilized in institutions,
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is not sufficient for those needing medications and require the
situated/knowledge of the case manager as the key figure in medication monitoring. This, Floersch suggests, compromises some
of psychiatry's authority over medical matters. In his concluding
chapter, while not asking for the return of the fifty-minute hour,
Floersch, seems to call for the return of ego psychology or of
"clinical" case management as a means of bringing "a theory of
the self back into management work." He does not, however,
articulate how a case manager's psychodynamic understanding will translate into well medicated, and well mannered, consumers, who spend their money wisely. His work does collect a
formidable amount of actual experiences obtained during the provision of strengths case management services. Funneled through
the strainer of the ethnographer, that experience results in a clear,
well documented and researched book that adds significantly
to our understanding of the daily realities faced by those who
provide services to the mentally ill. It raises many points worthy
of further inquiry.
Rafael Herrera
University of California, Berkeley
Howard Jacob Karger, James Midgley and C. Brene Brown (Eds.),
ControversialIssues in Social Policy. Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
2003. $ 24.67 papercover.
Social policy is one of the core areas of social work education.
Controversies surrounding social policies come up in classroom
discussions, professional meetings, in public discussion, as well
as in the media. A critical understanding of these debates should
help strengthen the profession as well as should be used as an
effective teaching tool. By putting together a selection of 18 debates, argued for and against by reputed scholars in the field,
Professors Karger and Midgley, and Ms. Brown have made a
valuable contribution to the social work profession.
The book is divided into four parts. Part I includes three
debates on general issues in social welfare policy In debate one,
James Midgley and Howard J. Karger address whether the American Welfare state is compatible with the free market economy.
While James Midgley believes it is, Karger essentially opposes
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the position. In the second debate, Jon Meyer and Stephen Erich
argue on the issue: "Should the federal government fund faithbased social service organizations?" Meyer believes it should,
while Erich asserts that it should not. In debate 3, David Stoesz
argues for the privatization of social services, whereas Ira C. Colby
argues persuasively against their privatization.
Part II of the book examines issues of poverty and inequality
and contains nine debates. In debate 4, Marion Wagner and Rebecca Van Voorhis argue in favor of the legislation for protecting
the rights of gay and lesbians, while John F. Longres finds special
legislations to be unnecessary. Debate 5 pertains to whether or not
governmental policies are solving the problems of homelessness.
Larry W. Kreuger, John Q. Hodges, and Debi L. Word argue that
they do, whereas John J. Stretch finds homelessness a prevalent
feature in the "midst of plenty" in America. Debate 6 focuses on
whether welfare-to-work programs have had any significant effect in reducing poverty. Sandra K. Danziger believes that it does,
but Eileen Trzcinski and Deborah Satyanathan doubt that welfareto-work programs have decreased poverty. Debate 7 addresses
the issue of whether an asset-based welfare policy really helps
the poor. Michael Sherraden, the originator of the idea of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), argues that the assets have
substantial positive effects on the well-being and development of
poverty-stricken households. Contrarily, James Midgley argues
that IDAs, with all their noted advantages, will not really help the
poor. In debate 8, Ann R. Alvarez argues that affirmative action
policies have really increased equality in the labor market, but
Sally C. Pipes maintains that they do the exact opposite. Debate
9 pertains to the issue of whether privatizing social security is
good for women or not. William W. Beach argues that every type
of worker and family would benefit if they could place their
current Social Security tax dollars in private investment funds.
Contrarily, Patricia Ireland argues in favor of the protection of the
federal Social Security system for women. Debate 10 addresses
whether or not the United States needs a national healthcare
policy. Dawn McCarty and J. Rick Altemose offer convincing
reasons in favor of it, whereas Robert E. Moffit is concerned that
it may curtail freedom of choice for American citizens. Debate
11 revolves around the issue "who really has benefited from the
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)" and "whether or not the
ADA is working." Howard J. Karger argues that on some levels
the ADA is working very well, whereas John C. Bricout doubts
its overall efficacy and calls for strengthening the Act's resources
and purpose. Debate 12 focuses on the issue: "Has the War on
Drugs been Effective?" The Office of the National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) maintains that both national and international
strategies of the government have effectively lowered the rates
of drug use. Susan P. Robbins, however, refutes the position and
asks for a rethinking of the national drug policy.
Part III includes four debates on social service policy and its
delivery issues. Debate 13 pertains to outpatient mental health
commitments for clients. E. Fuller Torrey and Mary Zdanowicz
argue for their necessity and benefits, whereas Kia J. Bently and
Melissa F Taylor believe that the existing system is totally inadequate and alternative delivery models should be sought. Debate
14 focuses on managed care. Richard L. Smith and Kristin Steward
believe that managed care has essentially benefited consumers
by improving the quality of medical care and making it affordable. Contrarily, Heather Kanenburg believes that the current
system is quite expensive and fails to offer quality services to
all consumers. Debate 15 relates to transracial adoption issues.
Elizabeth Bartholet argues convincingly in its favor. She believes
that transracial adoption offers a special kind of diversity which
should be embraced as well as celebrated. Leslie D. Hollingsworth
opposes transracial adoption on the ground that it may separate
children from their cultural group and could deprive them of the
best assistance and protection. Debate 16 focuses on adoption by
gays and lesbians. Stephen Erich argues that gays and lesbians
should be accorded the same opportunities for adoption as that
of heterosexuals. Howard J. Karger urges caution in pursuing
gay and lesbian adoptions because of possible negative impact
on children's welfare.
Part IV of the book includes two debates on social work
education and professional policy issues. In debate 17, John T.
Pardeck and Roland Meinert argue on: Should abortion rights be
an accepted social work value? John T. Pardeck argues in favor of
it. Roland Meinert maintains that it cannot be accepted as a social
work value. The last debate in the book touches on the issue:
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whether faith-based social work programs should be required
to comply with nondiscrimination standards if they violate the
beliefs of those institutions? The debate's context refers to some
alleged practices of faith-based schools that may not tolerate gay
and lesbian lifestyles. Karen E. Gerdes and Elizabeth A. Segal
identify some legal difficulties in imposing any standard regarding sexual orientation but argue that every program should teach
and model nondiscrimination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. Lawrence E. Ressler disagrees and maintains that the CSWE standard on nondiscrimination is legally
and ethically flawed and should not be applied to all institutions
equally.
A valuable feature of this book is the "Editor's Note" at the
beginning of each debate, which serves as a thumbnail sketch introducing each selection. ControversialIssues in SocialPolicy will no
doubt be very useful as a text in both undergraduate and graduate
social work policy classes. While as a collection of contemporary
social policy debates it is quite extensive, by no means should the
book be treated as exhaustive. Its additional strength lies in its
style of presentation. The presentation of topics as controversies,
as the authors argue, "is the essence of intellectual discourse"
and I believe that we should make the best and most effective use
of this critical discourse in our educational process as well as in
professional forums.
Mizanur R. Miah
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Gita Sen, Asha George and Piroska Osltin (Eds.) Engendering
InternationalHealth: The Challenge of Equity. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2002 $24.95 papercover.
For at least the last twenty years, health theorists have employed social epidemiology to better understand the distribution
of health and illness among various populations. Most of the
research in this area has concentrated on three main factors, races,
sex and income, a set of variables that have sometimes been
called the 'Holy Trinity' of social epidemiology. Data about these
variables are readily available, and each has been shown to have
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a significant impact on health status. The editors of Engendering
International Health: The Challenge of Equity, and the numerous
authors who contributed to the book argue that to more fully
comprehend the distribution of health and illness, one needs to
include not only sex, but also gender in one's analysis. They
posit that these two variables, biologically determined sex, and
socially defined gender, have significant impact on health status,
especially through social roles that delimit how women and men
behave, work, and reproduce.
The book begins with an excellent introduction to the themes
of the text. The editors of the text lay the groundwork in this
chapter for the rest of the book. Sex and gender are clearly differentiated, and the various pitfalls and difficulties of separating
their unique impacts on health are discussed fully. They provide a
clear explanation of why and how gender has been largely overlooked in social epidemiological studies of health status. They
also examine the importance of the intersections among race,
age, income status (in particular poverty) and gender. This single
chapter provides an essential framework for including gender
in health study. The remainder of the book is divided into two
sections: key health area, and health research and policy. The
health areas included are communicable diseases; work and its
effects on health; reproductive health; violence against women;
mental health; hip fracture; and, health and the environment. The
research and policy section includes two chapters on gender, race
and class--one examining these issues in the United States and
the other in India. The remaining chapters in this section are on
policy environments, health status measures and health sector
reform.
Each of the key health area chapters follows the same format.
They begin with a description of the issue, its distribution in
various populations, a gender analysis, and end with discussions
of research and policy needs to further address the areas. The
policy chapters do not follow a specific format, although each
describes its subject and then includes a careful gender analysis
related to its specific focus.
This is a strong book with few, but at least one notable weaknesses. The content is meaningful and the focus on international
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health provides opportunities to compare developed and developing nations with regard to both their population health
status and the different gender roles and its impact. Although
the primary focus is on women's health, the impact of gender
roles on men's health is not overlooked. What is omitted is an
analysis of the impact of sexual orientation/identity on health.
This is surprising given that the effects on health of a person's
sexual orientation/identity are equally as socially grounded as
are the effects of gender, and in some person's definitions sexual
orientation is part of gender identity.
The policy section of the text is not as strong as are the health
area chapters. There is some considerable redundancy in the
content, especially with regard to discussion of measures. The
chapter on measures is clear and complete, and the inclusion of
further analysis of those measures in other chapters is not needed.
The final chapter focuses on health sector policy reform, but is
located fully in developing countries. Important as this is, those
of us searching for health sector reform in the United States may
find ourselves frustrated by the lack of discussion of this most
pressing issue.
Except in a course on women's health, this book may be
difficult to use as a text. In addition to the obvious limitation
of the primary focus on gender, its organization of covering both
health areas in a theoretical perspective, followed by policy issues
may make it difficult to locate in a single class. I may use some of
this text in the course that I teach on the behavioral, psychosocial
and environmental aspects on health and illness. I would, however, probably not use the entire text. The introductory chapter
provides the necessary framework for expanding the discussion
of social epidemiology to include gender (and in my teaching,
to include sexual orientation, as well). I would suggest that students read health area chapters that inform research for their for
the various class assignments, however, I would be somewhat
reluctant to use the policy segments of the text-mostly because
they do not fit with the course. In contrast, I might want to assign
at least a few of the chapters for reading in my health policy
class, especially the ones related to measurement and policy environments. Regardless of whether it is used as a primary text, a
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secondary one, or to provide background for preparing classes,
as a university professor, I find this a valuable book and suggest
that others teaching health courses will find it so.
Deborah Schild Wilkinson
University of Michigan
Van Wormer, Katherine and Davis, Diane Rae, Addiction Treatment
A Strength's Perspective, Pacific Grove, CA: Thomson Brooks
Cole, 2003. $ 51.92 papercover.
In this recently published work, Katherine van Wormer, Professor of Social Work, University of Northern Iowa and Diane Rae
Davis, Associate Professor of Social Work, Eastern Washington
University offer their readers an exhaustive and comprehensive
Cook's tour of the why's, wherefores and whereby's of addiction
treatment from a strengths (including but not limited to social
work) perspective. The book is a must read for social workers and
other allied health and substance abuse treatment professionals
and provides refreshing and insightful vignettes and anecdotes
from both authors' professional and personal lives. It is full of
history and facts, and the authors take the bio-psycho-social ecological framework very seriously in their effort to situate current
addiction treatment in its appropriate context.
The book is divided into four parts: Part I offers an Introduction which encompasses chapters on the nature of addiction,
historical perspectives and strength's based helping strategies
while Part II, on the biology of addiction, consists of two chapters;
these deal respectively with substance misuse, dependence and
the body and interventions related to the biological nature of
substance abuse among Native Americans. Part III addresses the
psychology of addiction with chapters on addiction across the
lifespan, eating disorders, gambling, shopping and other behavioral addictions and substance use with a coexisting disorder
or disability. Part IV provides an overview of the social aspects
of addiction, including chapters on family risks and resiliencies,
racial, ethnic and cultural issues, gender and sexual orientation
differences, mutual help groups, and public policy.
In short, the book is remarkably wide ranging and comprehensive and if there are any downsides it may be that, for some
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readers, the book offers too much detail on too wide a spectrum
of issues. This reader, however, came away with a sense that the
book makes a major contribution to substance abuse treatment
generally and in particular to the (much needed) field of social
work practice in the field of addictions. This is an area of social
work practice, research and policy that many believe has been
woefully ignored by mainstream social work. Indeed, given that
NO area of contemporary social work practice can ignore substance abuse in its many permutations, it is surprising that such
a book has not appeared sooner. But, the fact of the matter is
that it has not, and Professors van Wormer and Davis are to be
congratulated on their effort which represents a milestone in this
reader's opinion.
The authors set the tone for the book in their very first sentence
by informing their readers:
"On the surface, our application of the strengths perspective to the
field of addiction treatment marks a dramatic departure from the
past. Our notion of reinforcing strengths in a self-directed program
of harm reduction is seemingly a more extreme departure still. And
yet the tone of the writing is intended to be conciliatory rather
than adversarial; the focus is "building upon" rather than "tearing
down". (p. 1)
To their credit, van Wormer and Davis take the proverbial bull by
the horns and come out of the closet at the onset with their explicit
support of a harm reduction perspective. This is refreshing and
yet their arguments are so well defended and referenced one
could not help but be persuaded by their many examples and
insightful vignettes. It is interesting to note that both women
likewise have had extensive personal and clinical experiences
with "substance abuse" and the book provides sensitive and
appropriate insights in terms of their own process and their
commitment to understanding this critically important area of
practice.
What else can one say? With respect to strengths, the book
is well researched, and comprehensive, although more attention,
not surprisingly, is given to some areas than others. This reader especially appreciated the authors' historical perspective, their clear
and sympathetic articulation of harm reduction, their inclusion
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of a section on biology (the oft forgotten part of the bio-psychosocial equation) and their inclusion of lifespan considerations, an
area seldom adequately addressed in the literature. The inclusion
of the "new" addictions, such as eating disorders, gambling,
shopping and sex are also appreciated as are their discussions
of gender, racial, ethnic and sexual orientation perspectives. With
regard to limitations, such as they are, at times the book felt a bit
too chocked full with almost too many examples and there were
chapters when it seemed as though the authors weren't sure who
the audience is-practitioners? students? policy wonks? Some
chapters had exercises for readers, while others did not so that
on occasion the reader experienced a certain (minor) confusion
as to what the intent was. But, at the end of the day, the richness
of the book must be recognized for its important contributions.
Thank you Katherine and Diane for a significant effort.
Mike Gorman
San Jose State University

Book Notes
Hobson, B. (Ed.), Making Men into Fathers:Men, Masculinities,and
the Social Policies of FatherhoodNew York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. $60.00 hardcover, $22.00 papercover.
In the last fifty years, the idea of fatherhood in the Western
World's has undergone a major transformation. This is because
the number of men entering into committed marriage-relationships has declined, as marked by the rise of rates in divorce and
cohabitation outside of marriage. The number of men who actually father children has also declined. Additionally, men who biologically father children are much more likely to become absentee
fathers, denoting not just non-custodial fatherhood, but in many
cases, a complete withdrawal from the father-child relationship.
Where fathers were once a key parenting partner, mothers have
become the provider, protector, and proctor. Further complicating
the fatherhood picture, men often times end up fathering nonbiological children when they engage with women who have
children from previous relationships.
At the same time that fatherhood has undergone profound
changes, welfare policy has experienced change. In most Western
countries, it is the state, rather than fathers who are ultimately
responsible for provision of income security when parents are
unable to fulfil this responsibility. The rise of the welfare state is
directly related to the decline of fatherhood. However, this newly
formed state-child role is manifested differently in different countries. While much academic attention has focused on children
and their mothers as the recipients of state welfare policy, fathers
have received scant attention, with the exception of child support
policy in the United States.
To what extent should the state be involved in the fatherchild relationship? How can the state positively impact this relationship? To what end should the state involve itself? These
questions are discussed in this interesting book. The book treats
fatherhood as a gendered institution, just as feminist theoreticians
have defined motherhood. From this perspective, the book examines both the politics of masculinity and the role fathers play in

234

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

social policy. It also examines their role as targets of social policy.
The various chapters discuss transnational fatherhood issues and
policies centered on the obligations and rights of fathers. The book
also provides a comparative analysis of state policies affecting
fatherhood,. It offers an interesting discussion of policies in the
United States that compel work in exchange for welfare and
thereby almost completely excluding consideration of parental
capacity to care for children. These policies are compared to social
democratic welfare approaches in Sweden and the Netherlands,
where paternal-child relationships are defined as both cash-andcare focused.
This book is a 'must-read' for social policy scholars and their
students and for policy makers who are focused on the issues of
child welfare, family issues and anti-poverty studies. It provides
important insights into social policy in Europe, North America
and other Western nations. By discussing contrasting definitions
and the historical formation of the role of fatherhood, the causation of abdication of the paternal role, and state response to
fallout caused by this abdication, it covers a large terrain. Perhaps
the only weakness is a lack of focus on other societies outside the
Western World, where fatherhood takes on different meanings
and faces different challenges. Nevertheless, this is an interesting and informative book which provides effective insights into
men, masculinity, and paternal-child relationships in the Western
societies.
Peter Moss and Pat Petrie, From Children's Services to Children's
Spaces: Public Policy, Children and Childhood. New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002. $25.95 papercover.
There has been a spate of new literature on children's rights,
childhood sociology and changing childhood conditions. Writing
in this genre, Moss and Petrie offer a critical analysis of the
political, economic, and historic factors that have produced modern notions of childhood in many English-speaking countries.
Further, they make a unique contribution by explaining just how
we've arrived at the often fragmented, insufficiently staffed, yet
highly regulated institutions that shape the lives of children today.
In addition to the usual calls for increased intergovernmental
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coordination, the authors offer up the refreshing possibility of
an alternative discourse and praxis based on political and ethical
choice.
The authors begin by illustrating the dominant discourse
about children and their relationships with parents and society
through policy analysis and comparative case study. Donning
the theoretical lenses of social constructionism and Foucauldian
interpretations of knowledge and power, the authors next provide
a critical analysis of the philosophy and practice of children's
institutions including schools. By way of contrast, the authors
provide vibrant accounts of early childhood programs in the
much-lauded Italian region of Reggio Emilia and dedicate a chapter to the case of Sweden to exemplify alternative possibilities that
might emerge in the postmodern era. Foregrounding the child as
a citizen, a member of a social group with rights, a child 'rich in
potential, strong, powerful, and competent' centered in politically
and ethically grounded 'children's spaces,' they elucidate their
own discourse based on the notion of children's spaces.
They contend that children's spaces, "the physical, social, cultural, and discursive spaces where children and adults might contest understandings, values, practices and knowledges," require
a new theory and practice of work with children. Borrowing from
continental Europe's long established theory of pedagogy, they
propose a holistic approach of social responsibility for children,
with the pedagogue as the nexus for education and social welfare
in daily practice with children. Resigned to market capitalism
and fated to a multiplicity of systems wrought by the hands of
modernism, the authors' reticence to prescribe wholesale solutions may leave some readers feeling dissatisfied. However, the
authors, attribute their intentional uncertainty to a resistance of
modernist inclinations to end with firm conclusions. On the other
hand, this resistance can also be interpreted and appreciated
as the stark realism with which concerned interventionists are
confronted. Their goal, rather, is to instigate a 'crisis of thinking'
about children's services. By freeing readers from the dominant
discourse, their intention is to create space for novel and experimental ideas. To this end, they achieve their goal. Bridging
the fields of sociology, educational studies, and social welfare,
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their ability to connect theory to practice should appeal to a
wide range of analysts and interventionists. It is hoped that those
concerned about children in the 21st century will consider the
relevance of the author's ideas for professional work and personal
practice.
Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo (Eds.), Restructuring the Welfare
State: Political Institutions and Policy Change. New York: Palgrave, 2002. $ 75.00 hardcover, $ 24.95 papercover.
There has been a good deal of discussion in the international
social policy literature about the future of the 'welfare state'.
Welfare states, it is said, have been severely damaged over the
last twenty years as a result of the political ascendancy of the
radical right and by budgetary retrenchments and privatization.
In addition, it is widely believed that the forces of globalization
are compelling governments of all political persuasions to reduce
social expenditures and re-evaluate their commitment to welfare
state ideals. This discussion has been accompanied by normative
proposals for restructuring the welfare state in ways that are
humane and that perpetuate the ideals of the welfare state's
founders.
The title of this book, and its introductory section suggests
that a rethinking of the welfare state is badly needed. Accordingly,
the reader's interests are whetted by the prospect of a substantive analysis of the ways in which welfare states can indeed be
overhauled so that they meet the needs of their citizens through
judicious and appropriate state intervention. Although the existing literature on the subject is quite extensive, there is a need for
a thorough review of the various normative proposals that have
been proposed for addressing the challenge posed by politics of
the radical right and by globalization.
Unfortunately, the book does not in fact grapple with these
issues at any length and amounts instead to an eclectic and discursive account by political scientists on diverse issues affecting social policy today. The topics covered by these contributors include
discussions of the role of political trust in the creation of welfare
states, the reasons for American exceptionalism, the contribution
of privatization and devolution in welfare state thinking, the role
of racial politics in social policy, policies for including 'foreigners'
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in welfare states and popular support for the welfare state. These
tropics are thematically linked by a theoretical commitment to historical institutional analysis which is used to frame the discussion.
Historical institutionalism differs from other dominant theories in
political and public policy such as pluralism and rational choice in
that it stresses the role of historically institutionalized practices in
the analysis of policy decisions. This is undoubtedly a worthwhile
enterprise but the reader is left with a sense of disappointment
that bigger issues such as the future of the welfare state have not
been addressed.
Nevertheless, the book does shed light on how historical
institutionalism guides social policy thinking in political science
circles today In addition, some of the contributions address topics
of current importance. The chapters on privatization, race and
immigration are particularly useful. Some of the chapters also
bring a welcome comparative perspective to the discussion, focusing on developments in Europe and the United States and
also on Japan and other countries. Although this is not a book for
undergraduates, it will be of interest to scholars concerned with
political theories and the way they affect social welfare policy.
Ian Ferguson, Michael Lavalette and Gerry Mooney, Rethinking
Welfare: A CriticalPerspective.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002. $92.00 hardcover, $27.00 papercover.
The last decade has offered fertile ground for the continuing
debate between the political Right and Left over the role and
function of the welfare state. As Neo-Liberalism has become the
dominant economic policy around the globe, welfare and welfare
state policies have been redesigned. Fiscal austerity measures
in the United Kingdom and the United States have resulted in
planned reforms aimed at minimizing welfare state functions. The
classic tension between those who advocate for an expanded state
and those who view the state as exacerbating already existing
inequalities has begun to play out on a global scale. Most of the
welfare reform efforts have been driven by a dynamism from
within the private sector, heralding consumer choice over state
control.
Scholars working from the Marxist tradition have continued
to provide critical analyses of these trends, which aim to identify
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and explain the cultural, economic and political forces of modern
capitalism. In this way, Rethinking Welfare provides researchers
and practitioners a compelling reminder of the largely structural
and material forces that shape our welfare states. The authors
respond to claims that Marxist analysis is no longer relevant or
capable of understanding the complexity of present day capitalism. They reflect on the familiar structure of this over-celebrated,
'new world order' and marshal evidence to suggest that, despite
ardent attempts by Western Democracies to celebrate difference,
empower women and minimize state authoritarianism, 21st century social welfare has not escaped the grasp of larger political
economic forces.
On a more academic note, Rethinking Welfare argues against
civil society led reform measures and theoretical paradigms that
fail to consider structural forces and class conflict. The authors
articulate a systematic critique of the new Left and its affection
for postmodernism. They argue that after years of promoting
excessive cultural relativism and what the authors dub as 'the
new essentialism', postmodern theory has undermined the gains
made by the working class and the poor. The cost of adopting
postmodernism has been an eroded social contract. By applying a structural Marxist analysis of postmodernism the authors
conclude that, in fact, postmodernism has really functioned as
Neo-Liberalism's lap dog than as an effective political force.
Rethinking Welfare provides a thoughtful and emerging resistance to the identity politics and vulgar social constructionism
that has pervaded the academic world and also taken hold in
many professional social work schools. The book's inclusion of
recent political developments on the world scene, such as the
G8 summit and the Seattle protest, will be welcomed by current
students of social policy trying to understand the impact of large
scale social movements on national policy making. However, in
some chapters the authors have drawn excessively on anecdotal
and dated research thus leaving parts of their argument on shaky
ground. Scholars looking for strong empirical support for the
book's arguments will be disappointed if not all together skeptical. Nonetheless, the book provides a convincing caveat to the
alleged success stories of free markets, structural adjustments and
globalization.
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Rhona Weinstein, Reaching Higher: The Power of Expectations in
Schooling. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. $
39.95 hardcover.
There is considerable debate about whether and how teacher
beliefs and expectancies about student ability impact attachment
to and performance in school. Weinstein posits that expectancy
effects in schooling have largely been misunderstood and, ultimately, underestimated. She describes three characteristics of
the extant research literature that potentially obscure the power
of these effects. These attributes include: a lack of an ecological lens that situates teacher and student beliefs and behaviors
within wider classroom, school, and societal contexts; a tendency
to ignore the ways in which individual differences, especially
in terms of race, class, gender and developmental stage, can
amplify or dampen these effects; and, finally, inattention to the
actual experience of and voice of children in measuring these
effects.
Weinstein's book is divided into three sections. The first section reviews the literature on educational expectancies and selffulfilling prophecies conducted from both teacher and student
perspectives within laboratory and classroom settings. She highlights the critical gaps in the literature; these gaps, most fundamentally, relate to questions of for whom and in what types
of contexts these effects occur. She then proposes an 'ecological
paradigm' relevant to conceptualizing the nature and outcomes
of ability related expectancies. The two remaining sections are
largely syntheses of Weinstein and her colleagues' research conducted over the last two decades. Using the ecological paradigm,
she investigates differentiation within and across classrooms,
within schools and across elementary, secondary and postsecondary settings. She begins by documenting, through both
quantitative and qualitative data sources, the ways in which
elementary aged children are acutely aware of not only their
own abilities, but of their teachers' perceptions of their own and
their peers' abilities as well. Rich in-depth case studies of classrooms illustrate the ways in which children learn about ability
differentials through classroom-level instructional grouping and
curricular coverage, teacher-directed motivational and reward
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systems and strategies and relational climates including teacherstudent trust.
Moving to the larger school context, Weinstein details challenges associated with implementing an intervention designed
to de-track a rigidly differentiated public high school. This is
contrasted with a 'best practices' example of a private elementary school which, by design, resists tendencies to sort students
through offering multiple opportunities for achievement across
a variety of domains. Finally, she compares university climates
which alternatively select faculty stars versus those who develop
faculty talent and potential. The thrust of the evidence presented
suggest the embeddedness of ability-related practices and beliefs
and the ways in which isomorphic processes that accentuate their
impact occur across and within educational institutions.
The contribution of this text lies in its breadth and depth.
Weinstein integrates knowledge ranging from developmental
psychology, the sociology of education and political processes
in urban school reform. In short, we see not only the potential
power of educational expectancies as they are enacted within and
across varying contexts over the life course, but, perhaps more
importantly, the book reveals the value of applying a contextualist
perspective to study the individually-based behaviors and beliefs
of both teachers and students.
Robert Wuthnow and John H. Evans, The Quiet Hand of God: Faithbased Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002. $60 hardcover, $24.95 paper cover.
The publication of The Quiet Hand of God reflects growing
interest (and concern) in the political and social role of religious
institutions. As the federal government attempts to devolve responsibility onto church-sponsored social service organizations
and as local, national, and international religious political groups
become more powerful and sophisticated in their influence, academics have tried to increase knowledge of how religious organizations and their social and political activities function and
succeed. This book parallels other work in the study of contemporary religion, regardless of the discipline, in that the focus is
empirical and not theoretical. The kind of theoretical work that
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harks back to the questions of Weber or Durkheim seems more
today the domain of comparative literature (Anidjar), continental
philosophy (Derrida, Agamben), or medieval studies (Boyarin).
This is not to negate the value of The Quiet Hand of God, which
offers an impressive, unique collection of articles on one of the
more significant forms of religious organization in the United
States today In fact, the book may serve as an important reference
and model for further research and publications on religious
practice and social and political influence.
The book brings together different methodological approaches
and disciplinary interests, producing a nuanced, complex, and ultimately fascinating portrait of mainline Protestant churches and
their adherents. The chapters range from the historical research
of Peter Thuesen into the institutional model of social activism
propagated by mainline Protestant churches to the quantitative
sociological analyses conducted by Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks
on the political participation (and suggested potential influence)
of mainline Protestants. Part I of the book concentrates on historical background and the organization of church political and social
activities, while Part II takes a more current look at involvement in
public issues. In a sense, the information and analyses provided
in Part II are more well-known to the lay reader, although the
historical research and the intricacies of the debates on issues like
homosexuality and environmentalism are not.
From one perspective, the strength of this collection lies in its
range, timeliness, and new research. From another perspective,
its weakness lies precisely in this range, which remains broad
and rather unfocused except for the common theme of mainline
Protestantism. The majority of authors are sociologists, with the
exception of a historian, political scientist, and few scholars of
religion. Rather than bring the collection together intellectually,
the common disciplinary and methodological terrain excludes
the kind of experiential insight provided by ethnography or the
conceptual framework offered by more theoretical work. Both
would have benefitted the collection, in that they would have
offered more depth and purpose to the intellectual endeavor. Perhaps theory represents the next stage for the sociology of religion,
after the notable collection of empirical research presented here.
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